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Micro and small scale entrepreneurs in developing countries face a number of challenges and 
constraints. One obvious constraint is access to finance, as most banks have regarded the poor 
as “unbankable”, due to high transaction costs and lack of collateral. This view was 
challenged by Mohammad Yunus and other microcredit pioneers. They believed it was 
possible to provide small loans to even the poorest of the poor, and still obtain high repayment 
rates. Their solution was to replace traditional collateral with joint liability loan groups, where 
group members are held jointly responsible for loans of each other. By doing so, physical 
collateral was replaced by social collateral and peer pressure. The transaction costs were then 
reduced to a minimum, as group members themselves performed the credit screening (Ghatak 
and Guinnane, 1999).  
Today around 200 million people worldwide are members of microfinance institutions. In 
2006, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded jointly to Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank 
"for their efforts to create economic and social development from below."  
All the optimism about microcredit, however, has not been accompanied by conclusive 
scientific evidence showing positive impacts. Early impact studies such as Khandker (1998) 
were optimistic, but less credible due to questionable econometric identification strategies. It 
was not until recently, that the results from the first large scale randomized field trials 
measuring the impact of access to credit were released. 
Banerjee et al. (2010) used a randomized field trial and examined the impact of access to 
microcredit in the slums of Hyderabad, India. They concluded that there was  
..no effect of access to microcredit on average monthly expenditure per capita, but 
expenditure on durable goods increased in treated areas and the number of new 
businesses increased by one third. (page 1). 
Furthermore, Karlan and Zinman (2010), measuring the impact of microcredit among 
marginal borrowers in Manila in the Philippines, similarly conclude that:  
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The canonical case for microcredit-- that access increases profits, business scale, 
and household consumption-- is not supported on average. (page 1). 
Karlan and Zinman (2010), however, found evidence that suggests access to capital may have 
positive impacts on males and high-income entrepreneurs; though these groups are normally 
not targeted by microfinance institutions.  
Other studies have pointed out that microcredit arrangements have many weaknesses. For 
instance, the poor may become trapped in spirals of increasing debts, and that they merely use 
the loans as consumption loans, without any impact on business growth and development 
(Dichter and Harper (2007) and Bateman (2010)). The concept of group loans as such has also 
been attacked. Studies have argued that bad group dynamics may destroy rather than create 
social capital; which may result in high exit rates and lower social impacts (Pagura, 2003, 
Dichter and Harper, 2007). Still, few would disagree that well functioning financial services 
for the poor is important. 
Perhaps as a result of increasingly critical views of microcredit, other constraints to 
entrepreneurial growth in developing countries have gradually received more attention. In 
addition to other financial constraints, like access to savings and insurance, lack of human 
capital may be a major constraint for business growth. For instance, without managerial skills, 
small scale entrepreneurs may lose managerial control when their businesses grow above a 
certain threshold. Without basic cost accounting skills, loans may be spent on projects with 
low returns. Other constraints to business growth, such as access to finance, regulations, 
taxes, corruption or low quality of workers, may also be more problematic if the entrepreneur 
lacks basic business knowledge and information.  
The belief in human capital interventions targeting small scale entrepreneurs is not 
uncontroversial:  
….rather than waste our time teaching them new skills, we try to make maximum 
use of their existing skills. Giving the poor access to credit allows them to 
immediately put into practice the skills they already know.  
Mohammad Yunus (1999), Banker to the Poor, page 140.  
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In fact, the only experimental study published so far on business training among poor 
entrepreneurs is not optimistic. Karlan and Valdivia (forthcoming), studying female members 
of loan groups in Peru, found only modest impact on business practices, and no significant 
effects on sales or profits. However, a few recent working papers and unpublished 
manuscripts, such as Drexler et al. (2010) and Gine and Mansuri (2011), suggest that there 
may be beneficial impacts of providing micro and small scale entrepreneurs with basic 
business skills. This leaves it an open question whether financial or human capital constraints 
are the most binding ones.   
When we look at female entrepreneurs in particular, it is far from clear what their most 
binding constraints are. A reoccurring finding both from the studies on financial and human 
capital, is that it’s much harder to raise female profits than male. For instance, in addition to 
Karlan and Valdivias (forthcoming) rather pessimistic study of business training for female 
entrepreneurs, both de Mel et al. (2009) and Fafchamps et al. (2010) found that the impact of 
business grants are lower for females than for males. These findings indicate that other 
constraints may be even more important than lack of financial or human capital for female 
entrepreneurs.  
A particular concern is that females engage in industries where the scope for utilizing 
additional financial or human capital is lower when compared to men. Often, females do 
business in saturated low productivity industries with limited growth potential, such as small 
scale restaurants, hairdressing, and other services. Men are more often involved in small scale 
manufacturing and retail industries. However, it is not obvious which sectors are more 
dynamic. Nevertheless, the gender biases often remains even when controlling for industry, 
scale of business and other background characteristics, pointing at other explanations as well. 
Females in developing countries also face a number of social and cultural barriers in their 
entrepreneurial activities. For instance Field et al. (2010) found that religion may decide how 
much impact business training has on female entrepreneurs.  
Females not only face severe constraints as entrepreneurs, they are often discriminated against 
in the labor market, thereby forcing females into self-employment out of necessity (Emran et 
al., 2007). On average, the discrimination of females may therefore lead to other types of 
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female entrepreneurs than male entrepreneurs, and we may therefore also expect different 
impacts of financial or human capital interventions. 
Furthermore, research has also shown that there exist deeper underlying differences in 
preferences between males and females, which may work together with cultural and social 
aspects, like the finding that males are more eager to compete and take risk (Croson and 
Gneezy, 2009).  
Such differences in preferences could, for instance, mean that males are more eager than 
females to invest loans in risky and high yielding projects, and that males are more eager to 
implement new business ideas and knowledge from business training. 
My thesis adds to our understanding of constraints to entrepreneurship by investigating the 
role of human and financial capital for business growth by using data from a field experiment 
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The thesis also improves our knowledge of the gender biases 
outlined above - particularly by investigating the role of gender and gender composition on 
group dynamics. Bellow follows short summaries of each chapter. 
1. Human and financial capital for micro-enterprise development: Evidence from a field 
and lab experiment 
The first chapter is co-authored with Kjetil Bjorvatn and Bertil Tungodden. We look at which 
is the most the binding constraint for microenterprise development; human or financial 
capital?  
To answer this question, we present the first field experiment that jointly investigates these 
two constraints, by giving poor entrepreneurs, all members of the microfinance institution 
(MFI) PRIDE Tanzania, treatments in the form of either business training or a business grant, 
or both. To compare welfare effects, the size of the business grant was set approximately 
equal to the marginal cost of providing training. To measure treatment effects, we use a novel 
combination of survey data and data from a lab experiment, and investigate the impacts of our 
treatments on business results, business practices, business skills and mind-set. Males and 
females have increased their knowledge identically, but otherwise the training has had 
stronger effects with most parameters, for male entrepreneurs. This may indicate that there are 
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other barriers than business knowledge that are more severe for females. In addition, we find 
no effect of the business grant for either males or females.   
The results suggest that human capital may be the more binding constraint for poor 
microentrepreneurs, but also point to the need for more comprehensive measures to promote 
development among female entrepreneurs.   
2. Business training in Tanzania: From research driven experiment to local implementation 
In this chapter, coauthored with Kjetil Bjorvatn, Kartika Sari Juniwaty and Bertil Tungodden, 
we raise an important, but often forgotten issue in field experiments; namely to which extent 
it is possible to scale up the evaluated intervention.  
Field experiments are typically implemented under strict supervision of the research group in 
charge of the study. However, when scaling up the intervention, the implementation relies on 
the supervision of the local organization. But it is not obvious that successful implementation 
in the field trial can be replicated locally. The present study explicitly addresses this challenge 
by analyzing the local version of the business training program presented in chapter one. 
We look at two questions that are important for PRIDE: (1) can they successfully implement 
business training on their own, and (2) do they want to? First, to evaluate whether PRIDE is 
able to provide training, we compare the attendance at the training sessions offered by the 
professional trainers with the sessions offered by the credit officers from PRIDE, with a high 
attendance indicating high quality.  
Second, if business training leads to massive exit from the institution, as trained clients for 
instance qualify for less expensive loans in ordinary banks, the institution may not benefit 
from offering such a program. We therefore compare exit rates among trained and non-trained 
clients.  
We find that business training was successfully implemented in one of two branches, and we 
conclude that the institutional environment is crucial for the implementation of such training 
programs.  Furthermore, we do not find any differences in exit rates between trained and 
control clients. In addition, we find that it should be possible to charge a participation fee that 
covers most of the cost of such a program. We therefore conclude that it should be in the 
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interest of PRIDE to scale up the training program, both to preserve financial sustainability 
and improve social impact.  
3. Measuring spillover effects from business training: Evidence from a field experiment 
among microentrepreneurs 
An often neglected issue in field experiments is the issue of spillover effects from treated to 
non-treated subjects. If such effects are important, a simple comparison between treatment 
and control may either over- or underestimate treatment impacts. 
In this chapter, I measure spillover effects from trained clients to their non-trained loan group 
fellows. To identify such effects, I compare clients with trained group members with clients 
with non-trained group members. 
I find evidence of spillover effects for male entrepreneurs on several loan group related 
outcomes. These include increased loan balances, more loan usage on investments, and 
increased satisfaction with PRIDE. However, I do not find any evidence of increased 
knowledge, or any changes of business practices, among male group members of trained 
clients. 
On average, there are no spillover effects among females. But, for one particular group of 
females, I find strong effects on business knowledge; namely females in loan groups with 
only females. This result may indicate that the learning environment in gender mixed groups 
is inferior to female-only groups.  
4. Group composition and group dynamics: Evidence from a lab experiment with 
microfinance clients 
Chapter one reveals severe gender differences in the impact of business training, and chapter 
three shows that knowledge spillovers may depend on the gender composition in the loan 
group. This chapter, coauthored with Kartika Sari Juniwaty and Linda Helgesson Sekei, use a 
lab experiment to study how gender composition affect group dynamics.  
We focus on three dimensions of group dynamics; i) group’s ability to solve problems in 
practice, ii) group’s willingness to accept risk, and iii) group’s behavior in a public good 
problem involving the possibility of free-riding.  
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We find that gender composition is of fundamental importance in understanding group 
dynamics. Female groups outperform male and mixed groups in problem solving, even 
though males at the individual level outperform females. Similarly, we find that female 
groups take more risk than male and mixed groups. Finally, we do not find any differences 
between female, male and mixed groups in the public good game.  
Our findings are very consistent with the findings in chapter three; that there may only be 
knowledge spillovers in female loan groups. These findings indicate that females are more 
able to cooperate in groups than males, and that males disturb the dynamics of female groups.  
Furthermore, the results may also shed light on why microfinance is dominated by females, as 
the loan group may be a rare arena where females can cooperate on their own without male 
interference. 
Finally, it may also shed light on why many studies similar to that in chapter one, fail to find 
any impact on females. Most social contexts involves males in one or another way, which 
may constrain females from utilizing their skills and capacity. 
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Abstract 
Which is the most binding constraint to microenterprise development, human capital or 
financial capital? To answer this question, we present the first field experiment that jointly 
investigates these two constraints for poor microentrepreneurs, by introducing separate 
treatments of business training and a business grant. We combine survey data and data from 
a lab experiment to investigate treatment effects on business results, business practices, 
business skills and mind-set. Our study demonstrates a strong effect of business training on 
male entrepreneurs, while the effect on female entrepreneurs is much more muted. There is no 
effect of the business grant for either males or females. The results suggest that human capital 
may be the more important constraint for poor microentrepreneurs, but also point to the need 
for more comprehensive measures to promote development among female entrepreneurs.   
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1. Introduction 
Microentrepreneurs in developing countries face a number of constraints on business growth. 
Lack of access to capital has received a lot of attention amongst donors and practitioners, as 
witnessed by the rise of the microfinance movement. But while there is a lot of optimism 
about the power of finance for small scale business development, research demonstrates that 
success cannot be taken for granted (Karlan and Morduch, 2009). Field experiments on the 
impact of financial capital, in the form of business grants (de Mel et al., 2008) and 
microfinance (Banerjee et al., 2009), demonstrate that the growth effect of finance may 
critically depend on dimensions such as the entrepreneur’s educational background, business 
skills, and mind-set.  
Moreover, the literature challenges the popular notion that microfinance is a particularly 
powerful tool for business growth when given to female entrepreneurs. de Mel et al. (2009a) 
find on average no effects of business grants given to female entrepreneurs, and conclude that: 
“The experience with the grants does indicate that permanently raising the income of women 
running small microenterprises may be more difficult than raising the income of men in a 
similar position (p. 24).”  
Partly as a result of the mixed evidence on the importance of financial capital, focus is 
shifting toward other constraints on microenterprise development, and in particular lack of 
human capital. Intuitively, returns to microfinance for entrepreneurs with low human capital, 
particularly in the form of weak business skills, can be expected to be modest. However, the 
message from the only published field experiment on business training to microfinance clients 
is not very optimistic (Karlan and Valdivia, forthcoming). While training is shown to have 
some impact on business practices, they find no robust effects on business profits and sales.1 
The present study is, to our knowledge, the first field experiment that jointly investigates the 
financial and human capital constraints for poor microentrepreneurs. In collaboration with the 
largest microfinance institution in Tanzania, Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development 
Enterprise (PRIDE), we introduced separate treatments offering business training and a 
                                                            
1 Bruhn et al. (2010) focus on the importance of managerial capital, and also cite unpublished work on different 
forms of business training showing more positive results than reported in Karlan and Valdivia (2010). Drexler et 
al. (2010) find positive effects of a simple “rule-of-thumb” training program on business practices, but relatively 
weak effects on business outcomes. 
23 
 
business grant of similar size to the cost of training, which allows us to investigate the relative 
importance of the human and financial capital constraints for microenterprise development.  
To study in more detail the mechanisms of change initiated by the different treatments, we 
also use the novel hybrid approach of combining the field experiment with a lab experiment 
where individuals make incentivized choices (Jakiela et al., 2010).2 This design allows us to 
study the causal impact of the training on the microentrepreneurs’ business knowledge (book 
keeping, marketing, investment analysis) and mind-set (willingness to compete, confidence, 
risk- and time preferences). It also provides us with a better understanding of how male and 
female entrepreneurs differ in their business knowledge and mind-set, which may shed some 
light on why policy interventions targeting microentrepreneurs in developing countries may 
have less impact on the business performance of female entrepreneurs. 
The present paper also adds to the literature on microfinance and entrepreneurship by 
focusing on Africa. Most research until now has addressed the situation in either Asia or Latin 
America, reflecting the longer history and larger outreach of microfinance in these regions. 
However, microfinance is on the rise in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it is clearly of first order 
importance to understand how the various initiatives may contribute to growth and poverty 
alleviation in the poorest region of the world.3  
The paper offers three main findings. First, we show that the human capital intervention 
causes a substantial increase in the profits of male entrepreneurs, while the effect on female 
entrepreneurs is much more muted. The financial capital intervention has no impact on 
business performance. This provides evidence of the human capital constraint being of 
fundamental importance for microenterprise development and more binding than the financial 
capital constraint. Second, we show that the human capital intervention works through 
increased sales among male entrepreneurs, whereas we do not see any changes in profit 
margins. This suggests that the impact of training goes through an expansion effect, and we 
demonstrate that trained males to a greater extent than trained females have implemented new 
business practices conducive to business growth. Third, we show that the human capital 
                                                            
2 Deaton (2010) underscores the importance of investigating mechanisms in randomized controlled trials, and 
points to the merger between behavioral economics and development economics as a promising line of research. 
See also Falk and Heckman (2009). 
3 See for instance the report “Sub-Saharan Africa 2009: Microfinance analysis and benchmarking report,” by the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), available at 
www.themix.org. 
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intervention has improved the business knowledge of both female and male entrepreneurs, 
and has also caused a change in their mind-set. On important dimensions, such as attitude to 
risk and self-confidence, the training has contributed to closing the gender gap, but the lab 
experiment reveals that even among the trained entrepreneurs, females are less willing to 
compete than males. We argue that this difference in mind-set, together with all the external 
constraints facing female entrepreneurs, may explain why a human capital intervention works 
very differently for male and female entrepreneurs.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the 
context in which the interventions were carried out, based on baseline data on the 
entrepreneurs and their businesses. Section 3 describes the intervention and provides data on 
the treatment-control balance. Section 4 discusses data and estimation methods, and Section 5 
reports treatment effects on the performance of the businesses. Section 6 and Section 7 
discuss mechanisms that may explain these treatment effects. Section 8 concludes.  
2. The context: Findings from baseline 
The participants in the present study were all members of PRIDE, the largest microfinance 
institution in Tanzania, at the time of the baseline survey.4 PRIDE has 70 000 clients, the 
majority of whom are females, in 48 branches all over the country. They employ a modified 
Grameen Bank model, where group members are jointly responsible for each other’s loans. 
To become a member of PRIDE, one must have an operating business and join a self-selected 
solidarity group of five members (called an enterprise group). We conducted our study in two 
branches of PRIDE in Dar es Salaam, namely Magomeni and Buguruni. These branches are 
located in different parts of the city and each of them has approximately 7500 clients.  
Table 1 provides a description of the entrepreneurs in our sample, based on the baseline data 
collected in June-July 2008. The average entrepreneur is about 38 years old and has 
completed eight years of schooling.  They run small businesses, typically hiring only one 
worker, and only around 20% of the businesses are registered by the government. The 
majority of the entrepreneurs keep some kind of business records. Commerce is the most 
common sector, involving around 70% of the entrepreneurs, while 38%of the entrepreneurs 
                                                            
4 For further details on the organization, see www.pride-tz.org.  
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have a business in the service sector, and 15% in the manufacturing sector.5 Kiosks and small 
market stalls are typical businesses in commerce, small restaurants and repair shops are 
common in services, whereas furniture and brick making are examples of manufacturing 
businesses in the sample. There is a balance between males and females in commerce, while 
female entrepreneurs dominate in services and males in manufacturing.  
Average monthly profits in 2008 were 568 497 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS), equivalent to 
approximately 480 USD, and average sales were 2 489 228 TZS. We observe that male 
entrepreneurs operate on a larger scale than females, with around 50% higher sales, 20% 
higher profits, and 35% higher investments. The female entrepreneurs, on the other hand, 
have a somewhat higher profit margin, 24.6% versus 20.4%. There are no significant gender 
differences in the business practices with respect to record keeping and marketing, but the 
male entrepreneurs have a higher score on a baseline test of business skills. Females, on the 
other hand, have somewhat more education, measured as number of completed years of 
schooling. 
3. The interventions and randomization procedure 
3.1 The interventions 
The interventions were designed as randomized field experiments, and took place during 2008 
and 2009. Business training was offered on a weekly basis from August 2008 to January 
2009, and the business grant was given to a subset of the participants, trained and untrained, 
in March 2009.   
The business training course consisted of 21 sessions, each lasting 45 minutes, starting 
directly after the clients’ weekly loan meetings at the PRIDE premises. The course was 
developed by the Entrepreneurship Centre at the University of Dar Es Salaam (UDEC) and 
tailored to microentrepreneurs, with the aim of unleashing entrepreneurship and creating 
business growth. The course was piloted extensively in the spring of 2008, with trial sessions 
offered to microcredit clients in a PRIDE branch in Dar es Salaam not part of our study, to 
credit officers in PRIDE working on a daily basis with the entrepreneurs, and to local 
researchers working on microenterprise development in Tanzania. The final training program 
                                                            
5 Many entrepreneurs have more than one business, and may hence be involved in more than one sector. 
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covered a range of topics particularly relevant for microentrepreneurs in Tanzania, including 
“Entrepreneurship and Entrepreneurial character”, “Improving customer service”, “Managing 
people in your business” and “Marketing strategies”. A full list of topics is given in Appendix 
B. The lectures, which were given by UDEC staff in Kiswahili, were practically oriented, and 
topics were often illustrated by the use of case studies and role play. Frequently, the clients 
were given homework to prepare for the next class. There was neither a course fee nor any 
seating allowances. 
A graduation ceremony was held at the end of January 2009, where clients who had attended 
ten or more sessions were awarded a diploma. The diploma and the threshold were announced 
at an early stage in order to motivate clients to attend the sessions. The attendance was 
monitored closely by teachers and credit officers, and absent clients were contacted either at 
the branch or by phone. The average attendance rate at a session was 70%, while 83% of the 
clients qualified for a diploma, see also Figure 1A in Appendix A. Entry control was strictly 
enforced, and only those assigned to training were allowed to enter the classroom. 
The business grant was offered to a subsample of the participants, both trained and non-
trained, six weeks after the graduation ceremony. It was approximately equal to the average 
cost per participant of providing the business training, 100 000 TZS. To most entrepreneurs 
this is a substantial grant, corresponding to around 50% of average investments in the 
businesses in 2008 (see Table 1). The grant was given in cash and framed to improve the 
entrepreneur’s business. The recipients of the grant were asked to keep records of how they 
spent the money. A copy of the letter accompanying the business grant is provided in 
Appendix B.  
3.2 Selection and randomization procedure 
In the randomization procedure, we exploit the fact that loan groups are randomly assigned to 
loan meeting days and hours according to availability of time slots at the branches, and 
therefore are independent of the characteristics of the entrepreneurs. For the business course, 
we randomly chose Tuesday (Magomeni) and Thursday (Buguruni) for training, and Monday 
(Magomeni) and Wednesday (Buguruni) for non-training. In this way, no training took place 
on days when members of the non-training group attended their weekly loan meeting.  
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We only considered clients with PRIDE loans between 500 000 TZS and 1 000 000 TZS, 
which at the time of the baseline represented the second and third steps on the loan-ladder in 
the group lending program. This was motivated by the fact that there are very high dropout 
rates among clients with smaller loans, and also that we wanted to avoid a too heterogeneous 
target group for the lectures. For logistical reasons, we also only considered loan groups with 
loan meetings at 09:00, 10:00, 12:00 and 13:00. Applying this eligibility rule, 565 clients 
were eligible for training (the ‘training group’), and 576 clients were eligible for non-training 
(the ‘non-training group’). Out of the 1164 eligible clients, we interviewed 644 clients on the 
basis of accessibility, balanced between the training group (319) and the non-training group 
(325). Clients were interviewed at their business location. The objective of the baseline survey 
was framed as “to identify strategies to improve the functioning of microcredit institutions in 
Tanzania”. Hence, clients were not informed about the prospective business training course.  
After the business training was completed in January 2009, we randomly selected a subset of 
252 clients to receive a business grant of 100 000 TZS, balanced between the training group 
(126) and the non-training group (126). All clients in our sample with loan-group meetings at 
12:00 as well as those meeting at 09:00 on Wednesdays and Thursdays were offered a 
business grant.6  
Table 2 shows that most baseline characteristics of the entrepreneur are not significantly 
correlated with the treatment status, indicating that our selection procedures created balanced 
treatment groups.   
 
                                                            
6 An additional ten males were offered a grant in order to improve the gender balance. The males were randomly 
selected among the members in our sample with loan meeting later than 09:00 on Wednesdays and Thursdays. 
The grant was collected by 247 out of the 252 entrepreneurs. We were not able to track down and interview the 
five entrepreneurs who did not collect the business grant in our follow-up survey in 2009. 
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4. Data and estimation methods  
4.1 Data issue 
Data stem from the baseline survey conducted in June - July 2008, a post-intervention follow-
up survey conducted in June - August 2009, and a lab experiment conducted in March 2009, 
after the training, but before the business grant was offered. In the follow-up survey, we 
reached 530 of the 644 clients; of these, 526 were still actively doing business.7 A randomly 
selected subset of the sample, 126 entrepreneurs from the training group and 126 
entrepreneurs from the non-training group, were invited to take part in the lab experiment; of 
these, 211 attended the lab, 107 from the training group and 104 from the non-training group.8  
In line with previous studies in this field (de Mel et al., 2008, 2009a; Karlan and Valdivia, 
forthcoming), the main source of information in the follow-up survey is self-reported data 
from the entrepreneurs. This raises the concern that respondents may exaggerate key outcome 
variables such as profits in order to impress the enumerator, or underreport true business 
results out of fear that the information will be spread to tax authorities. In order to deal with 
these issues, we asked about average monthly profits in two different ways, stated and 
calculated. The former is based on the entrepreneur’s own estimate of operating profits on a 
normal business day. The latter is based on a more interactive process between the enumerator 
and the entrepreneur, to the extent possible by making use of business records, where the 
operating profits are calculated by subtracting the different categories of operating costs from 
income.  
Figure 1 provides a histogram of the difference between monthly stated and calculated profits 
in our sample. We observe that the two measures of profits closely overlap, the average 
difference corresponding to only 3.9% of stated profit (25 410 TZS). However, as shown in 
Table 3, column (1), in the sample of 526 clients who were active entrepreneurs at the time of 
the follow-up survey, there is a statistically significant positive relation between training 
status and the difference between stated and calculated profits for male entrepreneurs. This 
may reflect a tendency of exaggerating profits among trained male entrepreneurs, or of 
                                                            
7 In Appendix A, Table A1, we report the upper and lower bounds for our main estimates, taking into account the 
level of attrition in the sample.  
8 The reported reasons for not attending the lab were that clients had exited PRIDE, illness, travelling, attending 
a funeral, and taking care of pressing family matters. Table A2 in Appendix A shows that we also had a balanced 
sample of clients in the lab. The detailed instructions for the lab experiment are provided in Appendix B. 
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underreporting profits among non-trained male entrepreneurs. There is no statistically 
significant effect for female entrepreneurs or of the business grant.  
In order to deal with this potential bias in our analysis, we trim the sample by removing 
entrepreneurs with the largest discrepancy between stated and calculated profit. As shown in 
Table 3, column (3), if we remove 6% of the sample (32 entrepreneurs), there is no 
statistically significant relationship between training treatment status and the discrepancy 
between stated and calculated profits. The remainder of our discussion of the follow-up 
survey is based on this trimmed sample of 494 entrepreneurs, but our main results are not 
sensitive to this trimming.9 As we show in Appendix A, Tables A5-A7, we find similar effects 
for the whole sample of 526 clients and for samples based on other trimming rules.  
We focus on stated profits in the following discussion, since this is in line with what has been 
done in the related literature. In particular, de Mel et al. (2009b) argue that self-reported 
profits give a more precise estimate of true profits than calculated profits. In Appendix A, 
Tables A8-A9, however, we show that our main results are robust to using calculated profits, 
or to considering stated profits and calculated profits as defining a range for the true profits. 
4.2 Intention to treat estimator 
We estimate the basic intention to treat estimators (ITT) for each individual outcome iY . 
Gender turns out to be a crucial dimension in our analysis, and we therefore include the 
interaction term to capture differences in the impact of training between males and females. 
We have also studied possible interaction effects between gender and the business grant and 
between training and the business grant, but do not find any statistically significant patterns. 
Thus, in the following, we focus on estimations of the following specification: 
1 2 3 4 5 1 6( * )i i i i i i i i iY Training Grant Female Training Female Y X               . 
Training and Grant are dummy variables taking the value one if client i has been offered 
training and business grant, respectively. Female is a dummy taking the value one if the client 
is female; the interaction term between training and female is given by Training*Female;  Yi-1 
                                                            
9 In Appendix A, Table A3 reports the baseline data for the trimmed sample, and Table A4 shows that we also 
have balanced treatment groups in this case.    
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is the lagged dependent variable (measured in the baseline survey); Xi is a vector of the 
covariates, including baseline characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their businesses. 
The ITT-estimators of the training are thus given by 1  for male entrepreneurs and )( 41    
for female entrepreneurs (in the tables we refer to the latter as Sum Female), 2  is the ITT-
estimator of the effect of a business grant, and 4  captures the degree to which the impact of 
the training is different for males and females.  
For the business outcome regressions, we report the estimated treatment effect both with and 
without the vector of covariates, Xi. Given that Training and Grant are uncorrelated with 
unobserved explanatory factors, there is no need to include a covariate matrix to get unbiased 
ITT estimates, but including control variables makes the estimation more precise.10  
4.3 Average treatment effect on the treated  
The intention to treat estimator does not take into account the fact that not all participants 
attended the lectures. In particular, 17% of the clients did not qualify to receive a diploma at 
the end of the course, most of whom only attended a few lectures. It is therefore interesting 
also to consider the impact on the clients who actually completed the course, and we do so by 
reporting the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) for the main outcome variables. 
We instrument whether a client completed the course (and received a diploma) by his or her 
treatment status.11 To estimate ATET, there must only be one-sided non-compliance (Bloom, 
1984), which in our case is satisfied since no one from the control group participated in the 
training. In addition, the instrument should only operate through one single known causal 
channel (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), which means that spillover effects from compliers to 
non-compliers in the training group or to clients in the non-training group should be ruled out. 
In the follow-up study, only 3% of the clients responded that they knew a client that attended 
a loan meeting in their branch on the other day that was included in this study, which means 
that we can rule out spillover effects from compliers to the non-training group. Moreover, 
Berge (2011) studies in detail possible spillover effects within loan groups from the training 
                                                            
10 We include standard controls suggested by the literature as well as variables where our treatment-control 
balance shows a statistically significant difference at a five percent level. See Angrist & Pischke (2009) for a 
comprehensive discussion of control variables in experiments. 
11 We obtain similar ATET-estimates if we instrument whether a client attended any lectures at all by his or her 
treatment status. 
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program, but finds no evidence of spillover effects on the main outcome variables. We can 
therefore also rule out spillover effects from compliers to non-compliers within the training 
group. Finally, we have to assume that the non-compliers did not benefit directly from the 
course, which seems rather uncontroversial given that they only attended a few lectures (and 
25% of the non-compliers no lectures at all). In sum, we thus argue that ATET gives us the 
estimated effect of the training on the clients that actually completed the course. 
5. Results on business performance 
In this section we study the extent to which the interventions have improved the performance 
of the entrepreneurs in terms of profits, and whether this has worked through increasing the 
profit margin or the sales of the businesses.  
Table 4A shows that training had a statistically significant effect on the businesses of males, 
increasing profits by around 20-30%, whereas we do not find any evidence of the training 
improving the profits of the businesses of females. We observe that the interaction term 
between training and female is statistically significant, which shows that the there was a 
systematic difference between males and females in how the training impacted their 
businesses. As expected, the ATET estimates for the impact on male clients are higher than 
the ITT estimates, reflecting the assumption that the impact of the training worked through the 
subset of clients completing the course. Finally, we report the OLS estimates, showing the 
difference in profits between clients who received training (the compliers) and clients who did 
not receive training (the non-compliers and the clients in the non-training group). The OLS 
estimates are slightly higher than the ATET estimates for the male clients, illustrating that 
there was a small selection effect working through unobserved characteristics, where male 
clients benefitting more from the training or with more promising businesses were more likely 
to complete the course. 
In contrast, we do not find any evidence of the business grant increasing the profits of the 
clients’ businesses. As shown in Table 4A, both for males and females, the business grant 
coefficient is not statistically significant for any of the specifications.  
An entrepreneur can increase profits by making the business more cost efficient, and thereby 
increase the profit margin (defined as profits divided by sales), and by expanding the 
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business, and thereby increase sales. Table 4B reports how the training and the business grant 
have impacted the profit margins and sales. Interestingly, neither for males nor for females do 
we find an impact from the training on the profit margin. Thus, the increase in profits for male 
entrepreneurs has taken place through an increase in sales at the same level as profits, 
estimated to be around 20-30%. In contrast, trained females have not increased their sales, 
and, again, we observe that the interaction term between training and female is statistically 
significant. Finally, as with profits, we do not observe any impact from the business grant on 
the profit margin or sales. 
These findings leave us with two puzzles. Why does the human capital intervention only 
affect the business performance of male entrepreneurs? And: Why does the financial capital 
intervention not have any effect at all? To gain a firmer understanding of these questions, we 
investigate in the following two sections the effects of the training and the business grant on 
business practices and entrepreneurial characteristics. 
6. Changes in business practices 
Tables 5A-5C provide an overview of how the interventions changed the business practices of 
the entrepreneurs, where we focus on the ITT estimates.12 Overall, we observe that the 
training had a larger impact on the business practices of male entrepreneurs than of female 
entrepreneurs, and that the business grant did not have any marked impact on business 
practices. Both of these findings are consistent with the observed effects on the business 
performance. 
If the entrepreneurs were credit constrained in their businesses, we would have expected the 
business grant to have an impact on investments, and possibly also on other financial 
dimensions. In Table 5A, we observe that the business grant did not cause any statistically 
significant changes in the financial dimensions, which suggests that these entrepreneurs are 
not primarily constrained by financial capital. From Table 5C, we observe that the business 
grant did reduce the involvement in commerce for male entrepreneurs, which may reflect that 
some of them used the business grant to invest in equipment that enabled them to operate in 
the manufacturing or service sector. This may not necessarily have been a profitable move, 
                                                            
12 The ATET-estimates provide the same picture, only strengthening the effects from training on the various 
business practices.   
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however, since we observe both from the baseline survey and from the follow-up survey that 
entrepreneurs operating in the commerce sector have significantly higher profits than other 
entrepreneurs. The fact that the business grant did not change other business practices like 
employee relations and marketing, as shown in Tables 5B-5C, is in line with what we should 
expect, since this intervention did not target these dimensions.  
In contrast, the training initiated important changes in business practices, both among males 
and females. In particular, from Tables 5B-5C, we observe that the training made the 
entrepreneurs more active in their employee relations, marketing, and record keeping, which 
are topics that were covered in depth in the lectures. We suggest that some of these changes 
may also shed light on why we only find an increase in profits and sales among trained male 
entrepreneurs. In particular, we observe from Table 5B that the training had a strong effect on 
the willingness of trained males to fire employees, whereas we do not see any such change for 
females. The profitability of improving employee management, for instance by the shedding 
of unproductive workers, has been shown in other studies of microfinance clients (Karlan and 
Zinman, 2009). The importance and difficulty of finding trustworthy workers were also 
highlighted by our entrepreneurs in the follow-up survey (to which we return in the following 
section). A number of clients reported that the employees had been stealing from them, and 
others that they were unable to expand because they could not find skilled workers. Thus, the 
fact that the trained male entrepreneurs were active in firing workers suggests that the training 
enabled them to improve the quality of their employees, and thereby also placed them in a 
better position to increase their sales and hence profits.  
The training also led to increased use of bonuses, where we find a statistically significant 
effect among females. However, this is arguably a softer strategy of employee management 
than the firing of workers. Furthermore, we observe that the estimated coefficient on the 
marketing index is higher for trained males than for trained females (even though the 
interaction term between training and female is not significant in this case), which provides 
suggestive evidence of the trained male entrepreneurs pursuing more aggressively a business 
strategy conducive to expansion and increased sales. Finally, we note that there is a 
significant treatment effect on trained males’ involvement in commerce, which was the sector 
with the highest profits and sales both in the baseline survey and in the follow-up survey, 
whereas we do not see a similar expansion of commercial activity among females.  
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Our findings thus suggest that more active employee management, increased marketing, and a 
move into commerce were important drivers of the business expansion for male 
entrepreneurs. A fundamental question still remains, why did not the female entrepreneurs 
adopt the same set of strategies for their businesses? 
7. Exploring the mechanisms: Gender and entrepreneurship 
The identification of new profitable business practices requires knowledge and understanding 
of how to best operate a business, whereas the decision to implement new business ideas 
requires the opportunities to do so and a mind-set that is conducive to business growth. In this 
way, differences in the effect of training on male and female entrepreneurs could stem from 
gender differences in business knowledge, mind-set, and external constraints. In this section 
we provide further discussion of how each of these dimensions sheds light on our findings, 
using evidence from both the surveys and the lab-experiment.  
7.1 Business knowledge  
Business knowledge was studied in the lab through a set of incentivized questions on best 
practice in business, covering topics such as customer care, employee management, time 
management, and definitions of sales, profits, variable costs and working capital.13 In the 
follow-up survey, we asked a separate set of non-incentivized questions on the profit concept. 
We measure a client’s business knowledge by the number of correct answers he or she had in 
these tests. As shown in Table 6A, column (1) and column (2), we obtain somewhat different 
results from the lab and the follow-up survey, but in none of the specifications do we find a 
statistically significant difference in the impact of the training on males and females. Focusing 
on column (3), which reports the overall performance of the lab sample on both tests, we 
observe that the training has increased the business knowledge of both male and female 
entrepreneurs.  
In the follow-up survey we also invited the entrepreneurs to take part in a business plan 
competition. They were asked: “Suppose you were given 100 000 TZS as a business grant to 
invest in your business. How would you spend this money most profitably? Explain your 
choices.” They were informed that the plans would later be evaluated, and that the three best 
                                                            
13 For further discussion of the lab-test on business knowledge, see Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010). 
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plans would each be awarded a prize of 100 000 TZS.14 Column (4) in Table 6A shows that 
the training has significantly improved the ability of females to formulate business plans, 
whereas we do not see a similar effect for males. Possibly, the stronger effect of training on 
females is due to their lower initial skills, as reflected in males scoring significantly better in 
the non-training group. 
In sum, we conclude that the observed difference in impact from training on business 
practices and business performance cannot be explained by females not benefitting in 
business knowledge from the course. If anything, our results point to training having a larger 
impact on the business knowledge of females, possibly due to their lower initial level of 
knowledge.  
7.2 Mind-set 
The lab experiment also investigated different mind-set variables. Willingness to compete and 
confidence were measured based on a set of questions on five different topics that were 
unrelated to the training (sports, maths, politics, health, and geography). In the first round, the 
clients were paid a fixed amount of 250 TZS for each correct answer, and, as expected, the 
training and the non-training group performed equally well (25.9 versus 25.3 correct answers; 
t-test of equality, p=0.581). Before the second round, the participants were asked about their 
expectations about own performance (“Are you better than, equal to, or worse than a typical 
microcredit client in answering questions on topic X”), which gave us a measure of 
confidence, and then, for each of the five topics, they had to choose whether to compete or 
not. If they decided to compete and performed better than the average microcredit client, they 
were paid 750 TZS per correct answer; if they performed worse, on the other hand, they were 
paid nothing. Alternatively, they could decide to work for the fixed rate of 250 TZS. The 
                                                            
14 Roughly speaking, the plans can be divided into two categories; those that were justified (42%) and those that 
were not, including a few cases where the entrepreneurs were unable to come up with any business plan at all 
(58%).  An example of a justified plan is the following: “She would buy sealed boxes to sell the food that she 
delivers. This way she will attract more customers, the food will look more expensive and professional. She 
would also buy shoes for her employees. That way, they would look more professional.” An example of an 
unjustified plan is the following: “She would invest the money in her fish business, to buy more stock of the 
same fish.” Our main results are also robust to more nuanced evaluations of the business plans, e.g. using a scale 
1-4. 
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number of times they entered the competition gave us a measure of their willingness to 
compete. 
Risk preferences were measured by the number of times the participant chose a risky 
alternative when a safe alternative was available. The participants were presented with four 
situations where they could choose between a risky alternative with two equally likely 
outcomes, 6000 TZS or nothing, and a safe alternative. The value of the safe alternative 
varied across situations, taking the values 1000 TZS, 1500 TZS, 2000 TZS and 2500 TZS.  
Time preferences were measured at the end of the experiment. The participants were given the 
choice of whether to pick up their participation fee one week after the lab, at which point they 
would receive 15 000 TZS, three weeks after the lab and receive 20 000 TZS, or five weeks 
after the lab and be given 25 000 TZS. Hence, by waiting four weeks their participation fee 
would increase by 67%. We here report their time preference by a dummy, which takes the 
value one if the participant chose the five-week option.15 
Table 6B summarizes the findings for the mind-set variables from the lab experiment. We 
observe that the training has had an impact on the mind-set of the entrepreneurs. It increased 
the confidence of the female entrepreneurs, and it made the male entrepreneurs more risk 
averse. Interestingly, this contributed to eliminating gender differences: in the training group, 
there are no statistically significant differences between females and males when it comes to 
confidence and risk preferences (t-tests of equality, p=0.643 and p=0.289), whereas the males 
are much more confident and risk-willing than the females in the non-training group (t-tests of 
equality, p<0.001 and p=0.001). There is no significant gender difference or treatment effect 
on time preferences. Finally, in the lab, we do not see any impact of the training on the 
willingness to compete. But here we observe a stark difference between males and females 
both in the training group and in the non-training group; females are much less willing to 
compete than males (t-tests of equality, p=0.049 and p=0.013). The observation that females 
are less inclined to compete is in line with the literature on gender and competitiveness 
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, Croson and Gneezy, 2009, Fletschner et al. 2010). 
                                                            
15 In Appendix A, Table A10, we show that our results on risk- and time preferences are robust to adopting the 
approach of Benjamin et al. (2010), who use interval regressions where the dependent variables are the minimum 
risk premium that the client requires to choose the risky alternative and the log of the minimum continuously 
compounded weekly interest rate that the participant requires to choose the delayed payment. 
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In the follow-up survey, we also asked some general mind-set questions on what the 
entrepreneurs considered as obstacles to business growth, and also whether they preferred to 
do the same kind of business as their neighbor. The last question was motivated by a concern 
expressed both by the management of PRIDE and by researchers at UDEC, namely that too 
many microentrepreneurs were involved in copycatting the businesses of their neighbors. In 
the words of Donath Olomi, former Director of UDEC “One of the most debilitating 
constraints is limited awareness and capacity of existing and potential business operators, in 
terms of exposure, values, knowledge and skills. The result is that most simply duplicate what 
their neighbors are doing and do not appreciate the importance of innovation, quality, 
credibility, and customer care” (Olomi, 2007, page 16). From Table 8, we observe that the 
training has changed the entrepreneurs’ perceptions of business obstacles. Fewer trained male 
entrepreneurs consider the quality of workers and bureaucratic barriers to be serious obstacles 
to business growth, and fewer trained female entrepreneurs consider demand to be a serious 
obstacle to business growth. In the training group, we find statistically significant differences 
between males and females with respect to their views on quality of workers and bureaucratic 
barriers (t-test of equality, p=0.064 and p=0.007). We do not see any influence from training 
on the clients’ preference for copycatting, but, in the training group, more female than male 
entrepreneurs express a preference for doing the same kind of business as their neighbor (t-
test of equality, p=0.015).  
In sum, the human capital intervention had an impact on a range of mind-set variables. 
Notably, however, training had no effect on the entrepreneurs’ willingness to compete, with 
both trained and non-trained males being significantly more willing to compete than females.  
We argue that the difference in willingness to compete represents a fundamental difference in 
mind-set between the male and female entrepreneurs, and that the greater aversion to 
competition among the female entrepreneurs may constitute an ‘internal’ constraint on 
business growth.  
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7.3 External constraints 
In Tanzania, as in most other countries, females face more binding external constraints on 
their activities than males. For instance, females typically have the main responsibility for the 
household. One indication of this in our data is the fact that females spend on average ten 
hours less per week than men in their businesses. Qualitative information from our surveys 
also shows that females more often than males operate their businesses in or close to their 
home, which suggests domestic commitments. 
Moreover, females may in some cases have a lesser say in decisions that are important for the 
household, including business decisions. One indication of this from our survey is the fact that 
females are less informed about their husbands’ income than vice versa. In the follow-up 
survey, we asked the married clients whether they knew what their spouse’s income was in a 
normal month: 79% of the male entrepreneurs responded positively, whereas only 45% of the 
female entrepreneurs reported to have this information. In the follow-up survey we also 
gathered anecdotal evidence suggesting that in some cases the husbands were in charge of 
businesses formally operated by female PRIDE members.  
It seems reasonable to assume that domestic obligations and lack of influence over business 
decisions make females less able to implement business knowledge from the training 
program. In particular, such constraints are likely to form a significant barrier to carrying out 
important business decisions like firing employees and introducing new business activities, 
which seem to be driving forces for increased sales and profits among the male entrepreneurs 
in our data set.16 Moreover, we find no effect of training on time spent in the business or on 
how informed married, female entrepreneurs are about their spouse’s income, which indicates 
that the training has not eased the external constraints on business growth faced by the female 
entrepreneurs.  
                                                            
16 Accordingly, when reflecting upon the possible impact of the training program immediately after its 
completion, the teachers involved expressed concerns as to whether the female participants would benefit from 
it, stating that: “Because of culture, most women are marginalized and sometimes interfered by their male 
counterparts when it comes to growing their business.”  
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7.4 A simple model  
We here outline a simple model that illustrates how a complementarity between business 
knowledge and internal and external constraints, or simply constraints for short, may explain 
the gender difference in impact from training. Let the sales of entrepreneurs i be determined 
by two factors; knowledge (ki) and constraints (ci). Moreover, in line with the data, let profits 
be proportional to sales. Knowledge is assumed to be exogenously given, based on the 
realistic assumption that there is no market for business training of small scale 
entrepreneurs.17 Increased knowledge is the target of business training. Constraints capture the 
degree to which entrepreneurs have the freedom or willingness to implement their ideas in 
practice. In line with what we observed in the follow-up survey and in the lab, we assume that 
these constraints are not affected by the training. 
To highlight the key mechanism in the clearest possible way, we assume that knowledge and 
constraints are perfectly complementary in explaining the level of sales (and hence profits): 
),min(arg iii cky  .          (1) 
Consider two types of entrepreneurs, males and females, i=m,f, where fm cc  . Assume now 
that the level of knowledge, both prior to training and after training, is in the interval: 
 mif ckc  ,           (2) 
implying that fc  is a binding constraint for females, while males are constrained by 
knowledge.18 Clearly, when the inequality in (2) holds, the model predicts that the increase in 
ik  caused by the human capital intervention should boost sales and profits of male 
entrepreneurs only.  
A similar model can also be used to explain the lack of impact from the business grant. If we 
interpret the variable c in the model above as representing financial capital, and assume that 
business knowledge, both prior to and after the training, is the binding constraint for both 
                                                            
17 Business training courses do exist in Tanzania, but are costly, and typically targeted to more advanced 
entrepreneurs than the average microfinance client. 
18 For completeness, if ki<cf, training would stimulate the businesses of both males and females, while if ki>cm, it 
would not affect the businesses of either gender. 
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males and females, then it follows that there will be no impact from the business grant 
intervention. 
8. Concluding remarks 
Our study has shown that a human capital intervention in the form of business training can 
have a powerful effect on business performance of poor microenterpreneurs. In contrast, a 
comparable infusion of financial capital had no effect on the businesses. This suggests that 
human capital is a fundamental constraint for microenterprise development and more binding 
than the financial capital constraint. 
We find that the effect of the human capital intervention is contingent on gender. In particular, 
we find on average no effect on business performance of training for female entrepreneurs, 
while male entrepreneurs experience an increase in sales and profits of around 20-30%. The 
lack of treatment effect on business outcomes for female entrepreneurs harmonizes with the 
findings in Karlan and Valdivia (forthcoming), who do not observe any effect on sales of the 
business training program implemented amongst members of a female-only microfinance 
institution in Peru. Taken together, the Peru-study, the present Tanzania-study on business 
training, and the studies by de Mel et al. (2008, 2009a) on the returns to capital among 
microentrepreneurs in Sri Lanka, suggest that promoting business development is more 
challenging among female entrepreneurs than among male entrepreneurs.   
Bruhn et al. (2010) emphasize the importance of managerial capital as a determinant for 
business performance. Their argument is that different levels of managerial capital, in dealing 
with financial capital, workers and customers, can explain the heterogeneous effects of capital 
grants found by for instance de Mel et al. (2009a). However, an important ambition of the 
business training program evaluated in the present paper was precisely to provide the 
entrepreneurs with more management skills. The fact that this treatment had very different 
impacts on male and female entrepreneurs points to the importance of other, and perhaps 
deeper, factors that may constrain the female entrepreneurs. Here, we have referred to these 
factors as internal and external constraints, and linked them to lab evidence on the willingness 
to compete and to survey and other interview-based evidence on the social position of women 
in Tanzania. Our research indicates that, given the more binding constraints facing female 
entrepreneurs, adding human or financial capital may be relatively fruitless. An important 
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policy implication from our research is thus that more comprehensive measures are necessary 
in order to promote development among female entrepreneurs, paying greater attention to 
their motivation for joining microfinance and to the external constraints which may limit their 
ambitions.  
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Figure 1 
 
Note: The figure shows the distribution of the difference between stated profits and calculated profits (both in 
thousand TZS) for the full sample of active entrepreneurs in the follow-up survey. 
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Table 1: Baseline values by gender 
 (1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Male 
(3) 
Female 
(4) 
Difference 
 
BUSINESS OUTCOMES 
    
Profit 568.497 625.206 538.664 86.542** 
 (17.914) (34.305) (20.417) (37.565) 
Sales                       2489.228 3062.518 2187.640 874.877*** 
 (143.895) (228.591) (182.218) (301.021) 
Profit margin 0.332 0.311 0.343 -0.032** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015) 
     
SECTOR     
Commerce                             0.699 0.703 0.697 0.006 
 (0.018) (0.031) (0.022) (0.038) 
Service 0.377 0.257 0.441 -0.184*** 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.024) (0.040) 
Manufacturing  0.154 0.234 0.111 0.123*** 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.015) (0.030) 
     
SCALE OF BUSINESS     
Employees 1.084 1.180 1.033 0.147 
 (0.064) (0.102) (0.082) (0.135) 
PRIDE loan                   770.342 766.677 772.275 -5.608 
 (9.394) (16.009) (11.614) (19.780) 
Investments                  198.983 249.937 172.178 77.760* 
 (20.692) (43.369) (21.762) (43.462) 
     
BUSINESS PRACTICE     
Keeping records  0.663 0.667 0.661 0.006 
 (0.019) (0.032) (0.023) (0.039) 
Registration  0.207 0.230 0.194 0.035 
 (0.016) (0.028) (0.019) (0.034) 
Marketing Index 0.490 0.498 0.485 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.019 (0.015) (0.024) 
Business knowledge 0.704 0.722 0.694 0.028** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) 
     
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
ENTREPRENEUR 
    
Age   37.710 37.30 37.92 -0.622 
 (0.333) (0.591) (0.402) (0.701) 
Education 7.935 7.734 8.040 -0.306* 
 (0.084) (0.137 (0.105) (0.176) 
Muslim                       0.662 0.730 0.626 0.104*** 
 (0.019) (0.030 (0.024) (0.039) 
     
Observations 644 222 422  
Note: The table reports average values from the baseline survey in 2008. Profit: Monthly profit in the businesses of the 
entrepreneur, in thousand TZS. Sales: Monthly sales in the businesses of the entrepreneur, in thousand TZS. Profit Margin: 
Profit/Sales. Commerce, Service, and Manufacturing: Share of clients involved in each of these sectors. Employees: Number of 
employees in the businesses of the entrepreneur. PRIDE loan: Initial size of loan in PRIDE, in thousand TZS. Investments: 
Investments in the businesses of the entrepreneur in the last 12 months, excluding additions to stocks, in thousand TZS. Keeping 
records: Indicator variable taking the value one if the entrepreneur reports keeping records. Registration: Indicator variable taking 
the value one if at least one of the businesses of the entrepreneur is registered by the government. Marketing index: An index of 
marketing initiatives made by entrepreneur the last year, from zero (no initiatives) to one (initiatives along three dimensions to 
attract customers). Business knowledge: Test of business skills, share of correct answers. Age: The age of the entrepreneur, in 
number of years. Education: The number of years of schooling of the entrepreneur. Muslim: Indicator variable taking the value one 
if the entrepreneur is Muslim. Standard errors in parentheses, p-values from two-sided t-tests of equality; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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Table 2: Verification of randomization  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Training, 
Full Sample 
Training, 
Female 
Training, 
Male 
Grant, Full 
Sample 
Grant, 
Female 
Grant, 
Male 
Profit (log) -0.021 -0.036 0.016 -0.016 -0.036 0.021 
 (0.040) (0.052) (0.072) (0.039) (0.052) (0.065) 
Sales (log) 0.001 -0.002 -0.020 0.035 0.047 0.038 
 (0.035) (0.046) (0.058) (0.035) (0.046) (0.058) 
Commerce 0.068 0.045 0.115 -0.086 -0.100 -0.029 
 (0.055) (0.068) (0.098) (0.054) (0.063) (0.094) 
Service 0.095* 0.108* 0.075 -0.010 -0.063 0.150 
 (0.053) (0.062) (0.102) (0.053) (0.059) (0.104) 
Manufacturing 0.071 0.130 -0.018 -0.050 -0.148* 0.149 
 (0.063) (0.085) (0.113) (0.060) (0.076) (0.109) 
Employees 0.006 0.005 0.017 -0.016 -0.007 -0.054* 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.031) (0.011) (0.013) (0.028) 
PRIDE loan -0.066 0.051 -0.245 0.011 0.006 -0.029 
 (0.087) (0.105) (0.156) (0.087) (0.103) (0.157) 
Investments -0.029 -0.063 -0.031 0.010 0.076 -0.066 
 (0.041) (0.052) (0.053) (0.040) (0.048) (0.043) 
Keeping records 0.044 0.005 0.104 -0.066 -0.080 -0.017 
 (0.046) (0.057) (0.079) (0.046) (0.058) (0.077) 
Registration 0.093* 0.084 0.108 0.014 0.000 0.044 
 (0.050) (0.065) (0.081) (0.051) (0.062) (0.097) 
Marketing Index -0.190** -0.121 -0.298** -0.001 0.010 -0.007 
 (0.074) (0.084) (0.128) (0.071) (0.086) (0.121) 
Age -0.004 -0.006* -0.001 0.004 0.006* 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Education -0.017* -0.029** 0.011 -0.003 0.002 -0.016 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) 
Muslim 0.067 0.058 0.054 -0.117*** -0.060 -0.271*** 
 (0.045) (0.054) (0.083) (0.045) (0.055) (0.081) 
Business Knowledge 0.156 0.134 0.071 -0.011 -0.106 0.060 
 (0.122) (0.156) (0.213) (0.120) (0.152) (0.202) 
Grant 0.021 0.036 0.006    
 (0.056) (0.066) (0.084)    
Training    0.020 0.035 0.006 
    (0.054) (0.064) (0.080) 
       
Observations 644 422 222 644 422 222 
Note: The table reports regressions of treatment status on variables from the baseline survey in 2008. Profit: 
Monthly profit (log) in the businesses of the entrepreneur. Sales: Monthly sales (log) in the businesses of the 
entrepreneur. Commerce, Service, and Manufacturing: Share of clients involved in each of these sectors. 
Employees: Number of employees in the businesses of the entrepreneur. PRIDE loan: Initial size of loan in 
PRIDE, in thousand TZS. Investments: Investments in the businesses of the entrepreneur in the last 12 months, 
excluding additions to stocks, in thousand TZS. Keeping Records: Indicator variable taking the value one if the 
entrepreneur reports keeping records. Registration: Indicator variable taking the value one if at least one of the 
businesses of the entrepreneur is registered by the government. Marketing index: An index of marketing 
initiatives made by the entrepreneur the last year, from zero (no initiatives) to one (initiatives along three 
dimensions to attract customers). Business knowledge: Test of business skills, share of correct answers.Age: The 
age of the entrepreneur, in number of years. Education: The number of years of schooling of the entrepreneur. 
Muslim: Indicator variable taking the value one if the entrepreneur is Muslim. Cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Stated profit vs. calculated profit  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Training 0.109** 0.074 0.042 0.038 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.046) (0.039) 
Grant -0.003 -0.015 -0.021 -0.024 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) 
Training*Female -0.155** -0.110* -0.070 -0.063 
 (0.063) (0.059) (0.057) (0.051) 
Female 0.079* 0.054 0.043 0.035 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.042) (0.036) 
Sum Female -0.045 -0.036 -0.029 -0.025 
 (0.040) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) 
Observations 526 510 494 478 
 Note: The table reports regressions of the difference between stated profits (log) and calculated profits (log) on 
treatment status, controlling for gender. Column (1) is for the full sample of active entrepreneurs in the follow-
up survey. Columns (2) – (4) are trimmed samples, where we have removed the entrepreneurs with the largest 
difference between stated and calculated profits. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 4A: Profits  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ITT          
no covar. 
ITT          
with covar. 
ATET        
no covar. 
ATET       
with covar. 
OLS        
with covar. 
OLS        
no covar 
Training 0.211* 0.253** 0.237* 0.283** 0.265** 0.305*** 
 (0.117) (0.115) (0.130) (0.127) (0.115) (0.115) 
Grant 0.057 0.027 0.056 0.025 0.055 0.025 
 (0.071) (0.075) (0.070) (0.074) (0.070) (0.075) 
Training*Female -0.255* -0.309** -0.289* -0.350** -0.253* -0.308** 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.171) (0.169) (0.149) (0.148) 
Female -0.027 -0.004 -0.027 -0.004 -0.039 -0.019 
 (0.109) (0.107) (0.108) (0.106) (0.102) (0.102) 
Sum Female -0.045 -0.057 -0.052 -0.067 0.012 -0.003 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.106) (0.105) (0.090) (0.090) 
 
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494 
Note: The table reports regressions of stated profits (log) on treatment status, controlling for gender and 
covariates. Covariates include age, education, number of businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, 
marketing index, religion, and the lagged dependent variable. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4B: Profit margin and sales   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Profit Margin 
ITT 
Profit Margin 
ATET 
Sales  
ITT 
Sales  
ATET 
Training -0.014 -0.015 0.257** 0.288** 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.123) (0.137) 
Grant -0.004 -0.004 0.038 0.036 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.073) (0.072) 
Training*Female 0.003 0.003 -0.262* -0.295* 
 (0.033) (0.037) (0.157) (0.177) 
Female -0.013 -0.013 0.044 0.044 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.110) (0.109) 
Sum Female -0.010 -0.012 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.089) (0.103) 
     
Observations 494 494 494 494 
Note: The table reports regressions of profit margin (stated profits/sales) and sales (log) on treatment status, all 
regressions controlling for gender and covariates. Covariates include age, education, number of businesses, 
PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, marketing index, religion, and the lagged dependent variable. Cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 5A: Finance and investment  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Savings 
ITT 
Total Loans  
ITT 
Total Investments 
ITT 
Consump./Loan 
ITT 
Training 218.059*** 173.668** -38.395 -0.096** 
 (82.246) (78.592) (177.041) (0.047) 
Grant 6.359 13.988 12.143 -0.050 
 (63.705) (47.380) (90.523) (0.033) 
Training*Female -172.751 -174.798* 75.188 0.068 
 (107.680) (91.262) (196.098) (0.061) 
Female 37.364 52.654 -97.901 0.040 
 (75.420) (57.195) (167.152) (0.046) 
Sum Female 45.308 -1.130 36.792 -0.028 
 (67.688) (48.473) (81.628) (0.038) 
Observations 494 494 494 494 
Note: The table reports ITT regressions of total savings, total loans, total investments, and share of consumption 
of PRIDE loan on treatment status, all regressions controlling for gender and covariates. Covariates include 
age, education, number of businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, marketing index, religion, and the 
lagged dependent variable (not available in (4)).  Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5B: Employee relations  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 No. of workers 
ITT   
No. fired   
ITT   
No. given bonus 
ITT      
Training -0.053 0.273*** 0.141 
 (0.200) (0.086) (0.161) 
Grant 0.015 0.111* 0.020 
 (0.104) (0.066) (0.079) 
Training*Female 0.227 -0.214* 0.035 
 (0.226) (0.112) (0.182) 
Female -0.226 0.080 -0.102 
 (0.181) (0.054) (0.140) 
Sum Female 0.174 0.059 0.176** 
 (0.113) (0.064) (0.078) 
Observations 494 494 494 
Note: The table reports ITT regressions of total number of workers, total number of fired workers, and total 
number of workers given bonus on treatment status, all regressions controlling for gender and covariates. 
Covariates include age, education, number of businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, marketing index, 
religion, and the lagged dependent variable. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
Table 5C: Other business practices   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Marketing Index  
ITT 
Commerce 
 ITT 
Record Keeping  
ITT 
Registration  
ITT 
Training 0.125*** 0.130** 0.255*** -0.087 
 (0.045) (0.059) (0.065) (0.070) 
Grant -0.003 -0.067* 0.025 0.056 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.040) (0.035) 
Training*Female -0.049 -0.078 -0.082 0.104 
 (0.054) (0.076) (0.082) (0.078) 
Female 0.013 0.075 0.024 -0.146** 
 (0.041) (0.056) (0.066) (0.064) 
Sum Female 0.076** 0.052 0.173*** 0.017 
 (0.030) (0.042) (0.049)   (0.036) 
Observations 494 494 494 494 
Note: The table reports ITT regressions of a marketing index, involvement in commerce, record keeping, and 
formal registration of the business on treatment status, all regressions controlling for gender and covariates. 
Covariates include age, education, number of businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, marketing index, 
religion, and the lagged dependent variable. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6A: Business knowledge  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Lab  
ITT 
Survey   
ITT 
Combined  
ITT 
Business Plan 
ITT 
Training 0.044 0.052** 0.161* -0.048 
 
Grant 
(0.040) 
− 
(0.024) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
(0.089) 
− 
(0.079) 
0.046 
(0.046) 
Training*Female 0.037 -0.023 -0.052 0.192* 
 (0.052) (0.030) (0.108) (0.099) 
Female -0.099** -0.020 -0.110 -0.149* 
 (0.041) (0.021) (0.080) (0.076) 
Sum Female 0.080** 0.029* 0.110* 0.144** 
 (0.033) (0.017) (0.060) (0.058) 
Observations 211 494 211 494 
Note: The table reports ITT regressions of business knowledge on treatment status, all regressions controlling 
for gender and covariates. Covariates include age, education, number of businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE 
loan size, marketing index, religion, and the lagged dependent variable (not available for regressions (1) and 
(4)). Column (1) is from an incentivized test in the lab, column (2) from a non-incentivized test in the follow-up 
survey. The dependent variable in column (3) is the sum of the performance on the two tests. Grant is not 
included in columns (1) and (3), since the lab took place prior to the distribution of the business grant. Column 
(4) reports the result of the business plan competition from the follow-up survey, where the dependent variable is 
a dummy taking the value one if the plan was justified and zero otherwise. Cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 6B: Mindset: Lab  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Confidence   
ITT 
Compete  
 ITT  
Risk   
ITT  
Time   
ITT 
Training -0.535 -0.042 -0.834*** -0.001 
 (0.440) (0.512) (0.315) (0.119) 
Training*Female 1.289** 0.309 1.120*** 0.136 
 (0.557) (0.650) (0.393) (0.144) 
Female -1.654*** -1.436*** -0.917*** -0.108 
 (0.355) (0.482) (0.263) (0.098) 
Sum Female 0.754** 0.027 0.229 0.135 
 (0.323) (0.400) (0.229) (0.084) 
Observations 211 211 211 211 
Note: The table reports ITT regressions of the entrepreneur’s confidence, willingness to compete, risk- and time 
preferences, controlling for gender and covariates. Covariates include age, education, number of businesses, 
PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, marketing index, and religion. Confidence is measured on a scale from minus 
one (worse than others) to one (better than others), willingness to compete is measured as the number of times 
the entrepreneur decides to compete, risk is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur chooses the risky 
alternative, and time is a dummy taking the value one if the entrepreneur decides to wait with the payment for 
five weeks. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6C: Mindset: Survey  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Quality of worker   
ITT  
 
Bureaucratic 
barriers  
ITT  
Market size   
ITT  
 
Copycatting   
ITT  
 
Training 0.139** 0.124* 0.001 0.071 
 (0.069) (0.072) (0.038) (0.063) 
Training*Female -0.171* -0.169* 0.053 -0.110 
 (0.088) (0.093) (0.050) (0.084) 
Grant -0.050 -0.023 0.033 0.054 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.026) (0.044) 
Female 0.060 0.005 0.008 -0.036 
 (0.064) (0.069) (0.036) (0.062) 
Sum Female -0.032 -0.045 0.053 -0.039 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.033) (0.055) 
Observations 493 493 493 493 
Note: The table reports ITT regressions of the entrepreneur’s responses to general mind-set questions in the 
follow-up survey, controlling for gender and covariates. Covariates include age, education, number of 
businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, marketing index, and religion. The dependent variable is in 
columns (1)-(3) a dummy variable taking the value one if the entrepreneur does not consider the dimension to 
represent an obstacle. The three dimensions are the quality of workers, bureaucratic barriers, and market size. 
The dependent variable in column (4) is a dummy variable taking the value one if the entrepreneur would not 
prefer to do the same thing as the neighbour. One observation is missing for this part of the follow-up survey. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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 Appendix A  
 
We here present various tables referred to in the main text.  
Figure 1A 
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Note. The figure shows the distribution of attendance at the training program, with the number of lectures on the 
horizontal axis and the number of entrepreneurs on the vertical axis.   
 
Table A1: Bounds on profit estimates  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Lower Lee 
Bound  
ITT 
 With covar.  
Lower Lee 
Bound  
ATET     
With covar.     
Original 
Estimates  
ITT  
With covar. 
Original 
Estimates 
ATET  
With covar.  
Upper Lee 
Bound  
ITT  
With covar.  
Upper Lee 
Bound  
ATET   
With covar.  
Training 0.083 0.095 0.247** 0.278** 0.303*** 0.334*** 
 (0.108) (0.122) (0.115) (0.128) (0.113) (0.124) 
Grant 0.003 0.003 0.027 0.025 0.052 0.050 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.075) (0.074) (0.072) (0.071) 
Training*Female -0.179 -0.209 -0.303** -0.343** -0.207 -0.222 
 (0.142) (0.162) (0.150) (0.169) (0.143) (0.160) 
Female -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.024 -0.025 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) (0.105) 
Sum Female -0.097 -0.114 -0.056 -0.066 0.096 0.112 
 (0.088) (0.103) (0.090) (0.105) (0.084) (0.096) 
       
Observations 477 477 494 494 477 477 
Note: The table reports upper and lower bounds for the ITT and ATET estimates of the treatment effect on 
profits, following the approach in Lee (2005) and  controlling for gender and covariates. Covariates include 
age, education, number of businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, marketing index, religion, and the 
lagged dependent variable. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A2: Verification of randomization: Lab sample  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Training,  
Full Sample 
Training,  
Female 
Training,  
Male 
Profit (log) -0.012 -0.054 0.168 
 (0.078) (0.107) (0.124) 
Sales (log) 0.004 -0.008 -0.019 
 (0.066) (0.095) (0.090) 
Commerce -0.037 -0.145 0.072 
 (0.091) (0.114) (0.163) 
Service 0.089 0.012 0.182 
 (0.103) (0.126) (0.158) 
Manufacturing 0.144 0.039 0.252 
 (0.117) (0.179) (0.156) 
Employees 0.002 -0.009 0.025 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.055) 
PRIDE loan 0.103 0.205 -0.024 
 (0.168) (0.205) (0.289) 
Investments -0.081 -0.042 -0.347*** 
 (0.054) (0.079) (0.109) 
Keeping records 0.117 0.043 0.176 
 (0.080) (0.101) (0.148) 
Registration 0.153* 0.108 0.222 
 (0.085) (0.119) (0.162) 
Marketing index -0.263** -0.268* -0.221 
 (0.117) (0.146) (0.179) 
Age -0.002 -0.005 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Education -0.023 -0.043** 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.035) 
Muslim 0.052 0.013 -0.058 
 (0.078) (0.106) (0.130) 
Business knowledge 0.111 -0.014 -0.166 
 (0.215) (0.301) (0.347) 
    
Observations 211 137 74 
 Note: The table reports regressions of treatment status on variables from the baseline survey in 2008 for the 
entrepreneurs taking part in the lab experiment in March 2009. Profit: Monthly profit (log) in the businesses of 
the entrepreneur. Sales: Monthly sales (log) in the businesses of the entrepreneur. Commerce, Service, and 
Manufacturing: Share of clients involved in each of these sectors. Employees: Number of employees in the 
businesses of the entrepreneur. PRIDE loan: Initial size of loan in PRIDE, in thousand TZS. Investments: 
Investments in the businesses of the entrepreneur in the last 12 months, excluding additions to stocks, in 
thousand TZS. Keeping Records: Indicator variable taking the value one if the entrepreneur reports keeping 
records. Registration: Indicator variable taking the value one if at least one of the businesses of the entrepreneur 
is registered by the government. Marketing index: An index of marketing initiatives made by the entrepreneur the 
last year, from 0 (no initiatives) to 1 (initiatives along three dimensions to attract customers). Business 
knowledge: Test of business skills, share of correct answers. Age: The age of the entrepreneur, in number of 
years. Education: The number of years of schooling of the entrepreneur. Muslim: Indicator variable taking the 
value one if the entrepreneur is Muslim. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
***p<0.01.
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 Table A3: Baseline values by gender: Trimmed sample 
 (1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Male 
(3) 
Female 
(4) 
Difference 
 
BUSINESS OUTCOMES 
    
Profit 544.692 606.770 511.828 94.942** 
 (19.354) (37.609) (21.728) (40.498) 
Sales                       2263.485 2911.545 1920.395 991.151*** 
 (119.517) (234.655) (130.392) (247.475) 
Profit margin 0.335 0.316 0.345 -0.030* 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.017) 
     
SECTOR     
Commerce                             0.664 0.661 0.666 -0.005 
 (0.021) (0.036) (0.026) (0.045) 
Service 0.399 0.269 0.467 -0.198*** 
 (0.022) (0.034) (0.028) (0.046) 
Manufacturing  0.170 0.281 0.111 0.169*** 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.018) (0.035) 
     
SCALE OF BUSINESS     
Employees 1.093 1.263 1.003 0.260* 
 (0.068) (0.123) (0.081) (0.143) 
PRIDE loan                   776.113 766.667 781.115 -14.448 
 (10.661) (18.248) (13.146) (22.422) 
Investments                  216.649 274.444 186.051 88.394 
 (25.857) (53.399) (27.571) (54.259) 
     
BUSINESS PRACTICE     
Keeping records  0.648 0.655 0.644 0.011 
 (0.021) (0.037) (0.027) (0.045) 
Registration  0.229 0.269 0.207 0.062 
 (0.019) (0.034) (0.023) (0.040) 
Marketing index 0.491 0.493 0.489 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.016) (0.027) 
Business knowledge 0.704 0.718 0.696 0.023 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) 
     
CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE ENTREPRENEUR 
    
Age   37.990 37.579 38.207 -0.628 
 (0.372 (0.659 0.450) (0.782) 
Education 7.933 7.731 8.040 -0.309 
 (0.094 (0.148 (0.120) (0.197) 
Muslim                       0.670 0.737 0.635 0.102** 
 (0.021) (0.034) (0.027) (0.044) 
     
Observations 494 171 323  
Note: The table reports average values from the baseline survey in 2008 for the trimmed sample of 494 participants. Profit: 
Monthly profit in the businesses of the entrepreneur, in thousand TZS. Sales: Monthly sales in the businesses of the 
entrepreneur, in thousand TZS. Profit Margin: Profit/Sales. Commerce, Service, and Manufacturing: Share of clients involved 
in each of these sectors. Employees: Number of employees in the businesses of the entrepreneur. PRIDE loan: Initial size of 
loan in PRIDE, in thousand TZS. Investments: Investments in the businesses of the entrepreneur in the last 12 months, 
excluding additions to stocks, in thousand TZS. Keeping records: Indicator variable taking the value one if the entrepreneur 
reports keeping records. Registration: Indicator variable taking the value one if at least one of the businesses of the 
entrepreneur is registered by the government. Marketing index: An index of marketing initiatives made by the entrepreneur the 
last year, from zero (no initiatives) to one (initiatives along three dimensions to attract customers). Business knowledge: Test of 
business skills, share of correct answers. Age: The age of the entrepreneur, in number of years. Education: The number of 
years of schooling of the entrepreneur. Muslim: Indicator variable taking the value one if the entrepreneur is Muslim. Standard 
errors in parentheses. p-values are from t-tests of equality; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A4: Verification of randomization: Trimmed Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Training, 
Full Sample 
Training, 
Female 
Training, 
Male 
Grant,  
Full Sample 
Grant, 
Female 
Grant, 
Male 
Profit (log) -0.039 -0.020 -0.009 -0.007 -0.048 0.053 
 (0.044) (0.059) (0.079) (0.044) (0.059) (0.074) 
Sales (log) 0.036 -0.006 0.030 0.003 0.031 -0.007 
 (0.040) (0.056) (0.063) (0.041) (0.056) (0.065) 
Commerce 0.032 0.001 0.076 -0.075 -0.081 0.014 
 (0.061) (0.077) (0.103) (0.059) (0.071) (0.098) 
Service 0.066 0.087 0.038 0.001 -0.054 0.203* 
 (0.059) (0.073) (0.114) (0.060) (0.068) (0.108) 
Manufacturing 0.054 0.107 -0.035 -0.062 -0.157* 0.137 
 (0.070) (0.099) (0.119) (0.069) (0.090) (0.122) 
Employees -0.001 -0.015 0.025 -0.009 0.007 -0.045 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.034) (0.016) (0.020) (0.031) 
PRIDE loan -0.074 0.032 -0.232 -0.032 -0.057 -0.035 
 (0.102) (0.124) (0.176) (0.103) (0.123) (0.183) 
Investments -0.012 -0.052 -0.022 0.005 0.088* -0.097** 
 (0.044) (0.058) (0.052) (0.042) (0.045) (0.042) 
Keeping records 0.058 0.010 0.115 -0.057 -0.070 0.019 
 (0.050) (0.064) (0.087) (0.052) (0.067) (0.087) 
Registration 0.087 0.120 0.036 0.046 0.025 0.076 
 (0.058) (0.076) (0.092) (0.058) (0.073) (0.099) 
Marketing index -0.149* -0.072 -0.281* 0.031 0.029 0.053 
 (0.084) (0.099) (0.154) (0.082) (0.098) (0.142) 
Age -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 0.003 0.005 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Education -0.017 -0.026* 0.010 -0.007 -0.000 -0.029 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.022) (0.012) (0.014) (0.023) 
Muslim 0.064 0.041 0.075 -0.126** -0.079 -0.270*** 
 (0.052) (0.065) (0.095) (0.052) (0.065) (0.091) 
Business knowledge 0.238* 0.205 0.111 -0.062 -0.072 -0.269 
 (0.142) (0.181) (0.250) (0.137) (0.173) (0.240) 
Grant -0.009 0.015 -0.030    
 (0.061) (0.074) (0.093)    
Training    -0.009 0.015 -0.029 
    (0.059) (0.072) (0.090) 
       
Observations 494 323 171 494 323 171 
Note: The table reports regressions of treatment status on variables from the baseline survey in 2008 for the 
trimmed sample of 494 entrepreneurs. Profit: Monthly profit (log) in the businesses of the entrepreneur. Sales: 
Monthly sales (log) in the businesses of the entrepreneur. Commerce, Service, and Manufacturing: Share of 
clients involved in each of these sectors. Employees: Number of employees in the businesses of the entrepreneur. 
PRIDE loan: Initial size of loan in PRIDE, in thousand TZS. Investments: Investments in the businesses of the 
entrepreneur in the last 12 months, excluding additions to stocks, in thousand TZS. Keeping Records: Indicator 
variable taking the value one if the entrepreneur reports keeping records. Registration: Indicator variable taking 
the value one if at least one of the businesses of the entrepreneur is registered by the government. Marketing 
index: An index of marketing initiatives made by the entrepreneur the last year, from zero (no initiatives) to one 
(initiatives along three dimensions to attract customers). Business knowledge: Test of business skills, share of 
correct answers. Age: The age of the entrepreneur, in number of years. Education: The number of years of 
schooling of the entrepreneur. Muslim: Indicator variable taking the value one if the entrepreneur is Muslim. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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 Table A5: Stated profit: Full sample  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ITT           
no covar. 
ITT            
with covar. 
ATET        
no covar. 
ATET        
with covar. 
OLS          
no covar. 
OLS          
with covar. 
Training 0.169 0.219* 0.189 0.245* 0.228** 0.278** 
 (0.115) (0.114) (0.127) (0.125) (0.113) (0.113) 
Grant 0.078 0.043 0.077 0.041 0.076 0.040 
 (0.070) (0.072) (0.070) (0.072) (0.070) (0.072) 
Training*Female -0.245 -0.304** -0.278 -0.345** -0.260* -0.324** 
 (0.151) (0.152) (0.171) (0.172) (0.147) (0.148) 
Female -0.006 0.017 -0.006 0.018 -0.009 0.013 
 (0.110) (0.109) (0.110) (0.108) (0.104) (0.104) 
Sum Female -0.076 -0.085 -0.089 -0.100 -0.032 -0.047 
 (0.093) (0.091) (0.108) (0.105) (0.091) (0.091) 
       
Observations 526 526 526 526 526 526 
Note: The table reports regressions of stated profits (log) on treatment status for the full sample of 526 
entrepreneurs, controlling for gender and covariates. Covariates include age, education, number of businesses, 
PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, marketing index, religion, and the lagged dependent variable. Cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table A6: Stated profit: Trimmed sample (510)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ITT          
no covar. 
ITT          
with covar. 
ATET        
no covar. 
ATET        
with covar. 
OLS          
no covar. 
OLS        
with covar. 
Training 0.220* 0.261** 0.245* 0.292** 0.275** 0.316*** 
 (0.114) (0.112) (0.126) (0.124) (0.112) (0.112) 
Grant 0.050 0.025 0.048 0.022 0.046 0.022 
 (0.069) (0.074) (0.069) (0.072) (0.069) (0.073) 
Training*Female -0.263* -0.309** -0.295* -0.348** -0.257* -0.306** 
 (0.148) (0.149) (0.167) (0.167) (0.146) (0.147) 
Female -0.017 -0.002 -0.017 -0.002 -0.029 -0.016 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.105) (0.101) (0.100) 
Sum Female -0.043 -0.048 -0.050 -0.056 0.018 0.010 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.104) (0.104) (0.090) (0.090) 
       
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 
Note: The table reports regressions of stated profits (log) on treatment status for the trimmed sample of 510 
entrepreneurs where the 16 entrepreneurs with the largest difference between stated profits (log) and calculated 
profits (log) have been removed, controlling for gender and covariates. Covariates include age, education, 
number of businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, marketing index, and the lagged dependent variable. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A7: Stated profit: Trimmed sample (478)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ITT          
no covar. 
ITT          
with covar. 
ATET        
no covar. 
ATET        
with covar. 
OLS         
with covar. 
OLS         
 no covar. 
Training 0.210* 0.254** 0.232* 0.280** 0.265** 0.304*** 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.129) (0.127) (0.116) (0.116) 
Grant 0.034 0.001 0.032 -0.003 0.032 -0.002 
 (0.072) (0.077) (0.071) (0.075) (0.071) (0.077) 
Training*Female -0.256* -0.313** -0.286* -0.351** -0.256* -0.312** 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.170) (0.168) (0.149) (0.148) 
Female -0.025 0.000 -0.025 0.000 -0.033 -0.013 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) (0.105) (0.103) (0.102) 
Sum Female -0.046 -0.060 -0.054 -0.071 0.009 -0.009 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.106) (0.105) (0.090) (0.090) 
       
Observations 478 478 478 478 478 478 
Note: The table reports regressions of stated profits (log) on treatment status for the trimmed sample of 478 
entrepreneurs, where the 48 entrepreneurs with the largest difference between stated profits (log) and calculated 
profits (log) have been removed, controlling for gender and covariates. Covariates include age, education, 
number of businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, marketing index, religion, and the lagged dependent 
variable. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table A8: Calculated profit  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ITT        
no covar. 
ITT         
with covar. 
ATET      
no covar. 
ATET       
with covar. 
OLS        
with covar. 
OLS       
no covar. 
Training 0.164 0.201* 0.184 0.226* 0.221* 0.256** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.132) (0.131) (0.118) (0.119) 
Grant 0.077 0.055 0.076 0.053 0.075 0.053 
 (0.072) (0.076) (0.071) (0.075) (0.072) (0.076) 
Training*Female -0.180 -0.223 -0.203 -0.251 -0.179 -0.221 
 (0.154) (0.155) (0.175) (0.175) (0.155) (0.156) 
Female -0.078 -0.065 -0.078 -0.065 -0.084 -0.074 
 (0.110) (0.111) (0.109) (0.110) (0.103) (0.104) 
Sum Female -0.016 -0.021 -0.018 -0.025 0.041 0.035 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.108) (0.108) (0.094) (0.095) 
       
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494 
Note:  The table reports regressions on calculated profits (log) for the trimmed sample of 494 entrepreneurs, 
where the 32 entrepreneurs with the largest difference between stated profits (log) and calculated profits (log) 
have been removed, controlling for gender and covariates. Covariates include age, education, number of 
businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, marketing index, religion and a lagged dependent variable. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table A9: Profit: Interval regressions  
 (1) (2) 
 ITT            
 no covar. 
ITT             
with covar. 
   
   
Training 0.230* 0.260** 
 (0.120) (0.115) 
Grant 0.050 0.037 
 (0.076) (0.077) 
Training*Female -0.280* -0.326** 
 (0.155) (0.150) 
Female -0.085 -0.072 
 (0.107) (0.104) 
Sum Female -0.049 -0.066 
 (0.098) (0.096) 
Observations 494 494 
Note:  The table reports interval regressions on stated profits (log) for a trimmed sample where the 32 
entrepreneurs with the largest difference between stated profits (log) and calculated profits (log) have been 
removed, controlling for gender and covariates. The lower bound is defined as min(stated profit, calculated 
profit) and the upper bound is defined as max(stated profit, operating profit). Covariates include age, education, 
number of businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, an index of marketing effort, religion, and a lagged 
dependent variable (stated profit). Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
Table A10: Risk and time preference: Interval regressions  
 (1) (2) 
 Interval 
Regression - 
Risk 
Interval 
Regression - 
Time  
Training 0.621** 0.021 
 (0.295) (0.138) 
Training*Female -0.838** -0.149 
 (0.376) (0.168) 
Female 0.565** 0.108 
 (0.262) (0.110) 
Sum Female -0.217 -0.128 
 (0.217) (0.097) 
Observations 211 211 
Note: The table reports interval regressions on time and risk preferences, following the approach of Benjamin et 
al. (2010), and controlling for gender and covariates. The dependent variables are the minimum risk premium 
that the client requires to choose the risky alternative and the log of the minimum continuously compounded 
weekly interest rate that the participant requires to choose the delayed payment. We control for gender and 
covariates. Covariates include age, education, number of businesses, PRIDE branch, PRIDE loan size, an index 
of marketing effort and religion. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix B-1: Topics in the business training program 
1 Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial character 
2 Developing an entrepreneurial behaviour 
3 Importance of long-term view and orientation in the business  
4 Identification of creative business ideas 
5 Understanding of business environment 
6 Planning for your business  
7 Understanding of the market for your business  
8 Marketing strategies/techniques for your business  
9 Improving customer service  
10 Pillars of good customer service 
11 Managing people in your business  
12 How to get good workers 
13 Allocating responsibilities and appraising employee performance 
14 Keeping business records  
15 Costing and pricing 
16 Managing working capital 
17 Sources of finance for small businesses 
 
 
 
60 
 
Appendix B-2: Business Grant Letter 
 
Dear entrepreneur, 
 
Please find enclosed a business grant of 100 000 TZS, which we give to you for free to develop your 
business. We trust that you will spend this money wisely. The funders of this grant require that we 
register how this money has been spent. For this purpose, we would like you to make a list of the 
items that you have spent the business grant on. We will collect this sheet when we visit your 
business in June‐July 2009. 
 
 
I have invested in the following items:  TSZ 
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.   
Sum  100 000
 
 
 
Date when sheet is collected by research team: 
 
 
 
 
Signed 
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Appendix B-3: Lab Instructions 
 
[Introduction] 
Welcome. We appreciate your willingness to participate in this session, which I will lead. In this 
session you will be asked to make some economic choices, and you will earn money based on your 
choices and your performance. 
The results from this session will be used in a research project on microcredit and entrepreneurship. It 
is therefore very important that all of you follow certain rules of conduct. You are not allowed to talk 
to any of the other participants during the session. If you have any questions or need any help, please 
raise your hand and one of us will assist you. All cell-phones must be turned off and put away If 
someone does not follow these instructions, we will have to ask him or her to leave the workshop. 
If you need to go to the bathroom during the workshop, please raise your hand. Importantly, do not 
leave the room without permission. 
We will now ask you to turn over the sheet which is on your desk. This is the registration form, which 
I will now read.  
My assistant will now collect the sheets. 
The session will be conducted under anonymity. It will not be possible for the other participants or 
anyone else, except for the researchers, ever to find out what choices you make, and hence what you 
earn in the session. This session consists of three activities. First, you will be asked some general 
questions not related to business. Second, you will be asked to make some choices under uncertainty. 
Finally, you will be asked some questions related to business. The activities are completely 
independent, which means that your performance in one activity has no impact on what happens in the 
other activities. The estimated time of the whole session is approximately two hours. 
In each activity, you can earn money. You will not be informed about how much money you have 
earned until the end of the session. The payment to you is organized as follows. The researchers keep 
track of how much money you earn throughout the session. At the end of the session, they prepare an 
envelope containing the money you have earned, where they will ensure that it is impossible to 
identify the amount of money inside the envelope simply by looking at it. This envelope will be 
handed over to you in private when you leave the session. 
[First round of questions - fixed rate] 
We will now explain the first activity in this session. We will shortly ask you some general questions 
not related to business. These questions are grouped in five different topics; sports and leisure, math, 
politics, health and nutrition, and places in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania. 
On each topic, we ask you 10 questions, and for each question you can choose between four different 
answers. Your job is to tick off the correct answer. You should only tick off one alternative. If you tick 
off more than one alternative, your answer will be considered incorrect. We now provide an example 
of how you should do this. 
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Your job is to tick off one of these answers. The correct answer is 67. Hence, if you tick off any of the 
other numbers, your answer is incorrect. In particular, you should never tick off more than one 
alternative. 
For each correct answer, you are paid the fixed rate of 250 TSZ. 
We will now hand out the questions on the first topic, sports and leisure, but please do not turn over 
the page before you are told to do so. 
You can now turn over the sheet. First, now and for all sheets that you receive, make sure that you fill 
in your correct desk number, so that we can pay you correctly. We will now read question by question, 
and then for each question you tick off what you think is the correct answer. 
Is this clear to everyone? If not, then please raise your hand and we will assist you. 
I'll now start reading the first question. 
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will collect the sheets, and hand 
out the questions for the second topic, math. Again, please do not turn over the sheet before you are 
told to do so. 
I'll now start reading the questions that are on your sheet. 
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will collect the sheets, and hand 
out the questions for the third topic, politics. Again, please do not turn over the sheet before you are 
told to do so. 
I'll now start reading the questions that are on your sheet. 
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will collect the sheets, and hand 
out the questions for the fourth topic, health and nutrition. Again, please do not turn over the sheet 
before you are told to do so. 
I'll now start reading the questions that are on your sheet. 
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will collect the sheets, and hand 
out the questions for the fifth topic, places in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania. Again, please do not turn 
over the sheet before you are told to do so. 
I'll now start reading the questions that are on your sheet 
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will now collect the sheets.  
 [Second round of questions – competition] 
You have now completed the first set of questions on the five topics. 
We will now ask you to answer a second set of questions on the same topics. This time, however, we 
will give you a choice between two different kinds of payment. One option for you is to work for the 
same fixed rate as you did with the first set of questions, namely that you receive 250 TSZ for each 
correct answer. Alternatively, you may choose to enter into a competition. Your payment will then 
depend on how well you perform relative to other microcredit clients from PRIDE. Let us explain in 
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more detail. We collected a group of microcredit clients at the same loan level as you from a different 
branch in PRIDE. We asked them to answer the same kind of questions as you will now answer, and 
we then calculated the average number of correct answers among these microcredit clients.  It is this 
average that you can choose to compete against. In the following, for short, we will refer to this 
average as the performance of a typical microcredit client. If you decide to compete, you will be paid 
TSZ  per correct answer if you provide at least as many correct answers as the typical microcredit 
client. However, if you provide fewer correct answers than the typical microcredit client, you will 
receive nothing.  
To give an example, suppose that the typical microcredit client provides 5 correct answers, and you 
manage to provide 6 answers correctly. If you chose to compete, you will then be rewarded the high 
rate of 750 TSZ per correct answer. However, if you only manage 4 correct answers, which is less than 
5, you will receive nothing.  
On the other hand, if you choose not to compete, you will always be rewarded the fixed rate of 250 
TSZ for each correct answer.  
The choice you have to make is summarized on the overhead projector.  
To repeat, if you choose not to compete you will earn 250 TSZ per correct answer. If you choose to 
compete, you will earn 750 TSZ per correct answer if you correctly answer at least as many as the 
typical microcredit client. Otherwise, you will receive nothing. Please raise your hand if you don’t 
understand.  
You can choose between the fixed rate and the competition for each of the five topics.  We will soon 
hand out a sheet where you have to make this choice for sports and leisure. However, let us first 
provide you with an example of how to do this. Look at this overhead: 
To repeat: First, you are asked to state whether you think you are better than, equally good as, or 
worse than a typical microcredit client in answering questions on sports and leisure. Second, you are 
asked to decide whether you want to work for a fixed rate or compete when answering questions on 
sports and leisure. Is this clear to everyone? If not, please raise your hand. 
 
We will now hand out this sheet. Please do not turn over the sheet before you are told to do so. 
I will now read the sheet. 
We will now collect the sheet for sports and leisure 
We will now hand out the same sheet for the second topic, math. Please do not turn over the sheet 
before you are told to do so. 
I will now read the sheet. 
We will now collect the sheet for math 
We will now hand out the same sheet for the third topic, politics. Please do not turn over the sheet 
before you are told to do so. 
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I will now read the sheet. 
We will now collect the sheet on politics. 
We will now hand out the same sheet for the fourth topic, health and nutrition. Please do not turn over 
the sheet before you are told to do so. 
I will now read the sheet. 
We will now collect the sheet for health and nutrition. 
 
We will now hand out the same sheet for the fifth topic, places in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania. Please 
do not turn over the sheet before you are told to do so. 
I will now read the sheet. 
 We will now collect the sheet for places in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania. 
We will now hand out the second set of questions, where again we start with sports and leisure. Please 
do not turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. 
I'll now start reading the questions on your sheet.  
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will collect the sheets, and hand 
out the questions for the second topic, math. Again, please do not turn over the sheet before you are 
told to do so. 
I'll now start reading the questions that are on your sheet. 
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will collect the sheets, and hand 
out the questions for the third topic, politics. Again, please do not turn over the sheet before you are 
told to do so. 
I'll now start reading the questions that are on your sheet. 
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will collect the sheets, and hand 
out the questions for the fourth topic, health and nutrition. Again, please do not turn over the sheet 
before you are told to do so. 
I'll now start reading the questions that are on your sheet. 
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will collect the sheets, and hand 
out the questions for the fifth topic, places in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania. Again, please do not turn 
over the sheet before you are told to do so. 
I'll now start reading the questions that are on your sheet. 
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will now collect the sheets.  
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You have now completed this part of the session. Our assistants will now calculate what you have 
earned in answering these questions, and prepare your payment from this part of the workshop. You 
will receive this payment at the end of the workshop.  
 
[Choices under uncertainty] 
We now move to the second part of the workshop, where you also can earn money, but in a different 
way. Let’s explain in more detail. 
First, we will simply give each of you 1000 TSZ. This is your money. You may decide to add it to the 
total amount of money that you are paid at the end of the session, or you may decide to take a risk. If 
you take the risk, then you can be lucky or unlucky. If you are lucky, you will get 6000 TSZ instead of 
1000 TSZ. If you are unlucky, you lose the 1000 TSZ and nothing is added to your final payment from 
this situation 
Here is how we decide whether you have been lucky or unlucky. When everyone has made their 
choice of whether to take the risk or not, we prepare two pieces of paper; one piece with the word 
LUCKY, the other piece with the word UNLUCKY. 
We will then put them into two identical and empty envelopes, and the envelopes will be placed in this 
bowl. Thus it will be impossible for any of us to identify which envelope contains the word LUCKY. 
We will randomly select one of you to make the draw of one of the envelopes. If this envelope 
contains the word LUCKY, we will pay 6000 TSZ to those of you who chose to take risk. However, if 
this envelope contains the word UNLUCKY, those who chose to take the risk will not receive 
anything in this situation. Thus, it is equally likely that those who take the risk are LUCKY or 
UNLUCKY. 
For those of you who chose the certain payment, the outcome of this draw does not affect your pay. In 
any case, you receive the certain payment of 1000 TSZ. 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make the choice of whether to risk your 1000 TSZ 
or keep them. Please do not turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. 
You should now make the choice of whether to risk your 1000 TSZ or keep them. 
We will now collect the sheet. 
We will now proceed to determine the outcome for those of you who took the risk in this situation. 
We will now put the envelopes in the bowl, and then decide who should make the draw of one of the 
envelopes. We do this by picking at random one of the desk numbers from this bowl. 
Desk number xx is chosen to pick one of the envelopes. 
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We will shortly open the envelope and reveal whether the participants who took the risk were LUCKY 
or UNLUCKY in this situation. However, first we will ask you to make a few more choices of this 
kind. In the meantime, we post the envelope on the wall.  
Now we move on to a new situation. Again, we will give you some money, this time 1500 TSZ. This 
is your money. You may decide to add it to the total amount of money that you are paid at the end of 
the session, or you may decide to take a risk. If you take the risk, then you can be lucky or unlucky. If 
you are lucky, you will get 6000 TSZ instead of 1500 TSZ. If you are unlucky, you lose the 1500 TSZ 
and nothing is added to your final payment from this situation 
After everyone has made their choice, we will again prepare two envelopes and follow the same 
procedure as earlier. Thus, it is equally likely that those who take the risk are LUCKY or UNLUCKY. 
 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make the choice of whether to risk your 1500 TSZ 
or keep them. Please do not turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. 
You should now make the choice of whether to risk your 1500 TSZ or keep them. 
We will now collect the sheet. 
We will now proceed to determine the outcome for those of you who took the risk in this situation. 
We will now put the envelopes in the bowl, and then decide who should make the draw of one of the 
envelopes.  
Desk number xx is chosen to pick one of the envelopes. 
Now we move on to the next situation. Again, we will give you some money, this time 2000 TSZ. 
This is your money. You may decide to add it to the total amount of money that you are paid at the 
end of the session, or you may decide to take a risk. If you take the risk, then you can be lucky or 
unlucky. If you are lucky, you will get 6000 TSZ instead of 2000 TSZ. If you are unlucky, you lose 
the 2000 TSZ and nothing is added to your final payment from this situation 
After everyone has made their choice, we will again prepare two envelopes and follow the same 
procedure as earlier.  
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make the choice of whether to risk your 2000 TSZ 
or keep them. Please do not turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. 
You should now make the choice of whether to risk your 2000 TSZ or keep them. 
We will now collect the sheet. 
We will now proceed to determine the outcome for those of you who took the risk in this situation. 
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We will now put the envelopes in the bowl, and then decide who should make the draw of one of the 
envelopes.  
Desk number xx is chosen to pick one of the envelopes. 
We now turn to the last situation in this section of the workshop 
Again, we will give you some money, this time 2500 TSZ. This is your money. You may decide to 
add it to the total amount of money that you are paid at the end of the session, or you may decide to 
take a risk. If you take the risk, then you can be lucky or unlucky. If you are lucky, you will get 6000 
TSZ instead of 2500 TSZ. If you are unlucky, you lose the 2500 TSZ and nothing is added to your 
final payment from this situation 
After everyone has made their choice, we will again prepare two envelopes and follow the same 
procedure as earlier.  
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make the choice of whether to risk your 2500 TSZ 
or keep them. Please do not turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. 
You should now make the choice of whether to risk your 2500 TSZ or keep them. 
We will now collect the sheet. 
We will now proceed to determine the outcome for those of you who took the risk in this situation. 
We will now put the envelopes in the bowl, and then decide who should make the draw of one of the 
envelopes.  
Desk number xx is chosen to pick one of the envelopes. 
We have now completed all four situations in this part of the session.  
We will now, for each of the four situations, reveal whether those who took the risk were lucky or 
unlucky.  Let us start with the first situation. 
Those who took the risk in the first situation were…. 
You have now completed the second part of this session. Our assistants will now calculate what you 
have earned when making these choices, and prepare your payment from this part of the workshop. 
You will receive this payment at the end of the workshop.  
[Best practices in business - fixed rate] 
We now move to the third part of the workshop, where you can also earn money. You will be asked to 
answer 10 questions about best practices in running a business. Also here, for each question, you can 
choose between four different answers. Your job is to tick off the correct answer. Please remember 
only to tick off one alternative for each question. If you tick off more than one alternative, we will 
consider your answer as incorrect. For each correct answer, you are paid a fixed rate of 250 TSZ. 
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We will now hand out the sheet with business questions. Please do not turn over the sheet before you 
are told to do so. 
I'll now start reading the questions that are on your sheet. 
You have now answered all the questions on best business practices. My assistants will now collect 
the sheets.  
 [Best practices in business – competition] 
We will now ask you to answer a second set of questions on best practices in business. This time, 
however, we will give you a choice between two different kinds of payment. One option for you is to 
work for the same fixed rate as you did with the first set, namely that you receive 250 TSZ for each 
correct answer. Alternatively, you may choose to enter into a competition. Your payment will then 
depend on how well you perform relative to a typical microcredit client. If you decide to compete, you 
will be paid 750 TSZ per correct answer if you provide at least as many correct answers as the typical 
microcredit client. However, if you provide fewer correct answers than the typical microcredit client, 
you earn nothing.  
We will now hand out a sheet where you are asked to decide whether you want to work for a fixed rate 
or compete on this topic. As before, you are also asked to state whether you think you are better than, 
equally good as, or worse than a typical microcredit client in answering questions on best practices in 
business. 
I’ll now read the sheet. 
We will now collect the sheet for business. 
We are now ready to give you the second set of questions on business practices. 
I'll now start reading the questions.  
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will collect the sheets. 
You have now completed the last part of the session. My assistants will now prepare the payments you 
have earned throughout the workshop before you leave. This will be paid to you just after the session.  
Additionally, you will be paid an amount as compensation for participating. Your participation 
compensation will be handed over to you by your PRIDE branch manager.  
This is how we will proceed for the participation compensation. You can choose between three 
alternatives.  
To repeat: First alternative: You can choose to receive your participation compensation one week from 
now, on Monday March 23. You will then receive a participation compensation of 15,000 TSZ.  
Second alternative: You can choose to receive your participation compensation three weeks from now, 
on Monday April 6. You will then receive a participation compensation of 20,000 TSZ. 
Third choice: You can choose to receive your participation compensation five weeks from now, on 
Monday April 20. You will then receive a participation compensation of 25,000 TSZ.  
69 
 
Based on your choice, we will give you a signed letter to certify your right to receive your 
participation compensation, and date of collecting the payment from your branch manager. For the 
branch manager, we will prepare an envelope with your name and a specification of your chosen 
payment date on the envelope, and your participation compensation inside of it. We will prepare the 
envelope so that it is impossible for anybody, including the branch manager, to identify its content.  
Is this understood? Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
We will now hand out the sheet where you choose the date of payment for your participation 
compensation.   
Now my assistants will collect your papers.  
This ends the workshop. Our assistants will now prepare your payments.  
In addition to the payment from this session and the participation compensation, we are happy to 
announce that we will also give each of you, as a gift, a business grant of 100,000 TSZ, which you can 
use to develop and expand your business. This grant will be handed over in a separate envelope after 
the session. We trust that you will spend this money wisely on developing your business, and wish you 
all the best in your future business activities.  
The funders of this business grant require that we register how this money has been used. For this 
purpose, we ask you to specify how you spent the grant. In the envelope containing the business grant, 
there is a sheet for this purpose. We will collect this sheet when we visit your business in June/July 
2009. 
While we are waiting for the assistants to prepare the payments which you have earned, we would like 
to offer you some refreshments. After the refreshments we will give you an envelope with your 
payment and the signed sheet for your participation compensation, and an envelope with the business 
grant.  
We would like to thank you all for participating in this session. Your input will be most valuable for 
our research project on microcredit and entrepreneurship. May we ask you not to discuss this session 
with others before the end of this week, since we will arrange further sessions with other microcredit 
clients the coming days. Please leave the pen on your desk when you leave the room. Again, thank you 
for your participation in this workshop. 
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Abstract 
Field experiments documenting positive treatment effects have a strong policy message: Scale 
up! However, such experiments are typically implemented under the close supervision of the 
research group in charge of the study. In contrast, scaling up would typically imply relying on 
local organization. It is not obvious that the positive treatment effects identified in the 
research-led intervention can be replicated locally. The present study explicitly addresses this 
challenge by analysing the local version of a research-led business training program among 
small-scale microfinance entrepreneurs in Tanzania. Comparing attendance in the local and 
external programs, we find that success in local implementation cannot be taken for granted. 
The paper also analyses the effect of business training on outcome variables of interest to the 
microfinance institution, and provides evidence on willingness to pay for training. We 
conclude that i) business training can be successfully implemented locally when the 
institutional environment is right; ii) training is likely to be beneficial to the microfinance 
institution; and iii) it should be possible to charge a participation fee that covers most of the 
cost of such a program. 
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1. Introduction 
A recent literature in development economics has used field experiments to investigate a host 
of issues of importance to policy makers, including the role of community participation in 
improving health services (Björkman and Svensson 2009), the effect of deworming on 
educational outcomes (Kremer and Miguel 2003), and the extent to which business training 
can increase profits for microentrepreneurs (Karlan and Valdivia, forthcoming, Berge et al., 
2011). These studies evaluate carefully implemented interventions, closely monitored by a 
research team. To draw policy implications, however, one would like to know what the effect 
of a program is when the researchers have stepped back, and what the willingness of local 
stakeholders is to implement such a program. Success in the research-driven experiment does 
not automatically translate into success when the program is implemented locally, and does 
not always capture all objectives of importance to the local stakeholders.  
The difficulty of scaling up is particularly pressing when the program is complex, such as 
business training, where the intervention stretches over time, and where the organizational 
setting and skills of the teachers matter greatly for the quality of the service provided. As 
emphasized by Sternberg et al. (forthcoming) when analyzing the challenges of scaling up 
educational programs: “Programs often work on a small scale due to adoption by highly 
motivated individuals. Moreover, in the context of small-scale implementations, a key factor 
is often the proximity of the creators of the program to its first adopters and implementers. 
This proximity implies not only the physical proximity, but also the proximity of ideas and 
beliefs—those educators who are willing to try new programs usually see a value in doing so 
and thus are more predisposed to raise the odds of the program to succeed. Therefore, 
programs may work on a small scale, but they fail when they are upscaled because the initial 
sample of the program’s deliverers was not representative of the larger population” (p. 9). 
In Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010) and Berge et al. (2011), we document that a business 
training program given by professional trainers from the University of Dar es Salaam 
Entrepreneurship Centre (UDEC) significantly affected business skills, entrepreneurial 
attitudes, business practices, and business outcomes among microfinance clients of the 
microfinance institution Promotion of Rural Initiative and Development Enterprise (PRIDE) 
Tanzania. For PRIDE, the business training program was seen as a pilot project that, if 
successful, would be implemented in one form or another by PRIDE itself. However, two 
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important questions remain, even if positive effects are documented for the clients: Can 
PRIDE implement the program? Do they want to implement it?  
First, we discuss the question of whether PRIDE can implement the program. Because 
outsourcing business training to professional trainers, such as UDEC, is expensive and hard to 
implement on a large scale in Tanzania, an important question for PRIDE is whether such a 
program can be offered in-house by PRIDE credit officers. Would the quality of such an 
internal program be sufficiently high to attract the attention of the entrepreneurs, as was the 
case for the course offered by the professional trainers? 
The second question is whether PRIDE want to implement the program? In Berge et al. 
(2011), we document a positive impact of business training on business outcomes, in 
particular for male entrepreneurs. Thus, from a societal point of view, business training is 
likely to be beneficial. However, as stressed by Armendãriz de Aghion and Morduch (2010), a 
microfinance institution typically balances social impacts on the one hand and financial 
sustainability on the other hand, which means that PRIDE also has to consider the benefits 
and costs for the institution from offering the training. One motive for PRIDE to offer 
business training to its clients on a regular basis is clearly that this could give PRIDE a 
competitive edge over other microfinance institutions and, thus, attract more customers. 
Another motive is that business training could improve the quality of PRIDE’s clients, in the 
sense that the clients would be more loyal to the bank, and that increased business skills 
would translate into higher loans and fewer payment problems.  However, it not obvious that 
increased business skills would lead to higher loans and fewer exits. Indeed, a more 
knowledgeable and successful entrepreneur may find cheaper sources of finance outside of 
the microfinance institution, which, after all, charges a relatively high interest rate on the 
loans, as well as imposing other conditions such as joint liability and frequent loan meetings. 
If training triggers the exit of clients, the microfinance institution may become more reluctant 
to offer such services to its clients. Further, PRIDE’s decision on whether to offer the training 
would also depend on the entrepreneurs’ willingness to pay for such a course. Do PRIDE 
have to offer the program for free to make it attractive to the clients, or can they cover the 
costs by imposing a participation fee? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
intervention, a business training program offered to microfinance entrepreneurs in Dar es 
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Salaam, Tanzania. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy, with an emphasis on 
randomization procedures, and Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 summarizes the 
feedback on the training program by the external trainers, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. The training program 
The business training program consisted of 21 sessions, each lasting 45 minutes, and was 
offered at the premises of PRIDE immediately after the weekly loan meeting. The aim of the 
program, which commenced in August 2008 and ended in January 2009, was to unleash 
entrepreneurship among their clients. The course covered a range of topics, such as record 
keeping, marketing practices, customer care, and employee management. It was developed by 
the University of Dar es Salaam Entrepreneurship Centre (UDEC), and piloted extensively.19 
The trainers from UDEC implemented the course at two branches chosen for the study, and 
taught each session four times at each branch. There was neither a course fee nor any sitting 
allowances.   
For capacity building purposes, PRIDE chose four of its credit officers to follow the training 
given by UDEC. The credit officers would then lecture on the same topic to a fifth group of 
entrepreneurs. The professional trainers also attended these lectures in order to give feedback 
on the performance of the credit officers. 
3. Empirical strategy 
The two main questions addressed in the present analysis are: first, is the microfinance 
institution capable of offering a training program of a sufficiently high quality?; and second, 
would it be in the interest of the microfinance institution to offer such a course?  In order to 
address the first question, we focus on the attendance at the sessions offered by the 
professional trainers (external training) and by the local credit officers (internal training), with 
a high attendance indicating high quality. Regarding the second question, we focus on 
membership in PRIDE. If business training leads to massive exit from the institution, as 
trained clients for instance qualify for less expensive loans in ordinary banks, the institution 
may not benefit from offering such a program. 
                                                            
19 The training program is described in detail in Berge et al. (2011). 
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We use the idea of a randomized field experiments to address these questions.20 Two groups 
were randomly chosen, one of which was offered a treatment (the treated group), whereas the 
other (the control group) was not. As the two groups, on average, should be identical in terms 
of observables and, more importantly, unobservables, any post-treatment difference between 
the two groups captures the causal impact of the intervention. 
In the present paper, we investigate two interventions. In the first, which we call the type-of-
training experiment, the treated group is the internally trained group (or “internal group”, for 
short), and the control group is the externally trained group (the “external group”). In the 
second intervention, which we call the impact-of-training experiment, the treated group is the 
group offered training, whereas the control group is the group not offered training. 
3.1 Randomization procedures  
We selected two of PRIDE’s branches in Dar es Salaam for the interventions, the Magomeni 
and Buguruni branches, which we refer to as Branch A and Branch B, respectively, in the 
following. For the impact-of-training experiment, we randomly chose two days for training 
and two days for non-training. More precisely training was carried out on Tuesdays in Branch 
A, and on Thursdays in Branch B. For the control group, we chose Mondays in Branch A and 
Wednesdays in Branch B. By choosing treatment and control on different days, we minimized 
spillovers from the treatment group to the control group.  
As loan groups were randomly assigned a loan meeting day and hour according to the 
availability of time slots at the branches, there is no reason to believe that there was any 
systematic difference between clients according to the day of the loan meeting. Thus, the 
entrepreneurs were effectively randomly assigned to either training or no training. This allows 
us to identify a causal effect of training on the outcomes of interest.21  
For the type-of-training experiment, we randomly chose one hour of the day for the internal 
training. More precisely, the internal session was offered to clients who had their loan 
                                                            
20 On the methodology of randomization, see Duflo et al. (2008). For a critical perspective, see Deaton (2009) 
and Rodrik (2009). 
21 Berge et al. (2011) analyze in detail the effect of the training program offered by UDEC on business-related 
issues. 
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meeting at 2 pm, while the four external training sessions were offered to clients who had 
their loan meetings between 9 am and 1 pm. As the hour the of loan meeting was allocated 
according to availability, there is no reason to believe that the loan groups were different in 
any systematic way according to the hour of their loan meeting.  
For both interventions, we only considered clients with PRIDE loans between 500 000 TZS 
and 1 000 000 TZS, amounts that represented the second and third steps on the loan ladder in 
the group lending program. This was motivated by the fact that there were very high dropout 
rates among clients with smaller loans, and also that we wanted to avoid an excessively 
heterogeneous target group for the lectures.  
For the impact-of-training experiment, we conducted a baseline survey among the clients 
eligible for training or non-training. We managed to interview 644 of the 1164 eligible clients 
(319 from the training group and 325 from the non-training group). The baseline survey was 
presented to the entrepreneurs as an effort “to identify strategies to improve the functioning of 
microcredit institutions in Tanzania”, and, hence, they were not informed about the 
prospective business training course. After the baseline survey, the clients we had reached 
through the training group received an invitation to attend training, whereas the clients we had 
reached through the non-training group constituted the control group for this intervention. 
Table 1 indicates that the randomization procedure was successful, in that the treatment and 
control groups in the impact-of-training experiment were in terms of a set of observable 
background characteristics. 
For the type-of-training experiment, we did not conduct a baseline survey of the clients who 
were eligible for the internal training because we did not initially plan to include them in the 
research part of the project. For this group, therefore, we invited all eligible clients that we 
could reach at the loan meeting where the training was announced. Effectively, the share of 
eligible clients that we reached for the internal group was close to the share of clients that we 
reached with the baseline survey and, thus, we made the working assumption that the pool of 
invited clients for the internal training was the same size as the pool of invited clients for the 
external training. Moreover, the letter of invitation to training was the same for all clients and, 
hence, they did not know ex ante that two different training programs, one internal and one 
external, were going to be implemented. We therefore argue that there should not be any 
systematic difference between the pool of clients that showed up initially for the external 
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training or the internal training. Hence, despite the slight difference in recruitment procedure, 
we shall think of the type-of-training experiment as a randomized experiment, with the group 
showing up initially at the internal session as the treated group, and the group showing up 
initially at the external sessions as the control group.22 
3.2 Treatmentcontrol balances 
Table 2 shows the balance between the treatment and control groups in the impact-of-training 
experiment. There were 644 individuals in this sample, of which 319 were trained and 325 
were not trained. Except for the fact that there were somewhat more females in the control 
group (69%) than in the trained group (62%), the difference being significant at the 10%  
level, the table shows no difference between the two groups on observables. In both groups, 
the average participant is around 40 years old, with a PRIDE loan of 770 000 TZS (USD 510), 
and just under eight years of schooling. This equality in background variables is also 
consistent with the fact that there is no systematic difference between clients according to the 
day of the loan meeting.  
Table 1 shows the balance between the treatment and control groups in the type-of-training 
experiment.23 The sample consisted of 349 clients, all of whom attended either the first or the 
second session of the program. Of these, 290 belonged to the external group and 59 to the 
internal group. The external group was divided into four classes in Branch A, classes A1A4, 
and four classes in Branch B, classes B1B4. For the internal group, there was one class in 
each branch, A5 and B5.24  
There are no significant differences between the two groups on observable background 
variables, which indicates that the randomization procedure was successful. This is also 
consistent with there not being any systematic difference between clients according to the 
hour of the loan meeting. 
                                                            
22 We focus on clients who attended the first and the second session, at which point it was not clear to the 
participants that the programs were different. The first session was an introduction to the course, and in this 
lecture the external trainer played a leading role in the internal the as well as the external program. Gradually, 
however, as the internal trainer became more experienced, the external trainer simply took the role of observer in 
the internal program. Focusing only on those who attended the first session gives very similar results, but the 
sample size is naturally smaller.  
23 Table 1 includes a variable on prior business knowledge, collected in the baseline survey and thus not 
available for the internal group. Hence, this variable is not included in Table 2. 
24 Figure 1A in the Appendix reports attendance rates for each of the six sessions. 
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3.3 Econometric models 
For the impact-of-training experiment, we estimate the following equation: 
0 1i i i iY Training X               (1)  
where Y is an outcome variable, Training is a binary variable taking a value of one if the 
entrepreneur was offered trained and zero if not, and X is a vector of control variables. Given 
that there are no systematic differences between the group that was offered training and the 
control group, 1  measures the causal impact of the training on the outcome variable. For the 
type-of training-experiment, we estimate the following equation: 
0 1 2 3*i i i i i i iY Internal Internal Branch Branch X              (2) 
where Y is an outcome variable, Internal is a binary variable taking a value of one if training 
was internal and zero if it was external, Branch is a binary variable taking a value of one for 
Branch B and zero for Branch A, Internal*Branch is an interaction term, indicating whether 
the internal training at Branch B had a different impact on attendance than did the internal 
training in Branch A, and X is a vector of control variables. 
Our focus on the interaction term between internal training and the branch, and not on 
external training and the branch, is based on the fact that external training was standardized 
across branches, with the same teacher giving the lecture in both branches. In contrast, the 
internal trainers were branch specific. Moreover, it is plausible that the local environment at 
the branch could have had a greater impact on the internal training program than it did on the 
external one. For instance, the added attraction of professional trainers from the university 
could be necessary to overcome turbulence and delays at the loan meetings, factors which 
could lead to dropouts from an internal program.25 
Finally, we study the willingness to pay for training by estimating the following equation: 
0i i iY X               (3)  
                                                            
25 We also considered whether the external training differed across branches, but found no significant effects. 
Therefore, the branch variable was not included in the econometric model for the impact-of-training experiment. 
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where X is a vector of background variables. Note that because we are most interested in the 
willingness to pay for business training for those who have not received such training, i.e., the 
control group, we are not looking for treatment effects on this issue.  
4. Results 
4.1 The type-of-training experiment: Can they do it? 
Is the local institution able to offer a high-quality course in-house? In order to answer this 
question, we focus on attendance, the assumption being that if quality is low, attendance will 
be low as well.  
We start the analysis of attendance with an overview of the evolution of attendance over time 
for the different branches and types of training, conditioned on attendance in either the first or 
second session (see Figure 1).  
The figure shows average attendance for the four externally trained classes, A1–A4, and B1–
B4, compared with the two groups of internally trained clients, A5 and B5. We can clearly see 
that for class B5, which is marked with a dashed line, attendance dropped substantially more 
after the first two sessions than was the case for the other three groups. In fact, the average 
attendance for B5 was 10 out of the 21 sessions, compared with 16 sessions for the internally 
trained in the other branch (class A5), and, again, 16 for the externally trained classes in each 
branch. Strikingly, attendance for class B5 was the lowest among all classes for all sessions 
except one. 
Table 3 shows the result from estimating Equation 2, and confirms the impression from 
Figure 1.26 As our sample is limited to those who actually showed up at the first or second 
sessions, we measured attendance by attendance at all subsequent lectures, i.e., from class 3 to 
class 21. Regression (1) shows the results without covariates, and regression (2) with 
covariates. We find no statistically significant difference in attendance between the internally 
and externally trained groups in Branch A. Indeed, if anything, the coefficient on Training 
Internal is positive, indicating a higher attendance for the internally trained group than for the 
                                                            
26 In Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010), we focus on how background variables from a lab experiment may shed 
light on attendance in the external training program. 
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externally trained group in Branch A. 
The interaction term is negative and significant at the one per cent level. It shows an average 
difference in attendance between the internally trained groups in the two branches of more 
than six lectures. This is a quantitatively large difference, corresponding to one quarter of the 
total course. 
Finally, we observe that attendance is not related to gender, number of years at school 
(education), or loan size at PRIDE. However, regression (2) shows that attendance was 
somewhat higher for people above median age, possibly due to younger entrepreneurs having 
more extensive domestic obligations. 
Our data do not allow us to identify the reasons for the difference in success in implementing 
the internal program between the two branches. It could be the result of teacher-specific 
factors or the local environment in which the training took place, such as physical 
infrastructure or organization of loan meetings, or perhaps a combination of personal and 
institutional factors. Hence, our analysis suggests that the answer to the question “Can they do 
it?” is yes, but that success cannot be taken for granted and is sensitive to the local conditions. 
. 
4.2 The impact-of-training experiment: Should they do it? 
In order to address this question, ideally we would have liked to analyze the impact of the 
locally implemented course. However, as noted earlier, we do not have a control group of 
untrained clients for the internal group and, hence, we are limited to studying the effect of the 
external training program on outcomes of relevance to PRIDE. Nevertheless, we know from 
the analysis above that PRIDE seems to be able to implement a program of similar quality 
when the conditions are right. Therefore, any results on the impact of external training can 
serve as an indicator of how a successfully implemented program may affect PRIDE. 
By offering a training program, a microfinance institution could potentially obtain both better 
clients (higher loan levels, fewer repayment problems) and more clients (existing clients stay, 
training attracts new clients). However, of course, training is costly, even if implemented 
locally. Some, or all, of these costs may be recovered by a participation fee, but that depends 
on the clients’ willingness to pay. Moreover, training could lead to exit, as trained 
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entrepreneurs are able to identify alternative, and cheaper, sources of finance for their 
investments, such as their own savings or loans from ordinary banks. This would reduce the 
value of training for the institution. 
While our data do not allow us to undertake a complete cost–benefit analysis, at least we are 
able to shed light on some relevant aspects. First, Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden (2011) 
demonstrate that training has led to improved business practices, such as bookkeeping, and, 
for male entrepreneurs, higher profits. These positive effects should translate into fewer 
payment problems, meaning better clients for PRIDE. However, if the trained clients exit, the 
fact that training has improved their financial performance would be of limited value to 
PRIDE. We therefore start our analysis by looking at the exit data, and then address the 
clients’ willingness to pay for training. 
4.2.1 Exit 
Table 4 shows the results from estimating Equation 1, with the outcome variable being exit 
from PRIDE. The sample consists of the entrepreneurs interviewed in the baseline survey, and 
the background variables are also from that survey.  
Regression (1) shows that 45 per cent of the clients interviewed in mid-2008 had exited the 
microfinance institution two and a half years later. Interestingly, training had no effect on the 
exit rate. Thus, any fears within PRIDE of the training leading clients to exit are not supported 
by the data, but, of course, neither is the hope that training would lead to more loyal clients. 
Regarding the control variables, we observe a lower propensity to exit amongst the higher-age 
clients. This could well reflect the fact that older clients have a longer relationship with 
PRIDE and also have more well-established businesses. The size of the latest PRIDE loan, 
gender, and education do not relate systematically to the exit decision. 
In sum, together with the observation documented in Berge et al. (2011) that training has led 
to improved business practices, such as bookkeeping, and higher profits (for males), the fact 
that training does not lead to exit is good news for PRIDE. Any additional effect that training 
may have in attracting more, and perhaps more attractive, clients, would of course strengthen 
this conclusion. 
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4.2.2 Willingness to pay 
Offering a business training program is costly. Indeed, the variable cost per participant of the 
externally provided training program was estimated to be around 100 000 TZS (USD 67). 
This covers compensation to the trainers, as well as expenses related to providing teaching 
materials and soft drinks to the participants. 
A relevant question for the local institution when considering whether to offer training in-
house is whether at least part of their costs can be covered by a participation fee. How much 
are the entrepreneurs willing to pay for such a training program? In the follow-up survey 
conducted in mid-2009, we asked the entrepreneurs this question.27 
One might expect that the answers to this question, which of course should be interpreted with 
some caution, would depend on whether the respondent had in fact received training or not. 
Indeed, comparing the responses of the trained and untrained, we find that the average 
willingness to pay amongst the untrained was 56 400 TZS (approximately USD 37.6), 
compared with 45 400 TZS (approximately USD 30.3) amongst the trained, the difference of 
11 000 TZS being statistically significant at the five per cent level (t-test of equality, p-value 
= 0.022). This may reflect the fact that the trained clients in general feel a lesser need to 
undergo yet another training program. 
To PRIDE, it is the willingness to pay for the untrained that is more relevant, and, hence, this 
is the sample we focus on here. The average willingness to pay for this group, 56 400 TZS, is 
around half of the estimated cost of offering such a course using the external trainers. 
Presumably, however, PRIDE can organize the course cheaper in-house. Our numbers 
therefore indicate that it should be possible for PRIDE to cover most of its costs through 
participation fees. 
Interestingly, the average willingness to pay conceals a quite large variation amongst the 
entrepreneurs, as illustrated by Figure 2. Clearly, while charging a higher price would exclude 
many clients, quite a few clients declared a willingness to pay close to 100 000 TZS, which in 
fact would cover all the variable costs of a program given by UDEC. Who are the 
                                                            
27 The exact question was: “Imagine that you were given the opportunity to participate in a 20-session (with 60 
minutes per session) entrepreneurship training course catered to your level. What is the maximum amount you 
would be willing to pay per session?” 
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entrepreneurs with the higher willingness to pay for business training? The answer to this 
question may be of great importance to PRIDE in their consideration of which pricing policy 
to follow if offering such a course. 
Table 5 reports the results from estimating Equation 3, limited to the untrained entrepreneurs. 
Interestingly, we observe that clients with greater prior business knowledge are more willing 
to pay for the training, the coefficient suggesting an additional willingness to pay relative to 
younger clients of 16 600 TZS, corresponding to 30% of the average for the control group 
(which, as noted above, was 56 400 TZS). This may indicate that PRIDE faces a problem 
whereby the clients who are in more need of training are less willing to pay for such a course. 
Thus, these clients may be excluded from training if PRIDE were to charge a price that 
covered the variable cost of training, which illustrates the difficulty involved in the trade-off 
between financial sustainability and social impacts. The fact that older people are more 
willing to pay for the training is consistent with the observation in Table 3 that attendance in 
the course is increasing with age. 
5. External trainers’ review 
The external trainers’ review of the program may be useful for the development and 
implementation of future training programs, and in this section we discuss some of the main 
conclusions in the report that they delivered to the research team after the completion of the 
course.  
The external trainers highlight the diverse background of the participants, not only in terms of 
education, but also with respect to prior business knowledge and experience. This diversity 
made it challenging to tailor the course to the individual needs of the entrepreneurs. We note, 
however, that education is not significantly related to attendance in Table 3, which indicates 
that the trainers managed to present the material in a way that was accessible and interesting 
for the different types of participants. Nevertheless, the trainers suggest in their report that it 
could have been useful to supplement the training with individual consulting on specific 
issues and problems. 
Even though the clients has different backgrounds, most of them has the same issues in mind 
when attending the lectures, for example, “How can I get more customers?”, “How can I get 
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a larger loan?”, and “How can I make my business more profitable?”. Participants enjoyed 
learning from each other’s experiences, and they were willing to share their business 
challenges and problems. A participatory method was adopted in the training and according to 
the trainers this motivated participants to be more active and involved throughout the course. 
The trainers also emphasized the importance of relating the lectures to real world examples, to 
make the insights more vivid for the entrepreneurs.   
Some topics in the training were appreciated more than others according to the trainers, 
particularly marketing, customer service, recording keeping, and sources of finance. 
Interestingly, as reported in Berge et al. (2011), we also found that the training has a strong 
impact on the business practices along these dimensions. On the negative side, many clients 
complained to the trainers that the course lasted for too long, which made it hard for the 
clients to keep up attendance. Hence, in future programs, one might consider sharpening the 
focus of the program, possibly dropping some of the more abstract sessions that were less 
well received by the participants.    
6. Conclusion 
The many recent field experiments conducted in poor countries have improved our 
understanding of the causal mechanisms at work in the development process. At the same 
time, from a policy perspective, there has been a lack of focus on how these research projects 
can be taken further and, particularly on the extent to which they can be implemented and 
scaled up by local stakeholders. In this paper, we have discussed these challenges in light of a 
recent field experiment in Tanzania, where our research team organized a business training 
program for a group of entrepreneurs in the microfinance institution PRIDE. As part of this 
research project, we also implemented initiatives that should assist PRIDE in scaling up the 
program, if successful, and we showed that PRIDE was capable of doing so in one of the 
branches in our study. This indicates that there is local capacity to sustain and expand this 
training program within PRIDE, whereas the lack of success in the other branch highlights 
that such initiatives are more sensitive to local conditions than is the case for a research-
driven project. We also provide some evidence indicating that it would be in the interest of 
PRIDE to scale up this training program, both to preserve financial sustainability and improve 
its social impact.  
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Our study highlights the importance of investigating the local capacity and local willingness 
to build on the lessons from a research driven field experiment. Further research is clearly 
needed in this area, to ensure that not only researchers, but also the local communities, benefit 
from the many important field experiments presently conducted in developing countries. 
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Figure 1: Development in attendance over time 
 
Note: The figure shows attendance rates at each of the 21 sessions of the training program for the internal and 
external groups, at the branch level. There are two classes in the internal group, A5 at Branch A and B5 at 
Branch B. Attendance rates for the external group are shown as the average of the four external classes A1A4 
in Branch A and, similarly, the average of classes B1B5 in Branch B. For further details, see Figure 1A in the 
Appendix. 
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Figure 2: Willingness to pay for business training 
0
10
20
30
40
P
er
ce
nt
0 100 200 300 400
Willingness to Pay
 
Note: The figure shows the distribution of the willingness to pay for a 20-session business training program, in 
Tanzanian Shillings, based on the response of the 260 entrepreneurs in the control group that we managed to 
reach in 2009. The willingness to pay is calculated by multiplying by 20 the expressed willingness to pay for a 
single session of a 20-session program. 
 
Table 1: Treatmentcontrol balance: Type-of-training experiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Internal Group External Group Difference          
Female   0.61 0.63 0.61 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) 
Age   39.56 39.73 39.53 0.20 
 (0.45) (0.95) (0.51) (1.35) 
PRIDE loan 753.01 754.24 752.76 1.48 
 12.74 (31.27) (13.97) (34.04) 
Education 7.79 7.82 7.82 -0.19 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.29) 
Observations 349 59 290  
Note: The table reports average values. Female is a dummy variable with a value of one if the participant is a 
female. Age is expressed in number of years. PRIDE loan denotes the loan size in 2008, in thousands of 
Tanzanian shillings. Education is the number of years of schooling. Standard errors are in parentheses: 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2: Treatmentcontrol balance: Impact-of-training experiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Training 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Difference       
Female   0.66 0.62 0.69 -0.07* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Age   39.71 39.30 40.11 -0.80 
 (0.33) (0.47) (0.47) (0.66) 
PRIDE loan 770.34 761.13 779.38 -18.26 
 (9.39) (13.37) (13.20) (18.79) 
Education 7.93 7.80 8.06 -0.26 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) 
Prior business knowledge 4.93 4.95 4.90 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
Observations 644 319 325  
Note: The table reports average values. Female is a dummy variable with a value of one if the participant is a 
female. Age is expressed in number of years. PRIDE loan denotes the loan size in 2008, in thousands of 
Tanzanian shillings. Education is the number of years of schooling. Prior business knowledge is measured by the 
number of correct answers on a test conducted as part of the baseline survey (010). Standard errors are in 
parentheses, and the star symbol indicates p<0.10 from two-sided t-tests of equality. 
 
Table 3: Attendance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Attendance 
no covar. 
Attendance 
with covar. 
Diploma 
with covar. 
Diploma 
no covar. 
     
Training Internal 0.87 0.89 -0.04 -0.04 
 (1.06) (1.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Training Internal *Branch B -6.18*** -6.08*** -0.36** -0.36** 
 (1.76) (1.73) (0.14) (0.15) 
Branch B 0.29 0.42 0.03 0.04 
 (0.56) (0.58) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female  -0.82  -0.02 
  (0.57)  (0.04) 
PRIDE loan_High  -0.19  -0.01 
  (0.53)  (0.04) 
Age_High  1.33***  0.02 
  (0.51)  (0.03) 
Education_High  0.92  0.06 
  (0.62)  (0.04) 
Constant 13.79*** 13.42*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 
 (0.43) (0.63) (0.03) (0.04) 
Observations 349 349 349 349 
Note: The table reports regressions on the number of sessions attended by the entrepreneurs, and whether the 
client qualified for a diploma by attending 10 or more sessions. Training Internal is a dummy indicating that the 
training was provided by internal lecturers. Branch B is a dummy indicating that the client was a member of 
Branch B, while Training Internal *Branch B is an interaction term between Training Internal and Branch B. 
Age_High is a dummy indicating age above the median age in the sample. PRIDE loan_High is a dummy 
indicating that loan size before the training was above the median in the sample. Education_High is a dummy 
indicating that years of schooling is above the median sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Exit from PRIDE 
 (1) (2) 
 Exit 
no covar. 
Exit 
with covar. 
   
Training -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Female  0.06 
  (0.04) 
Age_High  -0.14*** 
  (0.04) 
PRDIE loan_High  -0.02 
  (0.04) 
Education_High  0.02 
  (0.04) 
Constant 0.45*** 0.49*** 
 (0.03) (0.05) 
Observations 644 644 
Note: The table reports regressions on a dummy variable indicating that the client was no longer a member of 
PRIDE in December 2010. Training is a dummy indicating that the client was eligible for training. Female is a 
dummy taking a value of one if the participant is a female. Age_High is a dummy indicating age above the 
median age in the sample. PRIDE loan_High is a dummy indicating that loan size before the training was above 
the median in the sample. Education_High is a dummy indicating that years of schooling is above the median in 
the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses., *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 5: Willingness to pay for training 
  
Willingness to pay 
  
Female 1.06 
 (8.53) 
Age_High 17.42** 
 (8.17) 
PRIDE loan_High 12.48 
 (7.56) 
Education_High 9.22 
 (9.10) 
Prior Business Knowledge_High 16.61* 
 (9.31) 
Constant 31.48*** 
 (8.04) 
Observations 260 
Note: The table reports the regression on willingness to pay for a 20-session training program, in thousands of 
Tanzanian Shillings. The willingness to pay is calculated by multiplying by 20 the expressed willingness to pay 
for a single session of a 20-session program. Female is a dummy indicating female gender. Age_High is a 
dummy indicating age above the median age in the sample. PRIDE loan_High is a dummy indicating that loan 
size before the training was above the median in the sample. Education_High is a dummy indicating that years 
of schooling is above the median in the sample. Prior Business Knowledge_High is a dummy indicating that 
prior business knowledge is above the median in the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix  
Here we present the figure referred to in the note to Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1A. Development in attendance over time, all classes. 
 
Note: The figure shows attendance rates at each of the 21 sessions of the training program for all classes, both  
internal (A1A4 and B1B4) and external (A5 and B5).  
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Measuring spillover effects from 
business training: Evidence from a field 
experiment among microentrepreneurs 
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Abstract 
I measure knowledge and information spillovers from a business training program for 
microfinance clients in Tanzania. Clients with trained group members are compared with 
clients with non-trained group members to identify spillover effects. I find that knowledge, 
attitudes and business practices may transmit from trained clients to their loan group 
members. Simple comparisons between trained and control clients may therefore 
underestimate the impact of such a training program. However, spillover effects are found to 
be heterogeneous, depending on both the gender of the recipient and the gender composition 
of the loan group. 
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1. Introduction 
Many microcredit institutions have introduced entrepreneurship training as an integrated part 
of their programs, to boost the growth of clients’ businesses. Research has been conducted to 
understand the impact of such add-ons to microcredit clients, and results are somewhat mixed. 
Karlan and Valdivia (fortcoming) find modest effects on female entrepreneurs in Peru, while 
Berge, Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2011) find that such treatment can change business practices 
and increase profits substantially, although mainly for male clients. 
Less is known about the wider impact of such educational programs, which may clearly not 
only influence treated individuals, but also influence knowledge and choices of their families, 
business partners and friends via their social interaction. Indeed, field experiments have been 
criticized for not incorporating the wider impact of interventions in the analysis, see e.g. 
Acemoglu (2010). The present paper seeks to address this gap in the literature. 
Early observational studies of social interaction and spread of knowledge and information 
were often plagued by weak empirical design, where it was hard to draw causal inference 
(Manski, 1993). However, newer research with more credible identification strategies finds 
that information spillovers via social networks can be important. For example, Miguel and 
Kremer (2003) analyzed the role of social networks in the adoption of knowledge about de-
worming drugs in rural Kenya, and found that those being exposed to information about de-
worming drugs via their social network were less likely to be infected than individuals who 
had not been exposed to such information via their social network. 
Another example is given by Lalive and Cattaneo (2009), who analyzed the effect of cash 
subsidies to prevent school-dropout in rural villages in Mexico, and found that also the non-
treated in villages with treated students changed their behaviour relative to that of the non-
treated in other villages. An elegant example of a natural experiment is given by Sacerdote 
(2001), who utilized the random room allocation of freshman students to dormitories at 
Dartmouth College. He found evidence of “peer influence” as students who shared rooms 
with able students tended to perform better. However, in an overview on peer effects in 
education, Sacerdote (2010) concludes that peer effects are modest in explaining academic 
results, but much more important in explaining social outcomes, such as drinking and 
smoking. 
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The research question in this paper is therefore to understand the wider impact of 
entrepreneurship training on microcredit clients’ group members. This is an important 
question, as it sheds light not only on the wider impact of this specific intervention, but also 
on how information and knowledge are spread in general via social interaction. 
To identify such effects, I utilize the field experiment described in Berge, Bjorvatn and 
Tungodden (2011), where selected members of loan groups were offered free business 
training, while other members in the same groups were not offered training. Loan groups of 
five are mostly formed by its members, and if one member does not fulfil the weekly loan 
obligations, the fellow group members must pay. The loan group is also part of a larger entity 
called the “market enterprise group” (MEC), which consists of ten loan groups that meet at 
the same time and place. If a complete loan group in the MEC defaults, the other groups in the 
MEC must cover the remaining debt. 
At the time of the introduction of the training program, all participants in the study were 
members of PRIDE Tanzania (Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development Enterprises), 
the country’s largest microfinance institution (MFI).28 The training program was tailored for 
the typical loan group member in PRIDE, covering a range of topics, such as marketing, basic 
accounting skills and customer care.29 To my knowledge, this is the first study that measures 
educational externalities in a field experiment setting. 
I find evidence of spillover effects for male entrepreneurs on mostly loan group-related 
outcomes, while effects on females are more modest. However, I do find that females in 
female-only loan groups improve their business knowledge and become more willing to take 
risks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, I present findings from 
semi-structured in-depth interviews, and discuss how and why we might expect information 
and attitudes to spread in a loan group. Section three presents the experimental design and 
methodology in detail, while section four presents the results. In section five I discuss the 
findings and suggest mechanisms that may explain the observed pattern. Section six 
concludes. 
                                                            
28 For further details on the organization, see www.pride-tz.org. 
29 For a detailed description of the training program, see Berge et al. (2011). 
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2 Mechanisms of spillovers 
2.1 Findings from in-depth interviews 
Three months into the training program, semi-structured interviews with trained clients took 
place.30 In this section I report findings from these interviews that shed light on how spread of 
information and knowledge in loan groups can take place. One trained client who has shared 
knowledge from the business training program with his group members is Gudila: 
Mr. Paulo, who is running a chicken-and-chips business, is not attending the course, 
but I have managed to advise him and he has made substantial changes to his 
business. This includes cooking using charcoal instead of firewood, putting a better 
roof on his business premises, keeping chicken meat in a more hygienic way and 
maintaining the cleanliness of his assistant. In addition, he has introduced an 
additional supporting product, beef meat soup. He is doing better business than 
before, and thus gets more profit. 
The above quote illustrates one type of spillover that may be present in loan groups: advice 
regarding daily business challenges. But why should we expect spillover effects in loan 
groups? 
First, it is in the trained group members’ own interest that their group members perform well, 
because of the joint liability loan scheme’s PRIDE practices. Trained group members, who 
better understand how to avoid default, therefore have strong incentives to influence other 
group members’ investment and business strategies in order to avoid repayment problems, 
and in particular to influence group members to invest in safe assets that ensure loan 
repayment (Armendãriz  de Aghion and Morduch, 2010). This is also what happens, 
according to Livin: 
We show them our notes, and whenever possible we explain to them what we have 
been taught. This is mainly done while attending a PRIDE meeting. Now they are 
also able to pay back their loans without problems. 
                                                            
30 Most interviews took place at the clients’ businesses or homes, and were conducted in Swahili, the local language. Quotes 
are therefore translated from Swahili to English. 
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Since group members are jointly responsible for the loans, they have incentives to form loan 
groups where they already have social ties to the other members. Being part of the same loan 
group presumably also strengthens the existing social ties. The training, seemingly, has also 
made clients more confident and caused them to discuss and seek advice more: 
Even before the training we have been sharing skills and experience together at 
PRIDE meetings and even at home. But this training has uplifted us to give 
confidently more accurate advice. (Fatuma) 
Second, indirectly trained clients may be curious about what the trained clients have learnt 
and done with their businesses, and ask for advice, as the trained client Zaituni experienced: 
Our group members would also like to get the training. Since they could not join the 
course, they ask what we have learnt whenever we meet in the PRIDE meeting and 
we explain to them. For example, Fatuma, who is my friend, whom I discuss business 
with, is not taking the course but she is always eager to learn from the course. I have 
even provided my notes for her. I don’t know to what extent she has changed her 
business, but I am told her customer care service is better now. 
Third, in addition to direct communication between group members, group members who 
observe changes in trained clients’ businesses might copy their innovations, e.g. imitate a 
restaurant’s new menu or change price accordingly. Norbert, for example, points out that non-
trained group members become curious when they see their fellow group members improve: 
Some of them would like to receive the same training because they see their group 
members making substantial improvement because of the training. (Norbert) 
As Hassan has experienced, it is also possible to earn money from business knowledge: 
I have put the Ten Commandments of Customer Service on the wall of my shop and 
my customers are really impressed. I earned five thousand shillings yesterday from 
my friend after training him about good customer service. 
However, you would probably not want to teach your competitors about good customer 
service. Group members, who by definition co-operate on financial issues, are, or may 
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become, competitors in the product market. Explaining market strategies or business secrets 
to fellow group members might therefore be a bad idea if they want to prosper themselves. 
Another argument against sharing of knowledge and best practices in loan groups is the fact 
that it is time consuming and difficult to explain concepts of customer service, accounting or 
marketing strategies, particularly if they are recently introduced to these concepts themselves. 
This is also experienced by Gudila: 
Some of them are inquisitive about what we have learnt and when they ask questions 
we do share knowledge. The problem is time, and it’s difficult to share with our 
group members unless we come to the meetings early. 
Finally, some fellow group members of trained clients may be too proud to ask for advice: 
Some of them would like to do the course, because they see some changes for those 
who are doing the course. Others do not like to hear anything about the course 
because they are proud of being able to manage both their businesses and loans. 
Generally, there is no course sharing between those who are taking the course and 
those who are not. Only one friend of mine who is new to PRIDE visits me in my 
business, and asks about the course. I have been sharing with him whatever I have. 
(Said) 
The quotes in this section illustrate that the loan group can be an arena for sharing of business 
knowledge, and they show that this can happen through both direct and observational 
learning. They also show that training may not only influence non-trained group member 
marketing and business practices, but that training can improve the repayment performance of 
non-trained group members as well, which is in the trained members’ own interest. 
On the other hand, they also illustrate some of the limitations with the loan group as a centre 
for knowledge sharing. Clients are busy and must sort out financial issues when they meet, 
thereby demanding that loan group members arrive early at the loan meetings or meet 
somewhere else to discuss and share business knowledge. 
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2.2 Gender, group composition and group dynamics 
Knowledge and information sharing in groups most likely depend on group members’ actual 
ability to co-operate and to discuss their social preferences in practice, and on a healthy and 
inclusive environment so that ideas and knowledge can flourish. If group members are not 
able to work and co-operate well together in the group, or do not care much about each other, 
it is less likely that one would see knowledge spillovers from trained clients to their non-
trained fellow group members. 
Loan groups are most often self-selected, but this does not necessarily mean that all loan 
groups are functioning well, or that group members are able to co-operate and share relevant 
knowledge. In particular, research points to the importance of gender for group dynamics. 
Croson and Gneezy (2009), in an overview article, conclude that females’ social preferences 
are shaped more by the institutional settings than those of males, and that males are more 
eager to compete than females. Surely, if group members are more eager to compete than to 
co-operate, we would expect less sharing of knowledge within the loan groups. 
Looking at the impact of gender composition in groups, Dufwenberg and Muren (2005), in a 
lab experiment, find that groups are more generous and egalitarian when females are in the 
majority. Similarly, Berge, Juniwaty and Sekei (2011), conducting a lab experiment with 
PRIDE clients in Dar es Salaam, find that female groups perform better in a problem-solving 
game than mixed or male groups, even though males outperform females at the individual 
level. This could indicate that females are more able co-operators, and that males constrain 
females in group settings. More traditional societies may also have strong gender norms, 
which may result in a less inclusive group atmosphere in mixed groups than in female groups, 
as males typically are expected to lead and make decisions when together with females. 
2.3 Social interaction and spillovers in loan groups 
The findings from the semi-structured interviews and the findings in Berge, Bjorvatn and 
Tungodden (2011) on the impact on the directly trained, together with the research on gender 
differences and group composition, give some guidance on what kind of spillovers to expect, 
and who are the most likely recipients of these spillovers. 
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Berge, Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2011) find that both males and females have improved their 
business knowledge, to more or less the same extent. However, there is a tendency that males 
have made more changes in their businesses than females, such as firing more employees or 
increasing total loans. Males have also increased their profits substantially, while there is no 
such effect for females. 
These findings may suggest that spillover effects might be less evident for females than for 
males. On the other hand, if female microentrepreneurs are better co-operators, as suggested 
in Berge, Juniwaty and Sekei (2011), this points to potentially stronger spillover effects within 
female-only loan groups than in groups with one or several males. 
3. Experimental design and methodology 
3.1 The Treatment: Spillovers from business training 
As discussed in the previous sections, the treatment in this study is to expose microcredit 
clients to improved business knowledge, practices and outcomes among their trained loan 
group members. Due to either direct discussion or observational learning among the clients 
and their trained loan group members, this indirect treatment can improve business 
knowledge, practices and outcomes, or influence group-related outcomes. In the following, I 
refer to these entrepreneurs as “indirectly trained clients”, and clients that have no trained 
group members as “control clients”. The clients who have participated in the training program 
are called “trained clients”. 
Selected loan group members were offered a business training course consisting of 21 one-
hour lectures taking place right after the weekly loan meetings on the premises of the 
microfinance institution. Entry control was strict, and only selected group members were 
allowed to enter the training sessions. We can therefore rule out the possibility that the 
treatment (being exposed to trained group members) was confounded with training directly 
improving clients’ knowledge and practices. 
3.2 Sample selection and sources of data 
Entrepreneurs with loan meetings on Tuesdays or Thursdays with medium-sized loans 
(500 000–1 000 000 TZS) who were reached by surveyors were eligible to take part in the 
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business training. The indirectly trained are group members of the trained entrepreneurs, who 
either were not eligible for training or were eligible, but not reached by the surveyors. This 
selection procedure effectively split the loan groups in two, where, e.g. two out of five group 
members were offered training, while three were not (but were thereby “indirectly trained”). 
Identically, clients with loan meetings on Mondays or Wednesdays, who had group members 
with medium-sized loans who were reached by surveyors but who were not eligible for 
training (since their loan group meeting was on Mondays or Wednesdays), make up my 
control group. 
Loan groups are randomly allocated to different days by the MFI. Figure 1 summarizes the 
sample selection. Note that the only thing that ex ante differs between indirectly trained 
clients and control clients is the fact that the former group had group members who were 
offered business training, while clients from the latter group did not have group member who 
were offered business training. 
Table 1 shows that 583 clients had one or several group members who were eligible to 
participate in the training. Of these, 132 clients were reached and interviewed in a survey, 
after completion of the training. In total, 470 clients had one or several group members who 
were not offered training, but who had medium loan size and were reached by surveyors. Of 
these, 129 clients were reached and interviewed. These 261 clients make up the sample for 
this paper. 
The clients were surveyed in May and June 2009, four to five months after the end of the 
training program, which started in August 2008. However, respondents were also asked about 
the state of their business one year before the training program started. 
Summary statistics are shown in table 2. We see that the typical client in my sample is 37 
years old, has on average slightly fewer than three children, has eight years of schooling and 
is most likely married. He/she is working around 60 hours per week, and has few or no 
employees. More than 60% of the entrepreneurs are involved in commerce (e.g. running 
kiosks, selling charcoal or used clothes), and around 40% of females and 30% of males are 
involved in service industries (small restaurants, hairdressing). Approximately 15% of male 
and 10% of female clients are running manufacturing businesses (furniture making, tailoring), 
while only a few per cent of the clients are involved in agriculture, since most clients live in 
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urban areas. We also note that males have significantly higher sales, even though females 
have more businesses. Finally, we see that daily income per capita in a household is 6800 
TZS (5.3 USD) for females and 5800 TZS (4.5 USD) for males. 
3.3 Intention to treat estimator 
Moreover, to get the intention to treat estimator (ITT) of being in a group with trained group 
members, I estimate 1  from the following equation: 
1i i iY TR               (1) 
iTR  is a binary variable taking the value one if client i has any group members that have been 
offered training. I also estimate the intention to treat estimator by including a covariate matrix 
i : 
1 2i i i iY TR                 (2) 
Assuming that treatment status ( iTR ) is uncorrelated with unobserved explanatory factors, 
there is no need to include a covariate matrix i  to get unbiased ITT estimates, but including 
covariates may make the estimation more precise. Standard errors are clustered at the loan 
group level. 
3.4 Average treatment effect on the treated 
The ITT estimator does not take into account that not all participants at the business training 
attended all the lectures, with the average attendance rate being 70%. As a result, the intensity 
of the indirect training varies among the indirectly treated. Some have group and centre 
members who frequently showed up at the training, while others have peers that never showed 
up. 
However, as discussed previously, group members typically select each other, causing some 
concern for self-selection and endogeneity. For example, prosperous clients might also have 
prosperous group members who choose to show up at all sessions, and who also teach their 
new knowledge to their indirectly trained group members. I therefore estimate: 
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1i i i iY INTENSITY                (3) 
where iINTENSITY  is instrumented by iTR . iINTENSITY  is the total number of sessions 
attended by the MEC members of the client, that is, the larger group to which all loan groups 
belong.31 All clients in the control group take the value of zero, while all indirectly treated 
have a value larger than zero, as someone from all eligible groups showed up at one or several 
sessions. To obtain the effect of having one more group member who showed up at 21 
sessions, the estimate must be multiplied by 21. As there is only one-sided compliance (no 
control clients have group members who received training), this enables me to identify the 
average treatment effect on the (indirectly) treated (ATET) (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
3.5 Heterogeneous treatment effects 
Since Berge, Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2011) find gender biases, section 2 concluded that we 
may also expect different indirect impacts of the training. I therefore run separate regressions 
for male and female. 
However, Berge, Juniwaty and Sekei (2011) find that female-only groups co-operate better. 
Hence, I explore whether there are heterogeneous treatment impacts among females, 
according to whether they are in groups with only females or in mixed-gender groups. I 
therefore estimate the following equation: 
1 2 3 4( * )i i i i i i iY Tr FemGroup Tr FemGroup X               (4) 
FemGroup  is a dummy taking the value 1 if the client is a member of a loan group consisting 
of females only. The effect of being in a loan group with trained clients is 1 , while 3  is the 
additional treatment effect of being in a loan group with only females. The sum of 1  and 3  
is therefore the treatment effect on females in female-only groups, and is referred to as “Sum 
Tr*FemGr” in the tables. 
                                                            
31 I do not summarize over attendance within the loan group, since there may be spillover effects across loan 
groups within the MEC as well. However, results do not change much if I instead summarize over the enterprise 
group. 
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3.6 Verification of equal control and treatment groups 
To verify that the indirectly trained and the control groups were similar along observables 
before the treatment, tables 3–7 show the results from performing t-tests on background 
variables based on treatment status. Since I look at treatment effects on males, females, 
females in female groups, and females in mixed groups, I do separate t-tests for all these 
subgroups. Table 3 shows the difference between indirectly trained and control males, and 
shows that significantly more indirectly treated were born in Dar es Salaam than the control 
clients. Table 4 shows that indirectly trained females had more employees one year ago, and 
there is a similar tendency in table 5. Table 5 also shows that control clients had 0.4 more 
children than treatment clients (among the females in female-only groups). Finally, table 6 
shows that treated females in mixed groups had 0.7 more children than the control clients, and 
that indirectly trained females in mixed groups are somewhat older than their control group. 
Because of these differences, I include age, number of children, number of employees, and 
dummy taking the value 1 if the client was born in Dar es Salaam, as covariates. 
4. Results 
In this section, I first present the impact on males, before I move on to the impact on females. 
The semi-structured interviews suggest that loan group members frequently interact and 
discuss business-related topics, and that the training itself has contributed to more sharing of 
knowledge and information. Table 8 shows that males have been influenced along several 
dimensions. We observe that the indirectly trained discuss more business, on average 0.28–
0.34 times more per week with each group member than control males, which is an increase 
of about 25%. 
The findings are also confirmed by the ATET estimates in columns (3)–(4). If an MEC 
member attended one more training session, this would increase average group discussion by 
0.002 times per week. This means that having one more trained client in an MEC who 
participated at all 21 lectures would cause clients to discuss 0.042 times more per week. The 
average number of MEC members with training among the indirectly trained is 11, meaning 
that the average treatment effect of being in a group with 11.5 clients who participated at all 
sessions would be to discuss business 0.48 times more, which as expected is a higher estimate 
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than the ITT estimates. However, the increased interaction has seemingly not resulted in 
stronger business knowledge, with coefficients very close to zero. 
On the other hand, when we look at the clients’ attitude to risk and their regard for PRIDE, we 
see that something has happened. Indirectly trained males have become more risk averse, and 
are more satisfied with PRIDE. In the survey, clients were given hypothetical choices between 
a risky and a safe bet, where the safe bet was gradually reduced, while the risky bet option 
was held constant. Based upon this, I add up the number of times the clients choose the risky 
bet, so that a lower number means more risk-averse preferences. I find that indirectly trained 
males play it safe significantly more often than control males. Out of five bets they choose the 
safe bet 0.7 times more often than the control males. Berge, Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2011) 
find the same pattern for directly trained males, but with a somewhat stronger effect.32 
Perhaps related to the finding that indirectly trained males discuss more business, we also see 
from table 8 that the attitude towards PRIDE has improved, as indirectly trained males are 13 
percentage points more satisfied with PRIDE than control males. This may reflect that they 
feel PRIDE is doing something positive when providing business training, and even though 
they do not receive training themselves, they are benefiting more from their membership. 
Their satisfaction may also be related to the finding that indirectly trained males have 
substantially increased their PRIDE loans, on average by 110 000–130 000 TZS (92–109 
USD).33 The same goes for total loans, as indirectly trained males have increased their loans 
by 163 000–168 000 TZS. 
Furthermore, we see that their increased loans have mostly been spent on income-generating 
assets, and not on consumption-related goods.34 This is not an obvious finding, as clients 
report that 15–20% of loans are used on non-income-generating items. 
On the other hand, when we look at other business practices and knowledge, I do not find any 
significant spillover effects. Indirectly trained males do not report more marketing initiatives, 
and have not changed their record-keeping practices. Thus, it is not so surprising that 
indirectly trained males have not increased their profits. 
                                                            
32 Berge et al. (2011a) used an incentivized lab when studying attitude towards risk. 
33 Treated males have also increased their loans if we look at initial loan size, or loans minus savings. 
34 Buying land and houses, paying old debt, saving, and lending to other is categorized as income generating. 
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Table 9 shows the overall impact of spillovers on indirectly trained female clients. Perhaps as 
expected, findings are indeed modest. However, when we look at the impact among females 
in female-only loan groups, some interesting patterns emerge. From table 11, we see that 
females in female-only groups have improved their business knowledge by 8 percentage 
points, which is significantly more than females in mixed-gender groups, who have not 
experienced any knowledge gain. On the other hand, females in female-only groups do not 
discuss more business because of the indirect training. Hence, it appears that it is the quality 
of communication rather than the quantity that has been affected by training. 
From table 12, we also see that attitudes of females in female groups have been influenced by 
the indirect training, as they have become more risk seeking, making 0.75–0.82 more risky 
bets than control females in female-only groups. An interesting point to make is that indirectly 
trained males and indirectly trained females in female groups make very similar risk choices, 
while control males and females are very different. Berge, Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2011) 
observe a similar pattern among the directly trained. This finding may be explained by the 
business training course emphasizing “appropriate risk taking”, including anecdotes of males 
overconfidently rushing to the next business opportunity, with limited success. 
However, when looking at other practices or outcomes, related to either the loan group or the 
clients’ businesses, I do not find any treatment impacts, nor do I find any treatment impact on 
females in mixed groups. Finally, from table 10, we note that there are no overall impacts. 
5. Discussion 
In the previous section, we saw that there is stronger evidence of spillover effects for male 
than for female clients. We saw that males discuss more business with their loan group 
members, increase their loans and invest the loans more wisely. In addition, males have 
changed their attitudes, and become more positive towards PRIDE and more reluctant to take 
risks. However, there is no evidence that males have improved their business knowledge, or 
changed much in their businesses. Hence, the spillover effects on males are mostly on 
dimensions directly related to the loan group. In contrast, for females, spillover effects were 
only evident within female-only groups, with spillovers consisting of improved business 
knowledge, and reduction in risk aversion. There was no evidence of any impact on group-
related outcomes or on business practices. 
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What can explain this observed pattern? The general finding that males are more affected by 
the indirect training is consistent with that of Berge, Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2011), who 
also find stronger impacts on trained males. However, they also find that trained males have 
improved their knowledge and changed their business practices along many dimensions, 
while I mostly find spillover effects for males on loan-group-related outcomes. As discussed 
in section 2, because of lack of time and incentives, trained clients may not be able or willing 
to spend time on teaching concepts of customer care or marketing strategies to their group 
members. 
However, if trained clients have become more financially literate because of the training, they 
may use this knowledge to influence attitudes and decisions of their group members in their 
own interest. This may partly explain the finding that indirectly treated males invest more 
wisely and have become more risk averse. Another reason may simply be that trained clients 
find it easier to co-operate and share knowledge with group members about issues that are 
already being discussed in the loan group, such as loans and use of loans. 
Furthermore, the finding that females in female-only groups have gained business knowledge 
in the same range as trained females, may be explained along similar lines as in Berge, 
Juniwaty and Sekei (2011). They find that groups consisting of females, who individually are 
outperformed by males, perform significantly better than both mixed and male-only groups. 
Accordingly, males, when present in a group, are typically expected to lead and make 
decisions. Females are therefore in practice constrained from utilizing their skills and 
competency when together with males. In spillover cases, this may translate into a bad 
learning environment in loan groups where men are present. Recall that the weekly loan 
meeting is the most relevant arena for spillovers, since this is where business discussion 
among group members typically takes place. Hence, male dominance in this arena may 
seriously impede spillovers among females. 
Berge, Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2011) also find that male microfinance clients are more 
competitive than female microfinance clients, thereby confirming the results discussed in 
Croson and Gneezy (2009). In the loan group setting, this may translate into an environment 
where males perceive each other as competitors in the social group, even though they are not 
competing in the product market. Because of this, treated males may be reluctant to share 
business knowledge with their fellow group members. In addition, males have weaker co-
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operating abilities than females, which may limit the ability to transmit knowledge even when 
there is a will. 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I have measured the impact of business training on its beneficiaries’ loan group 
members. The findings show that knowledge, attitudes and certain practices related to the loan 
group may transmit from trained clients to their loan group members. Comparing trained and 
control clients may therefore underestimate the impact of such a training program. However, 
the indirect impacts are found to be heterogeneous, as males and females are affected 
differently, along different dimensions. Indirectly treated males are mostly found to change 
business practices and attitudes related to the loan group, while females in female-only groups 
improve their knowledge the most. 
These heterogeneous findings indicate that there are important underlying differences in how 
males and females respond to the institutional setting, which in this case is the loan group. 
Understanding such responses may be important when designing institutions and policies, and 
should be an important topic for future research. 
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Figure 1: Sample selection and treatment status 
 
 
 
Table 1: Eligible versus surveyed clients 
 Eligible Clients Surveyed Clients 
 
Indirectly Trained 
 
583 
 
132
Control Group 470 129 
Total 1053 261 
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Table 2: Summary statistics by gender 
  (1) 
TOTAL 
(2) 
MALE 
(3) 
FEMALE 
(4) 
DIFFERENCE 
 
SCALE OF BUSINESS     
 Sales+  13.868 
(0.064) 
14.067    
(0.118) 
13.754       
(0.073) 
0.312***    
(0.132) 
     
Number of Businesses 1.330    
(0.033) 
1.219    
(0.054) 
1.394    
(0.041) 
–0.175**    
(0.068) 
     
Employees  0.391    
(0.055) 
0.385    
(0.079) 
0.394    
(0.073) 
–0.009      
(0.113) 
     
PRIDE Loan  359 004    
(21.114) 
388.542    
(35.821) 
341.818     
(26.088) 
46.724    
(43.774) 
SECTOR     
 Commerce  0.648    
(0.030) 
0.615    
(0.050) 
0.667    
(0.037) 
–0.052      
(0.068) 
     
Service 0.368    
(0.030) 
0.302    
(0.047) 
0.406    
(0.038) 
–0.104*    
(0.062) 
     
Manufacturing  0.115    
(0.020) 
0.167     
(0.039) 
0.085    
(0.022) 
0.082**    
(0.041) 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME     
 Household Income 29.619    
(1.697) 
24.698    
(1.865) 
32.482    
(2.431) 
–7.784**    
(3.492) 
  
Income per Household Member 6.461    
(0.320) 
5.820    
(0.426) 
6.834    
(0.439) 
–1.015      
(0.661) 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENTREPRENEUR    
 Children  2.628    
(0.124) 
2.438    
(0.245) 
2.739    
(0.135) 
–0.302      
(0.257) 
     
Born in Dar es Salaam 0.272    
(0.028) 
0.146    
(0.036) 
0.346    
(0.037) 
–0.120***    
(0.056) 
Work Hours 57.594    
(1.548) 
62.021    
(2.515) 
55.018    
(1.941) 
7.003**    
(3.187) 
Education 
 
8.008    
(0.147) 
8.094     
(0.212) 
7.958    
(0.198) 
0.136       
(0.306) 
  
Age 
 
37.471    
(0.530) 
36.771 
(0.909) 
37.878 
(0.651) 
–1.108     
(1.100) 
Marital Status 
 
0.789  
(0.025)
0.865  
(0.035)
0.746  
(0.034) 
0.119**    
(0.052)
OBSERVATIONS 261 96 165  
Note: The table reports average values. Sales: Log of monthly sales in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008 
(before the training), in thousand TZS, as reported in 2009 (after the training). +Note that I have only 88 and 154 
observations for males and females, respectively, because of log transformation of zero-observations. Number of 
Businesses: The total number of businesses owned by the clients in 2009 (a business must have either a separate 
location or activity). Employees: Number of employees in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008, as reported in 
2009. PRIDE Loan: Initial size of loan in thousand TZS as reported by PRIDE in 2008. Commerce, Service, and 
Manufacturing: Share of clients involved in each of these sectors in 2009. Household Income: Total daily household 
income in the household of the entrepreneur in 2009. Income per Household Member: Total daily household income 
per household member in the household of the entrepreneur in 2009. Children: Total number of children in 2009. Born 
in Dar es Salaam: Indicator variable taking the value one if the client was born in Dar es Salaam. Work Hours: Weekly 
work hours for the client in 2008, as reported in 2009. Education: The number of years of schooling of the 
entrepreneur. Age: The age of the entrepreneur, in number of years. Marital status: Indicator variable taking the value 
one if the client is married. Standard errors in parentheses. Inference from t-test: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Treatment – control balance, male sample 
  (1) 
INDIRECTLY 
TRAINED 
(2) 
CONTROL 
GROUP 
(3) 
DIFFERENCE 
     
Age 37.31 
 
36.14 1.171              
(1.830) 
    
Employees 0.308 
 
0.477 –0.170             
(0.158) 
    
PRIDE Loan 374.039 
 
405.682 –31.643            
(72.200) 
    
Children 2.731 2.091 0.640              
(0.490) 
    
Born in Dar es Salaam 0.212 
 
0.0698 0.142*             
(0.072) 
    
Work Hours 60.73 
 
63.55 –2.815             
(5.066) 
    
Marital Status  0.885 
 
0.841 0.044              
(0.071) 
    
Education   7.923 
 
8.295 0.372              
(0.426) 
    
Sales (log)+ 
 
14.169 13.950 0.220 
(0.236) 
     
OBSERVATIONS 52 44  
Note: The table reports averages. Age: The age of the entrepreneur, in number of years. Employees: Number of 
employees in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008 (before the training), as reported in 2009 (after the 
training). PRIDE Loan: Initial loan size in thousand TZS at PRIDE, as reported by PRIDE in 2008. Children: 
Total number of children in 2009. Born in Dar es Salaam: An indicator variable taking the value one if the client 
was born in Dar es Salaam. Work Hours: Weekly work hours for the client in 2008, as reported in 2009. Marital 
Status: Indicator variable taking the value one if the client was married in 2009. Education: Years of schooling 
of the entrepreneur. Sales: Log of monthly sales in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008 in TZS, as 
reported in 2009. +Note that because of log transformation of zero-observations, I have only 47 and 41 
observations in the treatment and control groups, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Inference from t-
tests: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Treatment – control balance, female sample 
  (1) 
INDIRECTLY 
TRAINED 
(2) 
CONTROL 
GROUP 
(3) 
DIFFERENCE 
     
Age 38.313 
 
37.471 0.842              
(1.305) 
    
Employees 0.550 
 
0.247 –0.303**          
(0.145) 
    
PRIDE Loan 356 875 327 647 29 228             
(52 310) 
    
Children    2.750 
 
2.729 0.021              
(0.270) 
    
Born in Dar es Salaam 0.362 
 
0.329 0.033              
(0.074) 
    
Work Hours 55.66 
 
54.41 1.251              
(3.894) 
    
Marital Status  0.775 0.718 0.057              
(0.068) 
    
Education 8.113 
 
7.812 0.301              
(0.397) 
    
Sales (log)+ 13.659 13.846 –0.187 
(146) 
     
OBSERVATIONS 80 85  
Note: The table reports averages. Age: The age of the entrepreneur, in number of years. Employees: Number of 
employees in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008 (before the training), as reported in 2009 (after the 
training). PRIDE Loan: Initial loan size in thousand TZS at PRIDE, as reported by PRIDE in 2008. Children: 
Total number of children in 2009. Born in Dar es Salaam: An indicator variable taking the value one if the client 
was born in Dar es Salaam. Work Hours: Weekly work hours for the client in 2008, as reported in 2009. Marital 
Status: Indicator variable taking the value one if the client was married in 2009. Education: Years of schooling 
of the entrepreneur. Sales: Log of monthly sales in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008 in TZS, as 
reported in 2009. +Note that because of log transformation of zero-observations, I have only 75 and 79 
observations in the treatment and control groups, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Inference from t-
tests: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Treatment – control balance, female-only sample 
  (1) 
INDIRECTLY 
TRAINED 
(2) 
CONTROL 
GROUP 
(3) 
DIFFERENCE 
     
    
Age 38.143 39.500 1.357              
(1.821) 
Employees 0.595 0.205 0.391*           
(0.235) 
    
PRIDE Loan 352.381     285.227 67.154        
(61.028) 
    
Children 2.524 
 
3.159 –0.635*            
(0.248) 
    
Born in Dar es Salaam 0.429 0.295 0.133              
(0.104) 
    
Work Hours 56.762 
 
54.250 2.512              
(5.213) 
    
Marital Status  0.714 
 
0.727 –0.013             
(0.098) 
    
Education   8.214 
 
7.636 0.578              
(0.543) 
    
Sales (log)+ 13.567 13.760 –0.194 
(0.186) 
     
OBSERVATIONS 42 44  
Note: The table reports averages. Age: The age of the entrepreneur, in number of years. Employees: Number of 
employees in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008 (before the training), as reported in 2009 (after the 
training). PRIDE loan: Initial loan size in thousand TZS at PRIDE, as reported by PRIDE in 2008. Children: 
Total number of children in 2009. Born in Dar es Salaam: An indicator variable taking the value one if the client 
was born in Dar es Salaam. Work Hours: Weekly work hours for the client in 2008, as reported in 2009. Marital 
Status: Indicator variable taking the value one if the client was married in 2009. Education: Years of schooling 
of the entrepreneur. Sales: Log of monthly sales in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008 in TZS, as 
reported in 2009. +Note that because of log transformation of zero-observations, I have only 41 and 42 
observations in the treatment and control groups, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Inference from t-
test:.*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6: Treatment – control balance, females in mixed groups 
  (1) 
INDIRECTLY 
TRAINED 
(2) 
CONTROL 
GROUP 
(3) 
DIFFERENCE 
     
Age 38.500 35.293 3.207*             
(1.828) 
    
Employees 0.500 0.293 0.207             
(0.166) 
    
PRIDE Loan 361.842 373.171 –11.329       
(86.995)  
    
Children 3.000 
 
2.269 0.732*             
(0.248) 
    
Born in Dar es Salaam 0.290 0.366 –0.076             
(0.107) 
    
Work Hours 54.447 
 
54.585 –0.138             
(5.891) 
    
Marital Status  0.842 
 
0.707 0.135              
(0.094) 
    
Education 8.000 
 
8.000 0.000              
(0.587) 
    
Sales (log)+ 13.771 13.942 –0.172            
(0.231) 
     
OBSERVATIONS 38 41  
Note: The table reports averages. Age: The age of the entrepreneur, in number of years. Employees: Number of 
employees in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008 (before the training), as reported in 2009 (after the 
training). PRIDE Loan: Initial loan size in thousand TZS at PRIDE, as reported by PRIDE in 2008. Children: 
Total number of children in 2009. Born in Dar es Salaam: An indicator variable taking the value one if the client 
was born in Dar es Salaam. Work Hours: Weekly work hours for the client in 2008, as reported in 2009. Marital 
Status: Indicator variable taking the value one if the client was married in 2009. Education: Years of schooling 
of the entrepreneur. Sales: Log of monthly sales in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008 in TZS, as 
reported in 2009. +Note that because of log transformation of zero-observations, I have only 34 and 37 
observations in the treatment and control groups, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Inference from t-
tests:*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 7: Treatment – control balance, complete sample 
  (1) 
INDIRECTLY 
TRAINED 
(2) 
CONTROL 
GROUP 
(3) 
DIFFERENCE 
     
Age 37.917 37.016 0.901              
(1.061) 
    
Employees 0.455 
 
0.326 0.129              
(0.109) 
    
PRIDE Loan 363.636 354.264 9.373              
(42.308) 
    
Children 2.742 
 
2.512 0.231              
(0.248) 
    
Born in Dar es Salaam 0.303 0.242 0.061              
(0.055) 
    
Work Hours 57.659 
 
57.527 0.132              
(3.102) 
    
Marital Status  0.818 
 
0.760 0.059              
(0.051) 
    
Education 8.038 
 
7.977 0.061              
(0.295) 
    
Sales (log)+ 13.856 13.881 –0.026 
(0.128) 
     
OBSERVATIONS 132 129  
Note: The table reports averages. Age: The age of the entrepreneur, in number of years. Employees: Number of 
employees in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008 (before the training), as reported in 2009 (after the 
training). PRIDE Loan: Initial loan size in thousand TZS at PRIDE, as reported by PRIDE in 2008. Children: 
Total number of children in 2009. Born in Dar es Salaam: An indicator variable taking the value one if the client 
was born in Dar es Salaam. Work Hours: Weekly work hours for the client in 2008, as reported in 2009. Marital 
Status: Indicator variable taking the value one if the client was married in 2009. Education: Years of schooling 
of the entrepreneur. Sales: Log of monthly sales in the businesses of the entrepreneur in 2008 in TZS, as 
reported in 2009. +Note that because of log transformation of zero-observations, I have only 122 and 120 
observations in the treatment and control groups, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Inference from t-
tests: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
122 
 
 
Table 8: Treatment effects, males 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ITT ITT ATET ATET 
 no covar. with covar. no covar. with covar. 
Group Discussion 0.275 0.336* 0.002 0.002* 
 (0.185) (0.196) (0.001) (0.001) 
Business Knowledge  –0.046 –0.032 –0.000 –0.000 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) 
Risk  –0.738* –0.741* –0.004* –0.004* 
 (0.437) (0.429) (0.003) (0.002) 
PRIDE Satisfaction 0.128* 0.126* 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) 
PRIDE Loan Balance 109.919** 133.407*** 0.648** 0.780*** 
 (47.901) (47.867) (0.269) (0.262) 
Total Loan Balance 168.108*** 163.058*** 0.991*** 0.953*** 
 (57.324) (54.390) (0.340) (0.301) 
Cons. PRIDE Loan –60.367* –54.606* –0.356* –0.319* 
 (32.408) (32.534) (0.192) (0.187) 
Inv. PRIDE Loan  168.497** 124.542* 0.993* 0.728** 
 (83.828) (63.461) (0.507) (0.359) 
Marketing Index  0.013 0.013 0.000 0.000 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) 
Business Records  0.058 0.015 0.000 0.000 
 (0.162) (0.127) (0.001) (0.001) 
Profit (log)+ 0.132 0.117 0.001 0.001 
 (0.186) (0.183) (0.001) (0.001) 
OBSERVATIONS 96 96 96 96 
Note: Columns (1) and (2) report the impact of being a member of a loan group where one or several group 
members have been offered training. Columns (3) and (4) report estimates from instrumenting the total number 
of training sessions attended by loan group members by an indicator variable taking the value of one if the client 
is a member of a loan group where one or several group members have been offered training. Outcome 
variables are defined as follows. Group Discussion: Number of times per week the client discusses business with 
fellow enterprise group members, divided by the number of group members. Business Knowledge: Percentage of 
correct answers on six multiple-choice questions. Risk: The number of times the client chose the risky option 
when choosing (hypothetically) between a safe and a risky bet, where the value of the safe bet was gradually 
reduced. PRIDE Satisfaction: An indicator variable taking the value of one if the client was satisfied with 
PRIDE. PRIDE Loan Balance: Amount outstanding at PRIDE. Total Loan Balance: Amount outstanding in 
thousand TZS at all loan sources. Cons. PRIDE Loan: Loan usage on consumption, such as food, paying for 
drugs, school uniforms, etc. Inv. PRIDE Loan: Business-related loan use, in addition to investments in house and 
land, and repayment of other loans. Marketing Index: A normalized index of three questions measuring change 
in marketing practices. Business Records: Number of different types of records (e.g. sales records, stocks 
records). Profit: Monthly operating profit (log). +: Note that I have only 91 observations of profit, because of 
log transformation of five zero-observations (five clients had closed down their businesses in 2009). Covariates 
include age, no. of children, no. of employees before the treatment and dummy taking the value 1 if the client 
was born in Dar es Salaam. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the enterprise group 
level). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 9: Treatment effects, females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ITT ITT ATET ATET 
 no covar. with covar. no covar. with covar. 
Group Discussion –0.119 –0.143 –0.001 –0.001 
 (0.172) (0.182) (0.001) (0.001) 
Business Knowledge  0.031 0.031 0.000 0.000 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) 
Risk 0.392 0.447 0.002 0.003 
 (0.274) (0.283) (0.002) (0.002) 
PRIDE Satisfaction –0.010 0.003 –0.000 0.000 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) 
PRIDE Loan Balance –49.689 –45.978 –0.304 –0.280 
 (50.908) (51.250) (0.312) (0.307) 
Total Loan Balance –45.307 –59.401 –0.278 –0.361 
 (56.520) (55.243) (0.346) (0.332) 
Cons. PRIDE Loan 8.201 7.093 0.050 0.043 
 (29.701) (31.283) (0.181) (0.187) 
Inv. PRIDE Loan  –43.826 –58.134 –0.269 –0.354 
 (46.715) (45.989) (0.285) (0.276) 
Marketing Index 0.014 0.017 0.000 0.000 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) 
Business Records 0.001 –0.037 0.000 –0.000 
 (0.171) (0.164) (0.001) (0.001) 
Profit (log)+ –0.101 –0.163 –0.001 –0.001 
 (0.125) (0.120) (0.001) (0.001) 
OBSERVATIONS 165 165 165 165 
Note: Columns (1) and (2) report the impact of being a member of a loan group where one or several group 
members have been offered training. Columns (3) and (4) report estimates from instrumenting the total number 
of training sessions attended by loan group members by an indicator variable taking the value of one if the client 
is a member of a loan group where one or several group members have been offered training. Outcome 
variables are defined as follows. Group Discussion: Number of times per week the client discusses business with 
fellow enterprise group members, divided by the number of group members. Business Knowledge: Percentage of 
correct answers on six multiple-choice questions. Risk: The number of times the client chose the risky option 
when choosing (hypothetically) between a safe and a risky bet, where the value of the safe bet was gradually 
reduced. PRIDE Satisfaction: An indicator variable taking the value of one if the client was satisfied with 
PRIDE. PRIDE Loan Balance: Amount outstanding at PRIDE. Total Loan Balance: Amount outstanding in 
thousand TZS at all loan sources. Cons. PRIDE Loan: Loan usage on consumption, such as food, paying for 
drugs, school uniforms, etc. Inv. PRIDE Loan: Business-related loan use, in addition to investments in house and 
land, and repayment of other loans. Marketing Index: A normalized index of three questions measuring change 
in marketing practices. Business Records: Number of different types of records (e.g. sales records, stocks 
records). Profit: Monthly operating profit (log). +Note that I have only 164 observations of profit, because of 
log transformation of one zero-observation (one client had closed down her businesses in 2009). Covariates 
include age, no. of children, no. of employees before the treatment and dummy taking the value 1 if the client 
was born in Dar es Salaam. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the enterprise group 
level). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 10: Treatment effects, complete sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ITT ITT ATET ATET 
 no covar. with covar. no covar. with covar. 
Group Discussion 0.036 0.031 0.000 0.000 
 (0.133) (0.139) (0.001) (0.001) 
Business Knowledge  0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) 
Risk 0.009 0.066 0.000 0.000 
 (0.256) (0.256) (0.002) (0.002) 
PRIDE Satisfaction 0.042 0.040 0.000 0.000 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) 
PRIDE Loan Balance 5.644 10.427 0.034 0.062 
 (38.345) (39.022) (0.230) (0.230) 
Total Loan Balance 30.328 21.964 0.183 0.132 
 (43.048) (42.111) (0.258) (0.249) 
Cons. PRIDE Loan –19.521 –21.029 –0.118 –0.126 
 (22.154) (22.244) (0.133) (0.132) 
Inv. PRIDE Loan  36.742 27.538 0.222 0.165 
 (44.538) (42.441) (0.268) (0.251) 
Marketing Index 0.011 0.008 0.000 0.000 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) 
Business Records 0.014 –0.013 0.000 –0.000 
 (0.124) (0.120) (0.001) (0.001) 
Profit (log)+ –0.012 –0.030 –0.000 –0.000 
 (0.105) (0.102) (0.001) (0.001) 
OBSERVATIONS 261 261 261 261 
Note: Columns (1) and (2) report the impact of being a member of a loan group where one or several group 
members have been offered training. Columns (3) and (4) report estimates from instrumenting the total number 
of training sessions attended by loan group members by an indicator variable taking the value of one if the client 
is a member of a loan group where one or several group members have been offered training. Outcome 
variables are defined as follows. Group Discussion: Number of times per week the client discusses business with 
fellow enterprise group members, divided by the number of group members. Business Knowledge: Percentage of 
correct answers on six multiple-choice questions. Risk: The number of times the client chose the risky option 
when choosing (hypothetically) between a safe and a risky bet, where the value of the safe bet was gradually 
reduced. PRIDE Satisfaction: An indicator variable taking the value of one if the client was satisfied with 
PRIDE. PRIDE Loan Balance: Amount outstanding at PRIDE. Total Loan Balance: Amount outstanding in 
thousand TZS at all loan sources. Cons. PRIDE Loan: Loan usage on consumption, such as food, paying for 
drugs, school uniforms, etc. Inv. PRIDE Loan: Business-related loan use, in addition to investments in house and 
land, and repayment of other loans. Marketing Index: A normalized index of three questions measuring change 
in marketing practices. Business Records: Number of different types of records (e.g. sales records, stocks 
records). Profit: Monthly operating profit (log). +Note that I have only 255 observations of profit, because of 
log transformation of six zero-observation (six clients had closed down their businesses in 2009). Covariates 
include age, no. of children, no. of employees before the treatment and dummy taking the value 1 if the client 
was born in Dar es Salaam. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the enterprise group 
level). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 11: Business knowledge and discussion, female sample with interaction effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Group Disc.  
no covar. 
Group Disc.  
with covar. 
Knowledge  
no covar. 
Knowledge  
with covar. 
Indirect Training 0.166 0.216 –0.025 –0.023 
 (0.162) (0.169) (0.034) (0.033) 
Ind.Tr.*FemGr –0.549 –0.697* 0.109** 0.105** 
 (0.337) (0.385) (0.054) (0.052) 
Female Group 0.419 0.504 –0.092** –0.090*** 
 (0.295) (0.323) (0.035) (0.034) 
Sum Tr*FemGr –0.383 –0.480 0.084** 0.081** 
 (0.296) (0.329) (0.041) (0.041) 
Observations 165 165 165 165 
Note: The table reports ITT regressions. Outcome variables are defined as follows. Group Discussion: Number 
of times per week the client discusses business with fellow enterprise group members, divided by the number of 
group members. Business Knowledge: Percentage correct answers on six multiple-choice questions. The 
outcomes are regressed on a dummy taking the value one if the client was in a group where someone was offered 
training, an interaction term of training and female-only group, and finally a dummy taking the value of one if 
the client is a member of a female-only group. “Sum Tr*FemGr” is the linear combination of the two first 
independent variables.  Covariates include age, no. of children, no. of employees before the treatment and 
dummy taking the value one if the client was born in Dar es Salaam. Cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses (clustered at the enterprise group level). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 Table 12: Attitudes, female sample with interaction effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Risk  
no covar.  
Risk  
with covar. 
PRIDE 
Satisfaction  
no covar.  
PRIDE 
Satisfaction  
with covar.  
Indirect Training 0.010 0.053 –0.038 –0.053 
 (0.419) (0.430) (0.089) (0.087) 
Ind.Tr.*FemGr 0.735 0.763 0.053 0.107 
 (0.552) (0.579) (0.124) (0.123) 
Female Group –0.486 –0.497 –0.035 –0.076 
 (0.361) (0.380) (0.083) (0.083) 
Sum Tr*FemGr 0.745** 0.816** 0.015 0.054 
 (0.354) (0.375) (0.086) (0.087) 
Observations 165 165 165 165 
Note: The table reports ITT regressions. Outcome variables are defined as follows. Risk: The number of times 
the client chose the risky option when choosing (hypothetically) between a safe and a risky bet, where the value 
of the safe bet was gradually reduced. PRIDE Satisfaction: An indicator variable taking the value one if the 
client was satisfied with PRIDE. The outcomes are regressed on a dummy taking the value one if the client was 
in a group where someone was offered training, an interaction term of training and female-only group, and 
finally a dummy taking the value of one if the client is a member of a female-only group. “Sum Tr*FemGr” is 
the linear combination of the two first independent variables.   Covariates include age, no. of children, no. of 
employees before the treatment and dummy taking the value one if the client was born in Dar es Salaam. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the enterprise group level). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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Table 13: Loan balance, female sample with interaction effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PRIDE Loan 
Balance 
no covar.  
PRIDE Loan 
Balance 
with covar. 
Total Loan 
Balance 
no covar. 
Total Loan 
Balance 
with covar. 
Indirect Training –64.949 –40.431 –31.287 –29.703 
 (67.956) (68.333) (79.964) (76.618) 
Ind.Tr.*FemGr 28.751 –10.778 –26.840 –57.556 
 (101.673) (103.767) (113.611) (122.714) 
Female Group 22.413 49.629 9.681 27.907 
 (84.389) (87.647) (87.919) (95.925) 
Sum Tr*FemGr –36.197 –51.209 –58.127 –87.259 
 (75.413) (76.901) (80.727) (88.171) 
Observations 165 165 165 165 
Note: The table reports ITT regressions.  Outcome variables are defined as follows. PRIDE Loan Balance: 
Amount outstanding at PRIDE. Total Loan Balance: Amount outstanding in thousand TZS at all loan sources. 
The outcomes are regressed on a dummy taking the value one if the client was in a group where someone was 
offered training, an interaction term of training and female-only group, and finally a dummy taking the value 
one if the client is member of a female only group. “Sum Tr*FemGr” is the linear combination of the two first 
independent variables.  Covariates include age, no. of children, no. of employees before the treatment and 
dummy taking the value one if the client was born in Dar es Salaam. Cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses (clustered at the enterprise group level). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Usage of loan, female sample with interaction effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cons. PRIDE 
Loan 
no covar.  
Cons. PRIDE 
Loan 
with covar. 
Inv. PRIDE 
Loan 
no covar.  
Inv. PRIDE 
Loan 
with covar.  
Indirect Training 4.256 –12.637 –17.318 –20.583 
 (38.234) (38.798) (68.031) (68.125) 
Ind.Tr.*FemGr 7.364 38.231 –50.309 –72.753 
 (58.868) (59.819) (94.298) (100.928) 
Female Group 10.779 –8.733 –13.135 –4.848 
 (37.397) (39.593) (70.718) (77.919) 
Sum Tr*FemGr 11.620 25.594 –67.627 –93.336 
 (44.980) (47.318) (65.099) (68.498) 
Observations 165 165 165 165 
Note: The table reports ITT regressions. Outcome variables are defined as follows. Cons. PRIDE Loan: Loan 
usage on consumption, such as food, paying for drugs, school uniforms, etc. Inv. PRIDE Loan: Business-related 
loan use, in addition to investments in house and land, and repayment of other loans. The outcomes are 
regressed on a dummy taking the value one if the client was in a group where someone was offered training, an 
interaction term of training and female-only group, and finally a dummy taking the value one if the client is 
member of a female-only group. “Sum Tr*FemGr” is the linear combination of the two first independent 
variables.  Covariates include age, no. of children, no. of employees before the treatment and dummy taking the 
value one if the client was born in Dar es Salaam. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at 
the enterprise group level). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 15: Business practices and scale, female sample with interaction effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Marketing 
Index 
no covar. 
Marketing 
Index 
with covar. 
Record 
Keeping 
no covar. 
Record 
Keeping   
with covar. 
Profit+ 
no covar. 
Profit+ 
with covar. 
Indirect Training –0.016 –0.005 0.065 0.033 –0.048 –0.048 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.273) (0.279) (0.186) (0.178) 
Ind.Tr.*FemGr 0.057 0.043 –0.119 –0.136 –0.093 –0.217 
 (0.095) (0.098) (0.352) (0.356) (0.249) (0.247) 
Female Group –0.047 –0.037 –0.124 –0.122 –0.290 –0.211 
 (0.070) (0.071) (0.245) (0.258) (0.184) (0.183) 
Sum Tr*FemGr 0.041 0.037 –0.054 –0.102 –0.141 –0.265 
 (0.065) (0.070) (0.219) (0.202) (0.166) (0.167) 
Observations 165 165 165 165 164 164 
Note: The table reports ITT regressions.  Outcome variables are defined as follows. Marketing Index: A 
normalized index of three questions measuring change in marketing practices. Business Records: Number of 
different types of records (e.g. sales records, stocks records). Profit: Monthly operating profit (log). +Note that I 
have only 164 observations of profit, because of log transformation of one zero-observation (one client had 
closed down their businesses in 2009). The outcomes are regressed on a dummy taking the value one if the client 
was in a group where someone was offered training, an interaction term of training and female-only group, and 
finally a dummy taking the value one if the client is member of a female-only group. “Sum Tr*FemGr” is the 
linear combination of the two first independent variables.  Covariates include age, no. of children, no. of 
employees before the treatment and dummy taking the value one if the client was born in Dar es Salaam. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the enterprise group level). Cluster-robust standard 
errors in parentheses (clustered at the enterprise group level). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Abstract 
In a lab experiment, we investigate the effect of gender composition on group 
dynamics in a microfinance institution in Tanzania. We focus on three 
dimensions: i) a group’s ability to solve problems in practice, ii) a group’s 
willingness to accept risk, and iii) a group’s behavior with regard to a public 
good problem involving the possibility of free riding. We find that gender 
composition is of fundamental importance in understanding group dynamics. 
Female groups outperform male and mixed groups in problem solving, even 
though males at the individual level outperform females. Similarly, we find that 
female groups take more risk than male and mixed groups. However, we find no 
differences between female, male and mixed groups in the public good game. 
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Loan group composition should be based on gender; once you 
have a single man in a group of women there is a problem. 
(Female loan group member) 
1. Introduction 
Loan groups with joint liability are fundamental in many microfinance institutions (MFIs), 
and thus it is of great importance to understand their group dynamics. Typically, there are a 
number of joint decisions to be made in such loan groups, and the ability of the members to 
cooperate is therefore of great importance. Let us provide two examples. If someone in the 
group has a problem with their business and loan repayments, members must jointly decide 
how to deal with this. Similarly, when a member applies for a larger loan, the group members 
must jointly decide whether to accept the increased risk this creates for the group. If groups 
are unable to handle such issues in a positive manner, the progress of its members may be 
hampered and groups may dissolve, with clients eventually exiting the loan programs. 
It is well established that there are systematic gender differences in preferences. The social 
preferences of females are shaped more by the institutional settings than are those of males, 
and males are more competitive and less risk averse than females (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). 
These differences probably also play an important role in shaping group behavior. 
We therefore conducted a lab experiment with microfinance clients to analyze the impact of 
gender composition on group dynamics. 
Other studies of group composition suggest that gender composition may be decisive for 
group outcomes, although the evidence so far is somewhat mixed. For instance, Apesteguia et 
al. (Forthcoming), studying a large business game with students, show that teams formed by 
females are outperformed by both mixed and male teams, while Fenwick and Neal (2001), 
studying students’ group performance in a business strategy game, conclude that “groups may 
be more effective when women outnumber or equal men.” Dufwenberg and Muren (2006), in 
a lab experiment, also find that female-dominated groups perform differently, and conclude 
that groups are more generous and egalitarian when females are in the majority. Similarly, in 
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a development setting, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find that female leadership in village 
councils in India influences what kind of public goods are provided. 
Although many papers discuss gender issues and microfinance, surprisingly few papers 
discuss the role of gender composition in loan groups. One exception is Anthony and Horne 
(2003), who find that the number of females in a loan group correlates positively with 
individual repayment rates. However, to our knowledge, there are no experimental studies 
examining group composition and dynamics in a microfinance setting. 
We take the first step towards filling this gap by conducting a lab experiment in a 
microfinance setting, with three group games capturing important aspects of loan group 
dynamics. 
First, to examine whether gender composition is significant for solving group tasks, we 
conducted a problem-solving game with 10 multiple choice questions. Second, to examine 
how gender composition affects group decisions involving risk, we conducted a decision 
game in which the groups had to decide between a safe and a risky investment. Finally, 
another vital part of loan group dynamics is the members’ willingness to fulfill their loan 
obligations, which serves as a public good for the other members of the group. To examine 
the role of gender composition on public good provision and free riding, we conducted a 
standard public good game. 
Our experimental design is novel, because we measure practical cooperation and decision 
making by letting group members communicate freely face to face, whereas to the best of our 
knowledge, communication and decision making in previous economic lab studies on group 
behavior has taken place via computers or voting devices (such as, for instance, the studies of 
risk and groups by Ertac and Gurdal (2010) and Masclet (2009)). We believe this is an 
important feature of the design, because many situations in the real world are constrained and 
shaped by ability as much as willingness to cooperate. To draw causal inference from gender 
composition to group outcomes, we randomly allocated clients to mixed or single gender 
groups. 
Our study shows that the gender composition of groups is important in several respects for 
well-functioning microfinance loan groups. Our main findings are as follows. i) Clients of 
single gender groups benefit more from group cooperation in solving problems than those of 
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mixed groups. ii) Female groups benefit more from cooperation than male or mixed groups. 
iii) Female groups take more risk than male and mixed groups. iv) Single gender groups are 
no different from mixed groups in terms of public good contribution. Our findings from the 
risk game also indicate that female groups make decisions that are no different from average 
individual decisions, whereas mixed and male groups become more risk averse. 
Our findings also have important policy implications for MFIs. First, if they want to attract 
more males, they should consider offering individual loans, because males are apparently less 
able to cooperate in groups. Second, when clients exit, the remaining group members have no 
replacement and the MFI must fill the gap; attention should then be paid to the gender 
composition of the group. In particular, placing a male entrepreneur in a group of female 
entrepreneurs should be done with caution, as this may negatively affect group dynamics. The 
findings also suggest that group lending has a stronger appeal to women than to men, which 
may to some extent explain the female dominance of microfinance.35 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental context and design, 
and Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 discusses the results and presents findings from 
focus group discussions. Section 5 concludes and discusses policy implications. 
2. Experimental context and design 
The experiment was conducted in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in October 2010, at the Research 
on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) research institute. Participants were recruited from among 
microcredit clients of the Promotion of Rural Initiative and Development Enterprises (PRIDE) 
Tanzania, the country’s largest microfinance institution (MFI). The participants’ ages ranged 
from 21 to 68 years, with an average of 36 years. Of the 229 participants, 129 were female 
and 100 male. Around 75% had completed primary education, i.e. seven years of schooling. 
In a field experiment using microfinance clients from the same MFI, Berge (2011) finds that 
most clients run small-scale, nonregistered businesses with few employees, typically running 
small kiosks or restaurants, with a daily profit in the range of 10–20 US Dollars (USD). 
                                                            
35 Lafourcade et al. (2005) reports that 58–86% of microfinance clients are female, depending on the 
geographical area, and approximately 60% are in Africa. 
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The experiment was run as follows. We invited 309 PRIDE clients to a “Workshop on 
microfinance and entrepreneurship” where they would earn money, which 229 attended. We 
conducted six sessions with different clients, each lasting approximately three hours. The 
experiment was single blind. 
The sessions consisted of two parts: the first with individual games, and the second with 
group games. Individual games were those in which the participants made decisions on their 
own, without cooperation or influence from other participants. Group games refer to those in 
which participants made decisions together with other participants. In the individual part, 
participants played a problem-solving game, two decision-making games involving a risky 
investment, a dictator game, and finally a public good game.36 These games were played 
independently of each other. 
In the group part, participants were randomly allocated to single gender or mixed gender 
groups of four, where they worked together in a problem-solving game and a decision-making 
game.37 Because the participants were allocated to single gender or mixed gender groups on a 
random basis, we are able to establish causal relationships between gender composition and 
the outcomes of interest. 
The mixed groups consisted of two females and two males. If there were not enough 
participants to form a complete group of four, or the gender composition in the session did not 
fit the intended group composition, we still asked the participants to perform the task in the 
problem-solving and decision-making games, but these groups were excluded from the 
analysis. For this reason, we have data from 52 groups. Of these, 22 groups were mixed, 12 
were male, and 18 were female. The same groups were maintained for both the problem-
solving and decision-making games. 
In the individual problem-solving game, participants were asked to answer 10 multiple choice 
questions, both related to business and other topics. For each correct answer, the client 
                                                            
36 Instructions were given in Kiswahili. See the appendix for the English translation. 
37 When the participants entered the session, they received a tag with their ID number. A duplicate of this tag 
was placed in one of two boxes depending on the participant’s gender. In three of six sessions, we formed mixed 
gender groups by picking two identity numbers from a “Male” box and two from a “Female” box to form one 
group. In the other three sessions, we formed single gender groups by picking either four identity numbers from 
the “Male” box, or four from the “Female” box. 
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received 150 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS), approximately equal to 10 US cents.38 After this, the 
participants were randomly allocated to groups of four. Each group had to cooperate in 
answering 10 similar questions, with each group handing in one answer sheet, and where the 
only difference was that the payoff was multiplied by four to keep individual stakes constant. 
On the other hand, in the group game, participants were sitting around a table and could freely 
communicate with other members of their group.39 It was made clear that the amount the 
group earned would be shared equally among the group members. 
The risk games were conducted in a similar way, with identical individual and group games. 
Participants on an individual basis first had to make two decisions involving risk. In the first 
round, clients could either make a safe investment, from which they with certainty would 
receive 1000 TZS, or they could gamble and receive either 0 or 2500 TZS with equal 
probability. In the second round, the safe bet was increased to 1500 TZS, with the gamble 
being unchanged. 
In the group decision game, the same procedure was used for each round played, with the 
only difference being that the payoff was multiplied by four to keep individual stakes and 
incentives constant.40 Before they made the first decision, we communicated to the 
participants that the outcomes of the lotteries would be determined at the end of the session, 
by asking one of the participants to pick one of two envelopes, of which one contained a sheet 
of paper that read “LUCKY” and another that read “UNLUCKY.” 
Between the individual and the group games in problem solving and decision making, we 
conducted a dictator game and a public good game. In the dictator game, each participant 
received 1000 TZS that he/she could decide to keep for himself/herself or share with another 
PRIDE client. The dictator game was played twice. The dictators in one round were told that 
the recipient was a male in the session and in the other round that the client was a female.41 
In the public good game, we randomly allocated participants to either single gender groups or 
mixed groups of four.42 We ensured that participants were aware of their group composition, 
                                                            
38 As a comparison, a typical meal with rice, beans and meat costs approximately 1500 TZS. 
39 Each group had a question sheet and a pen to record answers directly on the sheet. 
40 We do not use the result from the second round of the risk games in our analysis because almost everyone 
chose the safe option (48 out of 52 groups). 
41 The order of the two dictator games was varied on a random basis to avoid systematic differences. 
42 Participants could see how the randomization was conducted. 
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but they could not identify who was in their group nor cooperate with their group members. 
Each participant received an endowment of 2000 TZS, which could either be kept in a private 
account or contributed to a group fund. Contributions to the group fund were doubled and 
then shared equally among the group members.43 
A few weeks after the experiment, we conducted focus group discussions (FGDs) with 
participants to better understand the dynamics of the groups in the lab experiment. We 
conducted five FGD sessions, two with male groups, two with female groups, and one mixed 
session, all consisting of 7–9 participants. The participants in mixed FGDs were randomly 
picked from participants in single gender FGDs. In total, 34 participants took part in the 
FGDs. 
3. Empirical strategy 
To estimate the impact of group composition on problem-solving, decision-making and public 
good contributions, we begin by estimating the following equation: 
1i i iY SingleGender              (1) 
iY  is the group outcome of interest, which is (i) the number of problems solved correctly, (ii) 
whether or not the group decided to gamble, and (iii) the total contributions by the group in 
the public good game. SingleGender is a dummy equal to one if the group consists of only 
males or females. Because clients are randomly allocated to either single or mixed gender 
groups, 1  has a causal interpretation as the impact of gender composition on the group 
outcome of interest. 
We also include a set of control variables, iX , in our regression to account for potential initial 
differences between the groups, by estimating: 
1i i i iY SingleGender      X         (2) 
                                                            
43 We explained the game thoroughly by conducting role-plays with research assistants as models. 
138 
 
Control variables include group averages of loan size in PRIDE, age, contributions in the 
dictator game, and years of membership of PRIDE, in addition to the number of literate 
members. In addition, when analyzing the impact of group composition on problem solving 
and decision making, we control for total individual knowledge and total number of risk 
takers in the group, respectively. 
Furthermore, because we wish to explore the impact of gender composition on group 
dynamics, we include the interaction term i iSingleGender Male and estimate: 
1 2i i i i iY SingleGender SingleGenderMale            (3) 
1  measures the difference in outcome of interest between female groups and mixed groups, 
while 1 + 2  captures the difference between male groups and mixed groups. However, we 
should interpret 2  with care. The coefficient measures the difference between male and 
female groups, and should not be given a causal interpretation, because an individual by 
definition cannot belong to both a male and a female group. Note that we do not need to 
include a term for male in our regression, because the constant term  captures mixed gender 
groups, while the remaining two terms capture female and male groups. Finally, we also 
included covariates when we estimated the differences between the groups: 
1 2i i i i i iY SingleGender SingleGenderMale        X     (4) 
We estimate (1)–(4) by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method when we study the impact of 
group composition on problem-solving and public good contributions. However, we use a 
probit model and report marginal effects when estimating whether groups decide to gamble or 
not, since this is a binary outcome. The results are similar to those obtained with OLS, but are 
rejected at slightly weaker significance levels. 
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4. Results 
In this section we present our findings. Contribution rates in the dictator games are reported in 
Table 1. Participants contributed an average of 440 TZS to males, and 452 TZS to females, 
from an allocation of 1000 TZS. However, this difference in contribution between males and 
females is not significantly different from zero. This also holds when we disaggregate by 
gender, and we see that contributions are very similar in all cases. We note that contribution 
rates are very high (40–47%). We use average contribution rates in the group as a control 
variable in the main games, which we present in the following subsections. 
4.1 Problem-solving game 
The left part of Figure 1 shows the distribution of number of correct answers for the 
individual problem-solving game for males and females, respectively. We observe that males 
are more often placed to the right of the graph, indicating that males achieve higher scores. 
Table 2 shows that males answer an average of 5.75 from a maximum of 10 correct answers, 
while females average 5.39 correct answers (t-test, p = 0.01). Examining the number of 
correct group answers in Table 3, the findings are reversed, with female groups achieving 
0.79 more correct answers than male groups (t-test, p = 0.05), and 0.9 more correct answers 
compared with mixed groups (t-test, p = 0.01). To further investigate this issue, we regressed 
gender group composition on the group score. 
When estimating equation (1), we see from Table 4, regression (1), that single gender groups 
(both male and female groups) achieved 0.59 more correct answers than mixed groups (p < 
0.05). In regression (2) we included control variables, and the impact of being in a single 
gender group becomes slightly stronger (p < 0.01). 
From regressions (1) and (2), we conclude that single gender groups perform better in the 
problem-solving test, indicating that the group dynamics are more positive in such groups. 
Furthermore, to explore whether this result is driven mainly by female or male groups, we 
include the interaction term SingleGenderGroup*Male in the regression, as reported in 
column (3). We observe that the overall effect of a single gender group from regressions (1) 
and (2) must clearly be driven by female groups performing significantly better than both 
male and mixed groups (significant at the 1% level), because they achieve 0.9 more correct 
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answers than the mixed groups (p < 0.01). As expected from the size of the coefficients, we 
also note that a joint significance test of SingleGenderGroup and SingleGenderGroup*Male 
reveals that the performance of male groups is not significantly different from that of mixed 
groups. In regression (4), we control for covariates, and again see that the estimates become 
slightly higher (p < 0.01). 
4.2 Risk and decision-making games 
On the left-hand side of Figure 2 and table 5, we see that males and females are identical at 
the individual level when it comes to taking risk, with 50% of both males and females 
choosing the risky option. However, from the group level on the right-hand side of Figure 2, 
we see that the percentage of risk takers is much lower for male and mixed groups; 25% of 
male groups and 18% of mixed groups choose to take risk compared with 44% of female 
groups. From the t-tests in Table 6, we also note that female groups are significantly less risk 
averse than mixed groups (significant at the 10% level). 
Table 7 reports regression results on the impact of group composition on a group’s risk 
decision. From regressions (1) and (2), we see that single gender groups are no more likely 
than mixed groups to choose the risky option. However, in regressions (3) and (4), we see that 
female groups are 25–26% more likely than mixed groups to choose the risky option.44 When 
covariates are included, the coefficient is significant at the 5% level, and when covariates are 
not included, the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, in regression (4), the 
coefficient of the interaction term Single Gender Group*Male is also significant but negative. 
This indicates that male groups take less risk than female groups. The number of risk takers in 
the group also significantly affects the group outcome. The more risk takers in a group, the 
more likely the group is to choose the risky option. 
Finally, t-tests show that female groups do not make significantly different risk decisions than 
the average number of individual decisions among group members, while male and mixed 
groups become significantly more risk averse in groups (significant at the 5% and 1% levels). 
This may indicate that female groups are more efficient in making joint decisions, in the sense 
that joint decisions are closer to their individual choices. 
                                                            
44 Ordinary least squares results are very similar, although slightly less significant. 
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4.3. Public good game 
Table 8 shows descriptive statistics at the individual level for the public good game. We see 
that participants contributed an average of slightly more than 50% of their endowment to the 
group fund. Females contributed an average of 1101 TZS from a maximum of 2000 TZS, 
while males contributed 943 TZS, but the difference is far from statistically significant. 
Furthermore, we note that contributions from participants in mixed gender groups are almost 
identical to those from participants in single gender groups. Table 9 reports regression results 
from the public good game that confirm the descriptive evidence in Table 8. Regressions (1) 
and (2) show that the average public good contribution is not influenced by whether the group 
was single gender or mixed.45 Furthermore, regressions (3) and (4) show that groups 
consisting of males do not contribute  significantly different than female or mixed groups. 
5. Discussion and findings from the focus group discussions  
We have shown that group composition is important for cooperation and decision making. At 
the individual level, we found that females are less able than males to answer correctly. 
However, when females are in groups with other females, we found that they outperform male 
and mixed groups. Surprisingly, total individual knowledge does not correlate with group 
performance, indicating that it is not the case that four clever people sitting together 
necessarily perform better. Female groups appear to have a more constructive group process 
than male groups, managing to utilize members’ capabilities. If this reflects a more general 
pattern for loan groups in microfinance, it may provide a reason why females find it more 
attractive to become members of microfinance institutions; they manage to cooperate well and 
can handle joint liability schemes in a constructive way. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the risk game. At the individual level, both for males 
and females, there was an equal split between participants choosing the risky and the safe 
option.46 When groups decided whether to gamble, we saw that in general they were more 
                                                            
45 Note that these groups are not identical to those used in the problem-solving and decision-making games. 
Furthermore, the sample in the public good game is not identical to the sample in the problem solving and 
decision making games. This is because we conducted two randomizations: one for the public good game, and 
one for the problem-solving and decision-making game. 
46 This is in contrast to previous research, which typically shows that females are more risk averse than males 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009). 
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likely than individuals to play safe, because only 15 of 52 groups chose the risky option. Ertac 
and Gurdal (2010) and Masclet (2009) found a similar pattern, and suggest that there is a 
cautious shift when people enter a group. Because females are often found to be more risk 
averse than males (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), one may believe that female groups would be 
hostile towards risk. However, this does not appear to be the case, because we find that female 
groups take more risk than male and mixed groups; nor do we find that female groups make 
significantly different choices than they do individually. Thus, female groups’ acceptance of 
risk may be a reason why females seem more comfortable than males with group loans. 
The finding that female groups perform better in the problem-solving game is probably 
related to the finding in the decision-making game. As female groups are more able to discuss 
and make common agreements in the problem-solving game, the fear of being blamed if the 
outcome of the gamble were negative may be less important. On the other hand, in the male 
and mixed gender groups, the atmosphere may be less inclusive, and groups may therefore 
more easily choose the nonrisky option if, for example, one member were reluctant to gamble. 
While we find that group composition may influence the ability of groups to cooperate and 
solve problems, we find no gender differences in public good contributions between the 
different groups, indicating that group composition does not influence willingness to 
cooperate. 
We had 34 participants in focus group discussions (FGDs) six weeks after the lab experiment, 
to shed further light on the results from the experiment. We conducted five sessions of FGDs, 
two with male groups, two with female groups, and one mixed session, all consisting of 6–9 
participants. Several interesting explanations were provided concerning the dynamics of 
cooperation in male and female groups. For instance, a male participant said: 
There is a Kiswahili proverb: “Two bulls do not stay in one house.” When you put 
men together there is always a tendency for them to disagree with each other, while 
females on the other hand would listen to each other. 
The quote reflects that it may be difficult for males to cooperate and listen to each other. 
Another male pointed out that women’s lack of confidence make them more open to others’ 
arguments: 
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Women lack self-confidence and this helps them to accept ideas and suggestions 
from other females. Unlike women, the self-confidence of males makes it difficult 
for them to accept ideas and suggestions from each other, and therefore they don’t 
perform well in a group. 
The response from a woman in another session indicates that females’ lack of confidence is 
related to their belief that they have a disadvantage in terms of education. Hence, working 
together is seen as a solution: 
 … I told you that women lack experience and education; therefore it is more useful 
for them to work in groups rather than independently. 
Discussing gender differences in groups, a male participant indicated the issue that males are 
expected to make decisions when together with females: 
Whenever males and females are mixed in a group, females tend to step aside, 
assuming that males are supposed to lead, even when the male is inexperienced in 
the relevant subject. 
On the other hand, a female participant said that it was not about females stepping aside, but 
that male arguments are heeded to a greater extent: 
In most cases a male’s suggestion, answer or idea is given more weight, thus 
women will tend to listen to men. 
The findings from the focus groups indicate that in mixed groups, females step aside and let 
the males decide. Females appear to lack self-confidence, and assume that males are more 
knowledgeable. Males, on the other hand, tend not listen to each other and do not want to 
reveal weakness. However, when females are grouped, they realize that four heads are better 
than one, and in our games this translates into discussing questions openly and firmly to find 
correct answers, and making decisions that suit the group. This indicates that females are 
dominated by males in group settings, thereby effectively constraining females from utilizing 
their knowledge and ability to cooperate. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
Our lab experiment with microfinance clients suggests that female groups gain more from 
cooperation and that males constrain females if they are together in a group. We have seen 
that female groups outperformed initially more knowledgeable males in the problem-solving 
game. Furthermore, groups consisting of females take more risk than other groups. 
Hence, gender composition is important for loan group dynamics, which may be important for 
social impact and the financial sustainability of microfinance institutions. When designing 
loan group schemes, MFIs should therefore take into account gender composition, because 
placing males in female groups may have negative effects. In addition, if an MFI wishes to 
attract more males, they should consider offering individual loans because it seems likely that 
males gain less from group cooperation than females. 
Our findings that females are more able to cooperate than males and that the presence of 
males disturbs the dynamics of female groups may also shed light on other important issues in 
related to microfinance and entrepreneurship. 
First, the findings may partly explain why microfinance is dominated by females, because the 
loan group setting is often one of few places where females can be together and cooperate 
without male interference. 
Second, they may also shed light on the apparent difficulty of raising female profits and 
incomes, because females seem less able to utilize their competencies and skills in social 
contexts involving males. This may be particularly true in settings with huge gender 
segregation, such as Tanzania. 
Finally, our study may also contribute more general insight into the literature on gender 
differences in willingness to compete. Males have previously been found to be more eager to 
compete than females (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), while our study suggests that females are 
more able team players. This may therefore suggest that females are more attracted to 
environments where cooperation is more important than eagerness to compete. 
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Figure 1: Gender, gender composition and problem solving 
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Figure 2: Gender, gender composition and decision making 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of dictator game 
N Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
Total 
Amount sent to Male Recipient 229 439.96 246.57 500 0 1000
Amount sent to Female Recipient 229 452.40 256.61 500 0 1000
Difference  –12.44 (17.37)
Sent by Male  
Amount sent to Male Recipient 100 440.50 245.74 500 0 1000
Amount sent to Female Recipient 100 425.50 232.85 500 0 1000
Difference  15.00 (22.02)
Sent by Female  
Amount sent to Male Recipient 129 439.53 248.17 500 0 1000
Amount sent to Female Recipient 129 473.25 255.72 500 0 1000
Difference  –33.72 (25.59)
This table reports the contribution in the Dictator Game. Participants were asked to share 1000 TZS with 
another person. Each participant had to make this decision twice: with a male and with a female. In the first part 
of the table, we report the average contribution of all participants to male and female recipients. In the second 
part, we report average contributions by males, and in the third part, we report average contributions by 
females. Inference from t-test. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 2: Number of correct answers, individually 
N Mean  Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Total 208 5.39 1.70 6 1 9 
Male  92 5.75 1.79 6 1 9 
Female 116 5.11 1.57 5 1 8 
Difference Male–Female 0.64*** (0.23)
This table reports the number of correct answers in the problem-solving game in the 
individual round. There were 10 multiple choice questions in the game. Inference from t-
test. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 3: Number of correct answers, by group 
N Mean  Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Total 52 7.88 0.87 8 6 10 
Male  12 7.66 0.65 8 7 9 
Female 18 8.44 0.78 8 7 10 
Mixed  22 7.54 0.86 7.5 6 9 
Difference Male–Mixed 0.12 (0.28)   
Difference Female–Mixed 0.90*** (0.26)   
Difference Male–Female –0.78** (0.27)    
This table reports the number of correct answers in the problem-solving game at the group stage. There were 10 
multiple choice questions in the game. Inference from t-test. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors 
in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Regression results for problem solving 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Correct Answers 
no covar. 
Correct Answers 
with covar. 
Correct Answers 
no covar. 
Correct Answers 
with covar. 
Single Gender Group 0.59** 0.78*** 0.90*** 1.07*** 
 (0.24) (0.22) (0.26) (0.25) 
Single Gender Group * Male   –0.78*** –0.75*** 
   (0.26) (0.27) 
Total Knowledge Endowment  0.03  0.06 
  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Average Loan Size  0.13*  0.10 
  (0.07)  (0.08) 
Average Years with MFI  0.09  0.08 
  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Average Age  –0.00  –0.02 
  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Number of Literate Members  0.21  0.07 
  (0.29)  (0.28) 
Average Altruism  0.10  0.09 
  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Constant 7.55*** 4.33*** 7.55*** 5.13*** 
 (0.18) (1.58) (0.18) (1.40) 
Observations 52 52 52 52 
Notes: This table shows results from OLS estimations. The dependent variable is the number of questions that a 
group is able to answer correctly (from 10 questions). The unit of observation is the group (which consists of 
four members). Single Gender Group is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a group is single gender 
and zero if the group is mixed. Single Gender Group*Male is an interaction term to capture male groups. Total 
Knowledge Endowment measures the total number of correct answers in the individual knowledge test by all the 
members in the group. Average Loan Size measures the average loan size of the four members of the group. 
Average Years with MFI is the average number of years of membership of PRIDE among the four members of 
the group. Number of Literate Members counts the number of members who are able to read. Average Altruism 
measures the average contribution from the group members in the dictator game. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 5: Proportion of risk takers, individually 
N Mean  Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Total 208 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Male  92 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Female 116 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Difference Male–Female 0.00 
This table reports the proportion of participants who choose to take risk individually. 
Participants were assigned the value of one if they took risk, and zero if they did not. 
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Table 6: Proportion of risk takers, by group 
N Mean  
Std. 
Dev. Median Min Max 
Total 52 0.29 0.46 0 0 1 
Male  12 0.25 0.45 0 0 1 
Female 18 0.44 0.51 0 0 1 
Mixed  22 0.18 0.39 0 0 1 
Difference Male–Mixed 0.07 
Difference Female–Mixed 0.26* 
Difference Male–Female –0.19 
This table reports the proportion of groups that chose to take risk in the decision-making 
game. Participants were assigned a value of one if they took risk, and zero if they did not. 
Inference from Mann–Whitney test. *z < 0.1, ** z < 0.05, ***z < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 7: Regression results for risk and decision making 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Risky Investment 
no covar. 
Risky Investment 
with covar. 
Risky Investment 
no covar. 
Risky Investment 
with covar. 
Single Gender Group 0.18 0.20* 0.25* 0.26*** 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) 
Single Gender Group * Male   –0.16 –0.20*** 
   (0.13) (0.08) 
Number of Risk Takers  0.30***  0.30*** 
  (0.08)  (0.09) 
Average Loan Size  –0.07  –0.07 
  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Average Years with MFI  0.07  0.06 
  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Average Age  –0.00  –0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Number of Literate Members  –0.11  –0.12 
  (0.14)  (0.11) 
Average Altruism  0.02  –0.00 
  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Observations 52 52 52 52 
Notes: This table shows the marginal effects after probit estimations. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the group decides to take a risk, and zero otherwise. The unit of observation is 
the group (which consists of four members). Single Gender Group is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if a group is single gender and zero if the group is mixed. Single Gender Group*Male is an interaction term to 
capture male groups. Number of Risk Takers counts the number of members in the group who take risk 
individually. Average Loan Size measures average loan size of the four members of the group. Average Years 
with MFI is the average number of years of membership of PRIDE among the four members of the group. 
Number of Literate Members counts the number of members who are able to read. Average Altruism measures 
the average contribution from the group members in the dictator game. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics of public good game 
N Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
Total 
Contribution to Public Fund 208 1027.88 815.13 1000 0 2000
By Gender 
Males’ Contribution to Public Fund  96 942.71 848.74 1000 0 2000
Females’ Contribution to Public Fund  112 1100.89 781.60 1000 0 2000
Difference  –158.18 (113.11)
By Group Composition 
Contribution in Mixed Groups 88 1018.18 844.39 1000 0 2000
Contribution in Same Gender Groups 120 1035.00 796.49 1000 0 2000
Difference  –16.82 (114.67)
This table reports the contribution in the public good game. Participants were asked to distribute 2000 TZS into 
either a private fund or a public fund. The first part shows average contribution by all participants. The second 
part reports the contributions when we disaggregate by gender, and the third part reports the contribution when 
we disaggregate by group composition. Inference from t-test. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 9: Regressions results for social preference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Average PG 
Contribution 
no covar. 
Average PG 
Contribution 
with covar. 
Average PG 
Contribution 
no covar. 
Average PG 
Contribution 
with covar. 
Single Gender Group 16.82 49.93 95.05 111.58 
 (121.87) (118.88) (129.10) (128.85) 
Single Gender Group * Male   –180.54 –144.05 
   (137.23) (124.42) 
Average Altruism  71.89**  71.29*** 
  (27.04)  (26.47) 
Average Loan Size  –1.57  –6.19 
  (30.52)  (30.38) 
Average Years with MFI  23.50  22.90 
  (33.99)  (32.94) 
Average Age  14.13  13.13 
  (12.54)  (13.48) 
Number of Literate Members  185.30  181.83 
  (181.88)  (184.53) 
Constant 1018.18*** –934.11 1018.18*** –855.47 
 (101.52) (899.36) (102.55) (944.00) 
Observations 52 52 52 52 
Notes: This table shows results from OLS estimations. The dependent variable is the average of group members’ 
contributions into the public fund in the public good game. The unit of observation is the group (which consists 
of four members). Single Gender Group is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a group is single gender 
and zero if the group is mixed. Single Gender Group*Male is an interaction term to capture male groups. 
Average Altruism measures the average contribution from the group members in the dictator game. Average 
Loan Size measures average loan size of the four members of the group. Average Years with MFI is the average 
number of years of membership of PRIDE among the four members of the group. Number of Literate Members 
counts the number of members who are able to read. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix: Lab instructions 
 
[Before the session starts] 
[Moderator ensures that Overhead 1 (“Karibuni”) is on when participants enter room] 
[MODERATOR ensures that the participants follow the rules of conduct after entering the 
room]  
[When Moderator receives a sign from the Head of the Experiment (LHE), he starts reading the 
introduction] 
[The session] 
[Introduction] 
Welcome. We appreciate your willingness to participate in this session, which I will lead. In this 
session you will be asked to make some economic choices, and you will earn money based on your 
choices and your performance. 
The results from this session will be used in a research project on microcredit and entrepreneurship. It 
is therefore very important that all of you follow certain rules of conduct. You are not allowed to talk 
to any of the other participants during the session. If you have any questions or need any help, please 
raise your hand and one of us will assist you. All cell-phones must be turned off and put away If 
someone does not follow these instructions, we will have to ask him or her to leave the workshop. 
If you need to go to the bathroom during the workshop, please raise your hand. Importantly, do not 
leave the room without permission. 
 [MODERATOR proceeds when HE gives signal]  
The session will be conducted under anonymity. It will not be possible for the other participants or 
anyone else, except for the researchers, ever to find out what choices you make, and hence what you 
earn in the session. This session consists of three activities.  
First, you will be asked to perform several individual activities. Second, you will be asked to make 
decisions a group were other group members are anonymous. Finally, you will be asked to work 
together with other participants to solve problems.  
The activities are completely independent, which means that your performance in one activity has no 
impact on what happens in the other activities. The estimated time of the whole session is 
approximately three hours. 
In each activity, you can earn money. You will not be informed about how much money you have 
earned until the end of the session. The payment to you is organized as follows. The researchers keep 
track of how much money you earn throughout the session. At the end of the session, they prepare an 
envelope containing the money you have earned, where they will ensure that it is impossible to 
identify the amount of money inside the envelope simply by looking at it. This envelope will be 
handed over to you in private when you leave the session. 
153 
 
It is very important that you remember your desk number and report it in each activity, as the desk 
number is your identity in this experiment. 
[Individual Game: Knowledge test] 
We will now explain the first activity in this session. We will shortly ask you some general questions. 
The questions are grouped in two topics: health and nutrition and business knowledge.   
In total there are 10 questions, and for each question you can choose between four different answers. 
Your job is to tick off the correct answer. You should only tick off one alternative. If you tick off more 
than one alternative, your answer will be considered incorrect. We now provide an example of how 
you should do this.  
[MODERATOR reads Overhead KT] 
Your job is to tick off one of these answers. The correct answer is XXXX. Hence, if you tick off any 
of the other numbers, your answer is incorrect. In particular, you should never tick off more than one 
alternative. 
For each correct answer, you are paid the fixed rate of 150 Tsh. 
We will now hand out the questions but please do not turn over the page before you are told to do so. 
[MODERATOR waits until the first sheet has been handed out to all participants. He continues 
when HE gives signal] 
You can now turn over the sheet. First, now and for all sheets that you receive, make sure that you fill 
in your correct desk number, so that we can pay you correctly. We will now read question by question, 
and then for each question you tick off what you think is the correct answer.  
Is this clear to everyone? If not, then please raise your hand and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR proceeds when HE gives signal] 
I'll now start reading the first question. 
[MODERATOR reads the questions on the sheet] 
[LHE gives a signal 15 seconds after Moderator has finished reading each question and the 
alternative answers; this applies for both topics] 
You have now answered all the questions on this topic. My assistants will collect the sheets. 
[Individual Risk Game] 
We now move to the second part of the workshop, where you also can earn money, but in a different 
way. Let’s explain in more detail. 
First, we will simply give each of you 1000 Tsh. This is your money. You may decide to add it to the 
total amount of money that you are paid at the end of the session, or you may decide to take a risk. If 
you take risk, then you can be lucky or unlucky. If you are lucky, you will get 2500 Tsh instead of 
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1000 Tsh. If you are unlucky, you lose the 2500 Tsh and nothing is added to your final payment from 
this situation. 
Here is how we decide whether you have been lucky or unlucky. When everyone has made their 
choice of whether to take the risk or not, we prepare two pieces of paper; one piece with the word 
LUCKY, the other piece with the word UNLUCKY. 
[F illustrates the procedure, as Moderator reads] 
We will then put them into two identical and empty envelopes, and the envelopes will be placed in this 
bowl. Thus it will be impossible for any of us to identify which envelope contains the word LUCKY. 
We will randomly select one of you to make the draw of one of the envelopes at the end of the 
workshop. If this envelope contains the word LUCKY, we will pay 2500 Tsh to those of you who 
chose to take risk. However, if this envelope contains the word UNLUCKY, those who chose to take 
the risk will not receive anything in this situation. Thus, it is equally likely that those who take the risk 
are LUCKY or UNLUCKY. 
For those of you who chose the certain payment, the outcome of this draw does not affect your pay. In 
any case, you receive the certain payment of 500 Tsh. 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
[MODERATOR shows Overhead 5 and reads it. He then continues] 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make the choice of whether to risk your 1000 Tsh 
or keep them. Please do not turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
You should now make the choice of whether to risk your 1000 Tsh or keep them. 
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal] 
We will now collect the sheet. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We remind you that the determination of LUCKY and UNLUCKY outcome will be done at the end of 
the experiment.  
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now we move on to a new situation. Again, we will give you some money, this time 1500 Tsh. This is 
your money. You may decide to add it to the total amount of money that you are paid at the end of the 
session, or you may decide to take a risk. If you take the risk, then you can be lucky or unlucky. If you 
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are lucky, you will get 2500 Tsh instead of 1500 Tsh. If you are unlucky, you lose the 1500 Tsh and 
nothing is added to your final payment from this situation 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
[MODERATOR shows Overhead 7 and reads it. He then continues] 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make the choice of whether to risk your 1500 Tsh 
or keep them. Please do not turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
You should now make the choice of whether to risk your 1500 Tsh or keep them. 
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal] 
We will now collect the sheet. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now all of you have made choice, at the end of the workshop, we will determine the outcome with the 
same procedure as have been explained.  
 [MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
 
 [MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
When all of you have made your choices, at the end of the workshop, we will determine the outcome 
with the same procedure as have been explained.  
You have now completed this particular part of this session.  
We now proceed to another activity.  
 [Individual Game: Dictator Game] 
We now move to the next activity of the workshop, where you also can earn money, but in a different 
way. Let’s explain in more detail. 
We will start a pair-activity. Each of you will be assigned to another person. This person is also a 
PRIDE client. You and this person will receive 1000 TZS in total.  
You will not be told who you will be paired with, and your partner will not know your identity. You 
will only know one characteristic of your partner. This characteristic will be given to you privately 
in the sheet that we will hand out to you.  
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You shall decide how to share the money between you and your partner, and you can send from 0 up 
to 1000 TZS to your partner with 100 as increment.  
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
[MODERATOR shows Overhead DG and reads it. He then continues] 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We will now hand out a sheet where you have to make decisions how much to share for your partner. 
In the sheet, you can see one characteristic of your partner. Please do not turn over the sheet until 
you are told to do so. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
You should now make the decision.  
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal] 
We will now collect the sheets. 
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal] 
We will now do this one more time. You will be paired with another PRIDE client. You and this 
person will receive 1000 TZS in total. 
As in the previous activity, you will not be told who you will be paired with, and your partner will not 
know your identity. You will only know one characteristic of your partner. This characteristic will be 
given to you privately in the sheet that we will hand out to you.  
You shall decide how to share the money between you and your partner, and you can send from 0 up 
to 1000 TZS to your partner with 100 as increment.  
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We will now hand out a sheet where you have to make decisions how much to share for your partner. 
In the sheet, you can see one characteristic of your partner. Please do not turn over the sheet until you 
are told to do so. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
You should now make the decision.  
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal]  
We will now collect the sheets. 
 [Group Game: Public Good Game] 
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We now move to the next activity of the workshop, where you also can earn money, but in a different 
way. In this particular activity, you will play in a group. This mean, both your decision and other’s 
decision will matter for the sum of money that you earn in this activity.  
Your group member will be randomly selected, and there are 4 persons in each group. We create the 
group by taking the number from two different boxes randomly. You will not know who your group 
members are, only the researcher will know who group with whom. 
 
To be read ONLY in SAME GENDER TREATMENT  
Let’s create the groups before we proceed with the information about the activity.  Here, there are two 
boxes, one consists of desk number of male participants, and the other consists of desk numbers of 
female participants. Now, we will make groups of 4 persons that consists of people with the same 
gender. Now, my assistant will take 4 desk numbers from male box, this is the first group. Then, we 
proceed to take 4 numbers from female box, then this is second group. We will proceed to the next 
group. 
In case the remaining desk numbers in the box are not enough to create a group, the participants with 
these desk numbers will do different task.  
 
To be read ONLY in MIXED GENDER TREATMENT  
Let’s create the groups before we proceed with the information about the activity.  Here, there are two 
boxes, one consists of desk number of male participants, and the other consists of desk numbers of 
female participants. Now, we will make groups of 4 persons that consists of two female and two male 
participants. Now, my assistant will take 4 desk numbers from male box, this is the first group. Then, 
we proceed to take 4 numbers from female box, then this is second group. We will proceed to the next 
group. 
In case the remaining desk numbers in the box are not enough to create a group, the participants with 
these desk numbers will do different task.  
 
Now, we will proceed with the information about how you can earn money in this session.  
You are now in a group of 4 persons with 3 other members in this room.  Each group member receives 
2000 TZS and will decide how to allocate this 2000 TZS. You can either put these 2000 TZS   into 
your private fund or you can invest them fully or partially into group fund. Each TZS you do not 
invest into the group fund will automatically remain in your private fund and will be added into your 
payment.  
The total group fund from 4 people’s contribution will be doubled and shared equally to all 
participants.   
 
To make you easily understand this particular activity, I will ask my assistant to visualize this 
activity.  
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First example: 
Now, I give each person 2000 TZS. This is their money; they will decide whether they want to keep it 
for private, or to contribute to group fund.  
Now, you see that all of them do not contribute. This mean each of them keep 2000 for their private 
fund. Then, the group fund remaining zero. This mean they will not get money from the group fund. 
So, everyone will get 2000 from this activity and can bring home this 2000 TZS.   
Because this was an example, I am taking the money back from them. 
Let’s try second example: 
As before, I give each of group members 2000 TZS. This is their money; they will decide whether 
they want to keep it for private, or to contribute to the group fund.  
Now you see that all of them contribute 2000 TZS. Then the total group fund will be 8000. Then we 
will add 8000 more to the group fund, so, group fund become 16000. We share the money equally to 
all participants. Then, you see that each participant  receives :::::::::::::::::::4000 from group fund.  
As you see they contributed all their money to the group fund, hence their private fund is zero, 
because,  now, they receive 4000 from  group fund, the total of private fund and their share from group 
fund that they can  bring home is 4000 TZS.   
Because this was an example, I am taking the money back from them. 
Let’s try third example: 
As before, I give each of group members 2000 TZS. This is their money; they will decide whether 
they want to keep it for private, or to contribute to the group fund.  
Now you see that member 1 contribute 0, member 2 contribute 500, member 3 contribute 1500 and 
member 4 contribute 2000. 
This mean, member 1 has 2000 in his private fund, member 2 has 1500 TZS in his  private fund, 
member 3 has 500 in his private fund, and member 4 has nothing left in his private fund.  
Now let’s calculate how much money is in the group fund. You see that this is 4000. Then, we will 
double it with the meaning that we add 4000 more to the group fund, so now, it becomes 8000. Then 
we divided them equally to 4 participants. 
NOW YOU WILL RECEIVE A SHEET WHERE YOU SHOULD WRITE HOW MUCH 
EVERYONE WILL RECEIVE FROM THE GROUP FUND.  
PLEASE WRITE DOWN NOW, and my assistant will check whether you have finished to answer.  
As everyone has answered, let us calculate how much everyone get. Now, you see that everyone have 
receive the same amount of money. Please write it down, how much everyone get in your sheet.  
My assistant now will collect the answer.  
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So, now, you see that everyone receive 2000 from the group fund.  
Now, let’s us calculate how much money each member has.  
Member one has 2000 in the private fund, and receive 2000 from the group fund, the total is 4000 that 
he/she can bring home.  
Member two has 1500 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 35000 
that he/she can bring home.  
Member 3 has 500 in private the fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 2500 that 
he/she can bring home.  
Member 4 has 0 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 2000 that 
he/she can bring home.  
Now, let us redo the same example so that it becomes clearer for you.  
Now I am taking the money back from them. 
Now we redo the example 
As before, I give each of the group members 2000 TZS. This is their money; they will decide whether 
they want to keep it for private, or to contribute to the group fund.  
Now you see that member 1 contribute 0, member 2 contribute 500, member 3 contribute 1500 and 
member 4 contribute 2000. 
This mean, member 1 has 2000 in his private fund, member 2 has 1500 TZS in his private fund, 
member 3 has 500 in his private fund, and member 4 has nothing left in his private fund.  
Now let’s calculate how much money is in the group fund. You see that this is 4000. Then, we will 
double it with the meaning that we add 4000 more to the group fund, so now, it becomes 8000. Then 
we divided them equally to 4 participants. :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::. 
So, now, you see that everyone receive 2000 from the group fund.  
Now, let’s us calculate how much money each member has.  
Member one has 2000 in the private fund, and receive 2000 from the group fund, the total is 4000 that 
he/she can bring home.  
Member two has 1500 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from the group fund, the total is 35000 
that he/she can bring home.  
 
Member 3 has 500 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from group fund, the total is 2500 that he/she 
can bring home.  
Member 4 has 0 in the private fund, and receives 2000 from group fund, the total is 2000 that he/she 
can bring home.  
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Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
[Control Questions] 
Now, let’s try more examples, but now, you should calculate by yourself and write down the answers.  
Now, we will hand out a sheet with examples.  
CHECK CONTROL SHEET QUESTIONS 
THIS IS CONTROL QUESTIONS INCLUDING THE P-EXPERIMENT 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, my assistant will collect the sheet. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, we finish with examples and we hope you have fully understood the activity. We proceed with 
the main activity whereas you should make decision which will determine how much money you will 
bring home as this is a group activity, remember that the decisions of the other members in your group 
will also determine how much money you bring home.  
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
[Group Game: Public Good Game C-experiment] 
Remember now you have been grouped with 3 different participants in this room; 
[for SAME GENDER TREATMENT]  who have the same gender as you  
[for MIXED GENDER TREATMENT]  one of them have similar gender as you, and the two others 
are people with opposite gender.  
The group for participants with these particular number:__________ is not full. So, these persons 
should do other task. My assistant will come to you and explain the special task. 
Now, we give each of you 2000 TZS. Then you must decide how much you want to contribute to the 
group fund and how much you want to keep for private fund.  As you remember from our previous 
examples the money that you keep in the private fund will be added directly to the amount that you 
bring home, and money that you put in the group fund will be doubled and shared equally to all 4 
members in the group.   
[MODERATOR shows Overhead CE and reads it. He then continues] 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make decision how much you will put into the 
group fund. Please do not turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. 
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[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, considering the examples that have been shown before, how much do you want to contribute to 
the group fund and how much do you think the other participants will contribute? Please write it down.  
[MODERATOR reads the sheet and continues when HE provides a signal] 
We will now collect the sheet.  
Thank you for your cooperation up to this point.  
We now proceed to other activity.  
 
[GROUP GAME] 
Now, we will form you into a group of four entrepreneurs. You will be allowed to talk with your 
group member in this session. Remember you are only allowed to talk with your group members, and 
not other participants. Further, please remember to talk in a tone such that only your group member 
can hear you. If anyone breaks this rule, we must kindly ask you to leave the classroom.  
In this activity, you can earn money in a group. But then you will share the money equally among the 
members.  
Now, let’s determine the group.  
Similar with before, we will randomly assign you into group. But, now we will announce who group 
with whom, and we will kindly ask you to take note of your group number. After everyone gets a 
group, we want you to sit together in your group. My assistant will let you know where each group 
should sit.  
[GROUP COOPERATION 1: KNOWLEDGE TEST] 
Now, you will do activity in a group. The first activity will be answering questions. In this 
activity, your group will solved questions that similar with previous individual questions. You can 
discuss among you what the right answers are.  
There are 10 questions that a group should answer. For each right answer, the group will receive 600 
TZS. Total amount received by the group will be distributed equally to each member. If your group 
answer the whole questions right, your group will receive bonus 5000 TZS. The time limits to answer 
the questions are 8 minutes.  
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
[MODERATOR shows Overhead KT and reads it. He then continues] 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
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We will now hand out the sheet of questions that should be solved in your group. Please do not turn 
over the sheet until you are told to do so. You will have 8 minutes to work on these questions, if you 
still working when we said time is over, your group will be disqualified. After 7 minutes, you will be 
notified that there is 1 minute left.  
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, you can start working.  
[F give a signal that 7 minutes have been passed; Moderator announce the reminder] 
[F give a signal that 8 minutes have been passed; Moderator announce that participant should 
put down their pen, and if they are still working then their group will be disqualified.] 
Now you should stop working and put your pen at the table.  
My assistant will collect the sheet.  
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
[Cooperation Game: Group Risk Game] 
We now move to the next group activity of the workshop, where the group also can earn money, but in 
a different way. The money that the group earns will be shared equally among the member.  
You will be allowed to talk with your group member in this session. Remember you are only allowed 
to talk with your group members, and not other participants. Furthermore, please remember to talk in 
the tone that only your group member can hear your sound. If anyone breaks this rule, we must kindly 
ask you to leave the classroom.  
[RISK GAME 1] 
In this activity, you as a group of four people will receive 4000 TZS.  
This is your money. Your group may decide to add it to the total amount of money that you are paid at 
the end of the session, or your group may decide to take a risk. 
If your group chooses not to take risk, the amount of 4000 Tsh will be divided equally among member 
of the group, meaning that each member will receive 1000 Tsh.  
If your group takes the risk, then your group can be lucky or unlucky. If your group is lucky, your 
group will get 10000 Tsh instead of 4000 Tsh. This money will then be shared equally to each 
member, so that each member will receive 2500 TZs. If your group is unlucky, your group loses the 
4000 Tsh and nothing is added to each member’s final payment from this situation. 
As this is a group activity, you must make decision in the group. One group only allowed making one 
decision.  
 [RISK GAME 2] 
Now, we will redo the same game. Now we move on to a new situation. Again, you as a group of four 
people will receive some money. This time is  6000 TZS. 
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This is your money. Your group may decide to add it to the total amount of money that you are paid at 
the end of the session, or your group may decide to take a risk. 
If your group chooses not to take risk, the amount of 6000 Tsh will be divided equally among member 
of the group, meaning that each member will receive 1500 Tsh.  
If your group takes the risk, then your group can be lucky or unlucky. If your group is lucky, your 
group will get 10000 Tsh instead of 6000 Tsh. This money then will be shared equally to each 
member, so that each will receive 2500 TZs. If your group is unlucky, your group loses the 6000 Tsh 
and nothing is added to each member’s final payment from this situation. 
As this is a group activity, you must make decision in the group. One group is only allowed to make 
one decision.  
We then will determine whether you will lucky or unlucky using the same procedure as before. 
Is this understood? If there are any questions please raise your hands now and we will assist you. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
On the overhead, we summarize the choice you have to make. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
We will now hand out the sheet where you have to make the decision of investing or not. Please do not 
turn over the sheet until you are told to do so. You have 4 minutes to make the group decision.   
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, please mark whether your group wants to invest or keep the money 
We will now collect the sheet. Please remember to write your group number and each member desk 
number in the sheet. 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
[DETERMINING THE RESULT] 
 [MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
Now, we will determine the result of your investments.  
Now, we will take the result for the investment choice one, when you decide to put 1000 in risky 
project or not. If it turns out of lucky, and the one who choose to invest will receive 2500.  
And then… it is…. 
Now, we will take the result for the investment choice two, when you decide to put 1500 in risky 
project or not. If it turns out of lucky, and the one who choose to invest will receive 2500.  
And then… it is…. 
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Now, we will take the result for the group investment choice 1, when your group decides to put 4000 
in the risky project or not. If it turns out of lucky, and the group who choose to invest will receive 
10000, meaning that each member will receive 2500.  
And then… it is…. 
Now, we will take the result for the group investment choice 2, when your group decides to put 6000 
in risky project or not. If it turns out of lucky, and the group who choose to invest will receive 10000, 
meaning that each member will receive 2500.  
And then… it is…. 
Your payment from investment choice will be determined according to this result.  
Our assistant will now prepare the payment.  
 
 
[SOCIAL NETWORK SURVEY] 
[MODERATOR waits until HE provides a signal] 
In the meantime, we will call each of your desk number and please stand up if your number is being 
called. Further, we will ask the others to raise their hand, if they have known this person outside the 
the workshop. 
While we are waiting for the assistants to prepare the payments which you have earned, we would like 
to offer you [for morning session:] LUNCH; [for afternoon session:] REFRESHMENT. After the 
LUNCH/REFRESHMENT we will call your desk number one by one and give you an envelope with 
your payment and the signed sheet for your participation compensation.  
[MODERATOR shows Overhead THANK YOU] 
We would like to thank you all for participating in this session. Your input will be most valuable for 
our research project on microcredit and entrepreneurship. May we ask you not to discuss this session 
with others before the end of this week, since we will arrange further sessions with other microcredit 
clients the coming days. Please leave the pen on your desk when you leave the room. Again, thank you 
for your participation in this workshop.  
 
 
